THE 

NORTHERN  CONFEDERACY 

ACCORDING  TO  THE  PLANS  OF  THE 
"ESSEX  JUNTO ^'  1796-1814 


bD    Lfi2 


A    DISSERTATION 

Presented  to  the 

Faculty  of  Princeton  University 

IN  Candidacy  for  the  Degree 

OF  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


BY 
CHARLES  RAYMOND  BROWN 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

PRINCETON 

london:  humphrey  milford 

oxford  university  press 


THE 

NORTHERN  CONFEDERACY 

ACCORDING  TO  THE  PLANS  OF  THE 
''ESSEX  JUNTC  1796-1814 


A   DISSERTATION 

Presented  to  the  / 

Faculty  of  Princeton  University 
IN  Candidacy  for  the  Degree 
OF  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


BY 

CHARLES  RAYMOND  BROWN 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

PRINCETON 

london :  humphrey  milford 

oxford  university  press 


t 


■^^ 


:^ 


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Published  October,  1915 

Accepted  by  the  Department  of  History  and  Politics 
May  1913 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     Origin  of  the  ''Essex  Junto" 7 

Opposition  to  John  Adams'  Administration  and  the 
Breaking  of  the  FederaHst  Party 10 


Plans  for  Secession  1803-1804 , 25 

The  Embargo  of  1807  and  the  Junto's  Plans  for  a 

British  Alliance    ." 46 

Intrigues  During  the  War  of  1812  76 

The  Hartford  Convention   102 

Bibliography  118 


324612 


PREFACE 

The  ''Essex  Junto"  when  applied  to  a  little  band  of  politi- 
cians in  Essex  County,  Massachusetts,  by  Governor  Hancock 
in  1778,  carried  little  significance  outside  of  local  politics.  It 
very  soon  grew,  however,  to  have  a  tremendous  influence  in 
national  affairs. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  work  to  follow  the  ''Essex  Junto," 
as  an  active  political  body,  in  their  endeavors  to  control  Na- 
tional legislation  and,  by  skillful  misrepresentation  of  the  mo- 
tives of  the  party  in  power,  to  arouse  the  New  England  people 
to  the  point  of  dissolving  the  Union  and  forming  an  indepen- 
dent Confederacy.  I  have  attempted  to  show  the  true  influence 
of  this  movement  upon  the  national  history  of  that  period; 
and  have,  in  some  instances,  found  cause  to  give  a  new  coloring 
to  familiar  historical  events  on  account  of  the  influence  of  the 
Junto. 

That  there  has  never  been  a  monograph  written  upon  this 
subject  is  due  largely  to  the  scarcity  of  available  sources.  In 
many  instances  the  entire  correspondence  of  men  intimately 
connected  with  the  Junto  has  been  purposely  or  otherwise  de- 
stroyed; and  the  fact  that  there  was  no  regular  organized 
movement  has  forced  me  to  write  this  monograph  almost  en- 
tirely from  the  letters  which  have  been  preserved.  There  are 
no  secondary  sources  of  any  merit  upon  the  subject.  The  most 
valuable  histories  covering  the  period  merely  mention  the  "Es- 
sex Junto,"  and  are  of  little  value  in  treating  the  subject.  With 
letters  as  my  principal  documents,  and  such  fragmentary  bits 
of  evidence  as  I  have  been  able  to  collect,  it  has  been  a  difficult 
but  an  interesting  subject. 

Under  the  guidance  and  kind  assistance  of  Dr.  R.  M.  Mc- 
Elroy,  this  Thesis  has  been  prepared  to  complete  the  require- 
ments for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy  in  Princeton 
University. 

C.  R.  B. 

Princeton  University, 
Princeton,  N.  J. 


CHAPTER  I 

Origin  of  the  ''Essex  Junto" 

Almost  every  historian  who  has  mentioned  the  ''Essex  Junto" 
at  all,  has  credited  John  Adams  with  the  distinction  of  having 
first  applied  that  name  to  a  radical  wing  of  the  FederaHst  party 
which  centered  in  Essex  County,  Massachusetts,  and  which  af- 
terwards figured  so  largely  in  shaping  the  destiny  of  the  party. 
This  is  not  true.  The  name  originated  a  quarter  of  a  century 
before  Adams  applied  it  and  under  entirely  diflFerent  circum- 
stances. There  was  no  such  thing  as  party  and  party  organiza- 
tion, as  we  understand  those  terms  today,  when  "Essex  Junto" 
was  applied  to  a  number  of  Essex  County  politicians.  There 
were  Whig  views  and  Tory  views  but,  before  the  Revolution, 
American  political  parties  had  not  taken  any  definite  form. 

About  the  time  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  the 
formation  of  a  constitution  became  a  matter  of  much  moment 
in  the  Colonies  which  had  just  become  states.  In  Massachu- 
setts, in  June,  1776,  it  was  proposed  in  the  General  Court  that 
a  constitution,  or  some  form  of  government,  be  prepared  and 
presented  to  the  people.^  It  was  thought  better,  however,  to 
refer  the  matter  somewhat  more  directly  to  the  people;  and  the 
House  of  Representatives  recommended  that  the  towns  em- 
power their  delegates,  at  the  next  election,  to  form  a  constitu- 
tion. Many  towns,  perhaps  most,  complied  with  this  request, 
and  early  in  1778  a  constitution  was  agreed  upon  by  the  Gen- 
eral Court,  and  presented  to  the  people.  It  was  rejected  by 
them  by  a  large  vote. 

There  were  severaP  reasons  offered  for  rejecting  the  con- 
stitution but  the  strongest  one  was  that  the  proposed  constitu- 
tion had  carefully  avoided  a  strong  form  of  government  and 
that  the  Executive  was  a  mere  cipher.  The  people  were  thus 
divided  over  the  form  of  government  which  would  be  the  most 
satisfactory  to  Massachusetts ;  one  class  desired  a  constitution 

^  Parsons'  "Chief  Justice  Parsons,"  p.  45. 
'Ibid.,  p.  46. 


which  would  place  the  governing  power  largely  in  the  hands 
of  the  people ;  the  other  class  believed  that  a  strong  centralized 
form  of  government  would  be  most  desirable  and  that  the  peo- 
ple should  not  be  the  real  governing  force.  To  the  men  of 
the  latter  class  the  proposed  Constitution  was  wholly  worthless 
and  they  succeeded  in  defeating  it.^  The  leaders  of  the  opposi- 
tion were  from  Essex  County*  and  believed  in  a  strong  central 
government.  Here  is  the  identical  line  upon  which  our  first 
two  national  parties  began  their  struggle. 

A  meeting  of  these  men  took  place  in  Essex  County,  in  April, 
1778.  By  whom  it  was  called,  we  do  not  know  but  it  seems  to 
have  been  attended  by  twenty-seven  delegates.^  It  originated 
in  Newburyport  and  there  began  its  work  but  later  adjourned 
to  Ipswich.  At  the  latter  place  a  pamphlet  was  prepared  and 
ordered  published  which  contained  eighteen  distinct  articles 
stating  the  leading  objections  to  the  proposed  Constitution.® 
Its  long  title  is :  "The  Result  of  the  Convention  of  Delegates 
holden  at  Ipswich,  in  the  County  of  Essex,  who  were  deputed^ 
to  take  into  consideration  the  Constitution  and  Form  of  Gov- 
ernment proposed  by  the  Convention  of  States  of  Massachu- 
setts Bay."  It  is  most  familiar  under  its  short  title,  "The  Essex 
Result." 

Upon  that  body  of  men  who  prepared  this  pamphlet  and 
supported  a  strong  central  government,  John  Hancock  fastened 
the  title  "Essex  Junto"  in  1778.  This,  therefore,  was  the  first^ 
appearance  of  that  name  in  American  politics. 

The  following  year  in  September,  1779,  a  convention^  was 
called,  and  met  at  Cambridge,  to  frame  a  constitution.  A  com- 
mittee of  four,  Samuel  Adams,  John  Pickering,  Caleb  Strong 
and  William  Cushing,  was  directed  to  draw  up  a  Constitution 

'  Parsons'  "Chief  Justice  Parsons,"  p.  47. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  47. 

'^  Ibid.,  p.  49.  Documents  give  number  of  delegates  and  say  that 
Parsons  called  the  Essex  Convention. 

*  Ibid.,  appendix,  p.  359,  pamphlet  printed  in  full. 

^  "Deputed"  would  lead  us  to  believe  that  they  were  officially  ap- 
pointed or  elected ;  they  were,  however,  evidently  a  self  chosen  body, 
representing  twelve  towns  of  the  County  of  Essex. 

'  Colonel  Pickering  quotes  Chief  Justice  Parsons  as  saying  that 
"Essex  Junto"  had  been  applied  before  the  Revolution.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  this  was  true,  however. 

'J.  S.  Barry's  "Hist,  of  Mass.,"  vol.  3,  p.  176. 

8 


and  Bill  of  Rights.  John  Adams  was  later  added  to  the  com- 
mittee and  was  the  real  drafter  of  the  document  although  he 
was  not  from  Essex  County.  The  Constitution/'^  as  presented 
by  this  committee,  was  adopted  and  it  gave  more  power  to  the 
Executive. 

These  men  of  Essex  County  who  later  dominated  the  Fed- 
eralist party  were  descendants  of  those  who,  in  the  dark  days 
of  1629,  had  followed  Endicott  into  the  wilderness.  They  were 
strong,  honest,  and  in  many  cases  of  an  almost  reckless  cour- 
age. But  their  intellectual  vigor  and  clear  perception  were  in 
many  instances  combined  with  great  mental  narrowness  and 
rigidity.  When  time  brought  new  political  forces  and  expan- 
sion of  ideas  the  old  Puritan  stock  could  not  bend  to  meet  the 
changes.  They  resisted^  therefore,  as  long  as  they  could  and 
submitted  only  when  resistance  was  no  longer  possible.^^  In 
1644  the  Essex  men  had  turned  Wirthrop  and  Dudley  out  of 
office  as  Federal  Commissioners,  and  replaced  them  with  Haw- 
thorne and  Bradstreet,  both  of  Essex  County. ^^  Palfrey,  in  his 
History  of  New  England,  says,  ''A  local  Caucus  (not  yet  so 
called)  arranged  a  combination  to  dictate  the  proceedings  of 
the  government ;  that  those  of  Essex  procured  a  court  made  up 
of  Deputies  of  the  several  shires  and  propounded  divers  things 
without  communicating  them  to  the  other  shires."  "Two  hun- 
dred years  ago,"  says  Palfrey  "Essex  men  were  thought  to  be 
aspiring  to  rule  the  colony,  as  fifty  years  ago  an  'Essex  Junto' 
was  cried  out  against  for  its  alleged  combination  to  rule  the 
Commonwealth."^^ 

Of  such  material  was  the  "Essex  Junto"  composed  which 
held  political  sway  in  Massachusetts  and  which  had  to  be 
reckoned  with,  if  not  obeyed,  for  nearly  a  half  century  in 
national  affairs.^* 

There  have  been  many  attempts  to  define  "Essex  Junto"  but 

^'F.  N.  Thorpe,  "Constitution  and  Charters,"  House  Documents,  vol. 
3,  59th  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  1888. 

"H.  C.  Lodge's  "Life  of  Cabot,"  p.  18. 

"  Palfrey's  "Hist,  of  New  England,"  vol.  2,  p.   156. 

""Ibid.,  p.  157. 

"  The  men  who  composed  the  Junto  were  Timothy  Pickering,  Caleb 
Strong,  Jonathan  Jackson,  Triston  Dalton,  Theophilus  Parsons,  George 
Cabot,  Fisher  Ames,  the  Lowells,  Benjamin  Goodhue,  and  Stephen 
Higginson,  all  from  Essex  County.  To  these  we  will  add  others  who 
were  associated  with  the  Junto. 


no  one  has  been  very  successful.  Mr.  S.  E.  Morrison  says:  *'I 
take  it  that  the  Essex  Junto,  from  1800  to  181 5  should  be 
defined  as  the  Massachusetts  Federalist  leaders  who  opposed 
John  Adams  in  1800,  who  condoned  the  Chesapeake  outrage 
and  who  squinted  at  secession  in  1814."^'^  It  can  best  be  defined 
after  we  have  finished  our  investigation. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  the  influence  and  activities  of 
the  ''Essex  Junto"  were  not  to  be  long  confined  to  a  single 
county  nor  to  a  single  state.  The  Junto  was  the  dominating 
force  in  the  Federalist  party  for  many  years ;  it  had  followers 
very  early  from  the  other  New  England  states,  and  later  from 
several  states  outside  of  New  England.  They  were  not  always 
as  ardent  and  dogmatic  as  the  old  members ;  nevertheless,  they 
were  of  the  same  political  faith  and  must  be  included  under 
the  title  "Essex  Junto"  in  our  narrative.  This  monograph  will 
not,  therefore,  have  very  great  concern  with  the  Junto  in  local 
affairs  but  rather  with  its  influence  upon  national  questions. 

^^  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  July  1912,  p.  794. 


10 


CHAPTER  II 

Opposition  to  John  Adams'  Administration  and  the 
Breaking  of  the  Federalist  Party 

After  the  Constitution  was  adopted  and  Washington  became 
President,  the  conflicting  tendencies  observed  in  the  struggles 
over  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  reappeared.  The  parties 
under  Washington  were  known  as  the  Federalist  and  the  Re- 
publican. It  had  sometimes  been  supposed  that  these  parties 
are  identical  with  the  Federalist  and  the  Anti-Federalist  of 
1787-88.  This  is  not  true.  To  be  a  Federalist  in  1787  and  1788 
was  to  favor  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution.  To  be  a  states' 
rights  Anti-Federalist  was  to  oppose  it.  But  to  be  a  Federalist 
in  1791  was  to  favor  the  adoption  of  Hamilton's  financial 
measures  and  a  broad  construction  of  the  Constitution. 

The  fundamental  difference  between  the  parties  during  the 
constitutional  debate  and  its  adoption  was  as  to  where  the 
political  power  should  center.  Mr.  Hamilton  believed  a  strong 
central  government  with  the  power  to  govern  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  aristocrats  to  be  most  satisfactory  for  any  nation ; 
he  had  neither  sympathy  for  the  states  rights  doctrine  nor  faith 
in  the  integrity  of  the  masses  of  the  people,  and  therefore, 
labored  for  a  form  of  government  bordering  strongly  on  that 
of  a  Monarchy.  Thus  the  term  ''Well  born"  was  a  contemptu- 
ous name  given  to  the  Federalists. 

On  the  other  hand  were  the  states'  rights  Anti-Federalists 
who  dreaded  as  the  greatest  of  calamities  the  vesting  of  large 
power  in  a  central  authority.  The  Anti-Federalists  believed 
that  the  central  authority  should  draw  its  power  from  the  states 
and  from  the  people.  We  should  notice,  then,  that  these  two 
parties  of  1787- 1788,  represent  merely  two  tendencies,  the  cen- 
trifugal and  the  centripetal. 

Hamilton's  financial  policy  and  the  broad  construction  of  the 
Constitution  in  1791,  determined  Jefferson  to  form  a  strong 
party  to  resist  Hamilton's  program.  Having  witnessed  the  out- 
break of  the  French  Revolution,  Jefferson  was  eminently  quali- 
fied to  become  the  leader  of  such  an   opposition  party,  and 

II 


because  of  the  predilection  of  its  leaders  for  things  French,  the 
new  party  was  called  "Democratic-Republican."  Thus  the  two 
parties,  Federalist  and  Anti-Federalist,  took  their  final  form 
in  the  "Federalist"  and  the  "Republican"  parties. 

The  next  few  years  brought  vexing  questions  of  foreign 
relations,  which  caused  the  two  parties  to  drift  further  apart. 
"Citizen  Genet"  landed  in  1793,  the  very  day  on  which  Wash- 
ington issued  his  Neutrality  Proclamation,  and  set  to  work 
rather  after  the  fashion  of  a  liberator  than  of  a  diplomat.^  In 
pursuance  of  secret  instructions,  he  not  only  presumed  upon 
the  force  of  the  existing  treaties,  but  attempted  to  draw  the; 
United  States  into  the  war,  so  as  to  make  it  her  common  cause. 
Money,  men,  and  privateers  from  America,  he  especially  reck- 
oned upon.  The  party  led  by  Jefferson  was  very  enthusiastic 
over  the  French  cause.  It  is  said  that,  at  a  banquet  given  Genet, 
they  all  filed  around  the  table  sticking  their  knives  into  the  head 
of  a  roasted  pig  in  celebration  of  the  beheading  of  Louis  XVI. 
This  being  their  attitude  they  exerted  themselves  to  enlist 
French  aid  against  England. 

The  Federalists,  having  less  feeling  for  French  Democracy, 
repudiated  this  bold  and  presumptuous  attitude.  Washington 
had  already  issued  his  Proclamation,  and  the  feeling  became 
intense.  Insults  were  heaped  upon  the  head  of  the  venerable 
Washington  by  the  followers  of  Jefferson,  and  the  result  was 
that  the  Republicans  gave  their  sympathy  to  the  French  cause 
and  the  Federalists  gave  theirs  to  the  English.  Here,  therefore, 
is  the  beginning  of  the  "British  Faction"  and  the  "French  Fac- 
tion" and  also  the  beginning  of  that  party  strife  which  lasted 
as  long  as  the  Federalist  party.  From  this  time  the  Essex  Junto, 
leading  the  "British  Faction,"  began  its  attacks  upon  the  "Ja- 
cobins" or  Jeffersonians. 

In  1793  Great  Britain  issued  two  of  her  Orders  in  Council,^ 
by  virtue  of  which  all  vessels  loaded  with  bread  stuff,  bound 
for  any  place  occupied  by  the  French 'armies,  were  considered 
good  prizes.  This  was  almost  an  unbearable  hardship  to  Amer- 
ican shipping.  Hamilton,  therefore,  advised  a  special  mission 
to  Great  Britain,  and  communicated  his  plan  to  that  portion  of 
the  Junto  then  in  the  Senate.  The  Eastern  Senators,  Cabot, 
Ellsworth,  Strong  and  King,  then  held  a  conference,  endorsed 

'  Schouler's  "Hist,  of  U.  S.,"  vol.  2,  p.  265. 
''  Perkins'  "Late  War,"  pp.   12-14. 

12 


the  mission  and  appointed  Ellsworth  to  confer  with  Washing- 
ton.^ He  was  instructed  to  state  that  Hamilton  was  the  person 
from  whom,  in  every  point  of  view,  a  successful  issue  to  this 
effort  was  most  to  be  expected.*  Ames,  although  more  hostile 
to  the  English  than  his  eastern  brothers,  wrote:  ''Who  but 
Hamilton  would  perfectly  satisfy  all  our  wishes?  He  is  ipsi 
agmen."^  This  was  probably  true  from  a  Junto  point  of  view, 
but  not  from  that  of  the  Republicans. 

Washington  avowed  his  preference  for  Hamilton,  but  in- 
timated doubts  arising  from  the  prejudices  which  had  been  ex- 
cited against  him.^  The  same  idea  was  repeated  to  Goodhue, 
''You  know,"  said  Washington,"  whom  I  wish, — but  for  the 
clamor  they  have  raised  against  him."^  Randolph,  Secretary  of 
State,  urged  that  such  an  appointment  would  be  unwise,^  and 
Monroe,  even  ventured  on  a  letter  against  the  choice  of  Ham- 
ilton.^ John  Jay  was  nominated,  as  a  compromise,  and  nego- 
tiated a  treaty^°  which  failed  to  satisfy  both  parties,  although  it 
was  ratified  by  the  Senate  and  signed  by  the  President.  It 
is  not  necessary  for  our  purpose  to  discuss  this  treaty,  which 
failed  to  adjust  many  of  the  points  which  the  United  States 
held  as  grievances. ^^ 

The  Junto  had  failed  to  obtain  the  appointment  for  Hamil- 
ton but  in  Congress  it  had  gained  adherents  and  succeeded  in 
ratifying  the  treaty,^^  although  it  seems  strange  that  Eastern 
Senators  should  have  been  willing  to  make  Great  Britain  con- 
cessions when  their  commerce  was  the  chief  sufferer.  Ratifica- 
tion took  place  behind  closed  doors  and,  when  the  contents  of 
the  treaty  were  made  known,  the  country  was  inflamed  as  by 
fire.  The  constituents  of  this  group  of  Senators  held  meetings 
in  opposition  as  did  the  whole  country.     Hamilton  and  the 

'  Hamilton's  "Hist,  of  the  Republic  of  the  U.  S.,"  vol.  5,  p.  532. 

*  Hamilton's  "Republic,"  vol.  5,  p.  532. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  532. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  533.  Washington  referred  to  those  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives who  were  hostile  to  the  Angloman  party. 

''Ibid.,  p.  533.  Jefferson,  Randolph  and  Monroe,  were  responsible 
for  the  appointment  of  Jay. 

"Washington's  Writings,  vol.   10,  appendix,  p.  558. 

*  Ibid.,  appendix,  p.  558.    Monroe's  letter  to  President  Washington. 
^"Jay  Treaty.    Am.   State  papers,  vol.    i,  p.  520. 

^  Hamilton's   Works,   vol.    7,   p.   723.    Hamilton    said,    "The    Treaty 
upon  the  whole  was  satisfactory."     Refer  to  text  of  Jay's  Treaty. 
"Schoulers'  "Hist,  of  U.  S.,"  vol.  2,  p.  309. 

13 


Junto  were  left  alone.  The  Federalist  party  lost  a  good  deal 
of  local  strength,  which  the  Republicans  gained;  and  Great 
Britain  went  on  with  her  tyranny. 

In  the  year  1796,  in  dread  of  the  possibility  of  the  election 
of  Jefferson,  and  the  establishment  of  a  Southern  and  pro- 
French  domination  over  the  United  States,  an  appeal  was  made 
to  the  people  of  Connecticut,  preparing  them  for  and  pointing 
to  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  'The  Northern  States,"  it  urged, 
"can  subsist  as  a  Nation,  as  a  Republic  without  any  connection 
with  the  Southern."^^  There  was  a  series  of  articles  published 
in  the  Hartford  Courant,  over  the  signature  of  Pelham,  urging 
the  dissolution  of  the  Union.^*  In  letters  of  Oliver  Wolcott, 
Lieutenant  Governor  of  Connecticut,  to  his  son,  then  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  the  idea  was  repeatedly  advanced.  "If,"  says 
Wolcott,  November  21,  1796,  "the  French  arms  continue  to 
preponderate,  and  a  governing  influence  of  this  Nation  shall 
continue  in  the  southern  and  western  countries,  I  am  confident, 
and  indeed  hope,  that  a  separation  will  soon  take  place."^^ 
"Such  an  event,"  he  says,  November  28,  1796,  "will  be  un- 
happy for  us ;  but  much  less  so,  than  to  be  under  the  govern- 
ment of  a  French  agent. "^*^  "I  sincerely  declare,"  he  added  a 
few  days  later,  "that  I  wish  the  Northern  States  would  separate 
from  the  Southern,  the  moment  that  event  (the  election  of 
Jefferson)  shall  take  place."^'' 

This  plan  of  disunion,  thus  rife  in  Connecticut  in  1796,  may 
not  improbably  be  regarded  as  the  germ  of  that  which  appeared 
at  Washington,  in  1803-04,  at  Boston  in  1808-09,  ^^^  which 
showed  itself,  for  the  last  time,  during  the  War  of  1812,  being 
disclosed,  in  the  Hartford  Convention  of  1814.  Whether  or  not 
this  was  the  sowing  of  the  seed  which  sprang  up  at  the  above 
mentioned  places  we  have  no  evidence.  It  is  true,  however, 
that  Connecticut  was  always  represented  in  the  movements  of 
the  Junto  which  had  its  base  in  Massachusetts.  That  is  suffi- 
cient for  our  purpose. 

After  the  election  of  John  Adams,  the  United  States  was 
forced  to  face  her  former  ally,  France,  in  a  still  more  serious 

''  Randall's   "Jefferson,"   vol.  3,   pp.  634-5. 
"  Randall's    "Jefferson,"   vol.   3,   pp.  634-5. 

^■'Quoted  in   Plumer's   "Life  of  Plumer,"  p.  283.     Almost  all  of  the 
Wolcott   papers    have    been    destroyed. 
'"Plumer's  "Life  of  Plumer,"  p.  283. 
''Ibid.,  283. 

14 


difficulty,  known  as  the  X.  Y.  Z.  affair.  In  this  controversy  the 
Federalist  party  received  a  blow  from  which  it  never  recovered. 
France,  disgusted  and  jealous  of  our  recent  treaty  relations 
with  England,  set  upon  our  commerce  in  retaliation  for  what 
she  termed  injustice,  and  it  became  necessary  to  open  treaty 
negotiations  with  her.  Adams,  therefore,  sent  a  commission 
consisting  of  Marshall,  Gerry,  and  Pinckney,  to  negotiate  with 
France  upon  the  situation.  .  .  .  This  was  an  unfortunate  ap- 
pointment and  it  gave  the  members  of  the  Junto  an  excellent 
opportunity  to  ridicule  the  new  President  who  was  as  much  a 
Republican  as  a  Federalist.  None  of  these  men,  except  perhaps 
Gerry,  were  in  sympathy  with  the  French  Revolution  and,  of 
course,  their  appointment  was  not  agreeable  to  the  French. 

Hamilton  said,  ''To  be  useful,  it  is  important  that  a  man 
agreeable  to  the  French  should  go.  Either  Mr.  Jefferson  or 
Mr.  Madison  should  be  on  the  committee,  but  neither  should 
go  alone.*'  ^^  In  this  Hamilton  was  right  and  the  appointments, 
being  somewhat  contrary  to  the  advice  and  wishes  of  the  lead- 
ing Federalists,  further  antagonized  them,  and  led  finally  to 
open  opposition  to  the  Administration.  This  is  a  familiar  bit 
of  history  and  we  need  only  state  that  the  commission  was  not 
received,  but  was  approached  by  certain  unofficial  gentlemen, 
named  in  the  official  despatches  merely  by  the  letters  X,  Y,  and 
Z.  The  object  of  these  unofficial  visits  was  purely  to  get  money 
from  the  United  States.  Their  demands,  therefore,  were  dis- 
regarded, and  yielding  nothing.  Pinckney  and  Marshall  were 
soon  ordered  to  leave,  while  Gerry  was  invited  to  remain.  That 
he  did  so  was  not  to  his  credit. 

When  the  X.  Y.  Z.  despatches  were  published,  the  Junto, 
especially  those  members  of  it  who  were  in  the  Cabinet,  was 
quick  to  take  advantage  of  the  feeling  produced  against  France 
and  began  to  work  up  a  war  spirit  in  New  England.^^  Wolcott, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  wrote  Cabot  asking  him  to  use  his 
influence  with  the  people  of  Massachusetts  against  France.^^ 
To  his  request  Cabot  replied :  'T  hope  from  my  very  soul  that 
the  President  will  enjoy  the  immortality  which  is  due  the  man 
who  dares  do  right  when  the  whole  world  does  wrong.     I 

^'  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  214. 

"Political  Writings  in  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  pp.  581-600.     This  will  give 
a  partial  estimate  of  the  agitation  which  took  place  in  New  England^ 
^Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  117. 

15 


readily  accept  the  apostleship  and  will  use  your  discourse  as  if 
it  were  my  own.  My  zeal  has  already  produced  a  letter  of  two 
sheets  which  will  be  transcribed  as  a  circular  to  a  half  dozen 
friends.  I  will  quote  no  authorities  to  infidels  and  the  faithful 
won't  need  them.''-^  Mr.  Cabot  would  have  been  dangerously 
near  the  truth  if  he  had  said :  "when  the  whole  Junto  does 
wrong."  The  war  spirit  in  Congress  was  due  largely  to  the 
energy  of  these  men,  and  in  1798,  preparations  were  begun  for 
mihtary  defense.  Washington  was  made  Commander  in  Chief 
and  chose  his  Major  Generals  as  follows:  Hamilton  first  Ma- 
jor General,  Pinckney  second,  and  Knox  third. -^ 

President  Adams  disapproved  of  Washington's  ranking  of 
the  Major  Generals  and  attempted  to  place  Knox  above  Ham- 
ilton. By  this  action  the  President  brought  the  whole  Junto 
forward  with  remonstrances,-^  and,  but  for  the  timely  inter- 
vention of  Washington,  the  party  might  have  been  hopelessly 
split  at  this  juncture.  As  it  was  the  existing  breach  between 
Adams  and  his  party  was  only  broadened.  There  was  really 
no  good  reason  for  the  action  of  President  Adams  in  this  mat- 
ter. Washington  had  agreed  to  assume  the  duties  of  Com- 
mander-in-Chief only  on  condition  that  he  be  allowed  to  choose 
his  staff,  and  extreme  aversion  to  Hamilton  seems  to  have  been 
the  only  basis  for  Adams'  conduct. 

The  first  schism  in  the  Cabinet  took  place  at  Trenton,  New 
Jersey,  early  in  1799.^*  The  trouble  arose  from  the  President's 
desire  to  send  a  second  mission  to  France  to  attempt  further 
negotiations.  The  particular  expressions  which  passed  on  this 
occasion  are  not  preserved;  but,  from  Mr.  Hamilton's  Public 
Letter-^  we  are  informed  of  the  principal  causes.  Such  an 
effort  was  considered  by  the  Cabinet  to  be  inconsistent  with  the 
honor  and  dignity  of  the  Nation.  Pickering,  Wolcott  and  Mc- 
Henry,  remonstrated  with  Aadms  but  with  little  success.   Judg- 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  120. 

'^  Ibid.,  p.   177. 

^Pickering  wrote  Cabot  confidentially  saying:  'The  object  of  this 
letter  is  to  engage  you  in  this  matter  in  such  a  way  as  you  and  one 
or  two  confidential  friends  (say  Higginson  and  Ames)  shall  deem  most 
eligible  to  prevail  on  the  President  to  acquiesce  in  the  first  arrange- 
ment." 

^"John     Woods,  "Administration  of  J.  Adams,"  p.  223. 

*A  public  letter  in  which  he  denounces  President  and  which  we 
will  examine  later. 

16 


ing  from  a  letter-^  from  Pickering  to  Rufus  King,  it  is  clear 
that  the  greater  part  of  their  strength  was  thrown  into  opposi- 
tion on  this  measure.  He  says :  ''The  second  mission  to  France 
was  deprecated  by  all  enlightened  Federalists, — especially  in 
New  England.  I  know  personally  that  your  friends  Cabot, 
Ames,  Higginson,  Ellsworth,  and  Quincy  objected  to  it."^^ 

This  opposition  determined  Adams  to  make  the  nominations 
without  further  Cabinet  consultation.  He  had  no  alternative  if 
he  wished  to  send  the  mission.  So  on  the  26th  of  February, 
1799,  he  nominated  Oliver  Ellsworth  of  Connecticut,  Patrick 
Henry  of  Virginia,  and  Wm.  Vans  Murry  of  Maryland,  Envoys 
Extraordinary,  and  drew  up  his  own  instructions.  Henry  de- 
clined, and  Wm.  R.  Davie  of  North  Carolina,  was  substituted. 

This  friction  in  the  Cabinet  put  Mr.  Adams  in  a  very  difficult 
position.  He  believed  further  negotiation  to  be  the  safest  pol- 
icy for  the  country ;  but  the  Junto  desired  a  war  with  France. ^^ 
The  policy  adopted  was  undoubtedly  the  wisest  but  it  resulted 
in  the  common  ruin  of  President  and  party,  by  giving  the  Junto 
a  broad  foundation  upon  which  to  attack  him.  The  fact  that 
a  portion  of  the  party  held  erroneous  views,  and  that  the 
President,  in  opposition  to  these  views,  carried  through  a  peace 
policy,  is  not  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  consequent  defeat 
of  the  Federalists.  "The  causes  of  defeat  in  this  instance  lay 
deeper,  and  were  inherent  not  only  in  the  party,  but  also  in  the 
character  of  the  prominent  men."^^  There  were  too  many  lead- 
ers in  the  party ;  all  of  them  were  unbending  and  all  dogmatic 
to  a  greater  or  less  degree.  This  policy  of  Adams,  the  wisdom 
of  which  cannot  be  doubted,  was  held  as  an  absurdity  by  most 
of  the  dominant  Federalists.  It  was  unfortunate  also  that 
two^°  of  the  most  ardent  supporters  of  the  war  policy  held  the 
highest  offices  in  the  Administration. 

We  cannot  doubt  that  Hamilton  and  all  of  the  Junto  saw 

^  Pickering  Mss.,   November  7,   1799. 

^  Combine  these  with  Hamilton  and  the  Cabinet  Junto  members  and 
we  have   the   leaders   of  the   opposition. 

^  Adams  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  270. 

^Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  193. 

^  Pickering  and  McHenry,  Secretaries  of  State  and  of  War.  Wol- 
cott  was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Pickering  was  a  man  as  eminent- 
ly self-centered  as  Adams  and  perhaps  had  a  greater  imagination,  for 
he  truly  believed  that  he  was  the  whole  Cabinet.  He  not  only  aspired 
to  lead  his  party  but  also  the  President. 

17 


clearly  that  peace  and  strong  neutrality  were  for  the  best  inter- 
ests of  this  country,  but  they  were  trying  to  restrain  "Jacobism" 
and  hold  the  reins  of  the  Government,  at  the  same  time ;  which 
policy  gradually  undermined  their  strength.  ''We  m.ust  all 
agree,"  says  Pickering  to  Higginson,  ''in  the  one  great  object 
of  securing  FederaHsts  for  the  two  first  magistrates  of  the 
Union ;  that  all  predilections  which  might  thwart  this  view  must 
be  laid  aside."^^ 

However  great  may  have  been  Adams'  mistakes  his  position 
was  now  almost  intolerable  for  his  highest  ministers  were  work- 
ing against  his  policies.  He  was  somewhat  relieved,  therefore, 
when  McHenry  asked  permission  to  resign  his  office  as  Secre- 
tary of  War.^-  His  resignation  was  accepted  by  the  President 
who  immediately  requested  Pickering  to  resign  his  office  as 
Secretary  of  State.  The  Secretary  refused  to  resign  and  was 
dismissed  by  the  President.  Pickering  immediately  wrote  Ham- 
ilton of  his  dismissal  and  added :  'T  have  been  contemplating 
the  importance  of  a  bold  and  frank  exposure  of  Adams ;  per- 
haps I  may  have  it  in  my  pjpwer  to  furnish  some  facts. "^^ 

Adams'  greatest  mistake  in  connection  with  these  men  was 
his  retaining  them  in  office  so  long.  It  was  the  duty  of  a 
President  to  replace  officers  who  directly  oppose  his  leadership, 
not  because  the  President  may  always  be  sound  in  his  opinions 
and  the  offending  officers  unsound,  but  because  no  President 
can  hope  to  accomplish  anything  when  there  is  a  direct  and  bitter 
opposition  among  his  advisers.  A  "Kitchen  Cabinet"  working 
in  harmony  is  to  be  preferred  to  one  of  intellectual  giants  pull- 
ing at  either  end  of  the  string,  as  subsequent  history  has  dis- 
closed. Adams  received  a  round  of  biting  abuse  from  the  other 
Junto  members  who  added  this  to  their  growing  stock  of  griev- 
ances. Sedgwick  wrote  Hamilton  in  this  connection  saying: 
"Every  tormenting  passion  rankles  in  the  bosom  of  that  weak 
and  frantic  old  man,  but  I  have  good  reasons  to  believe  that 
Pickering  and  McHenry  have  been  sacrificed  as  a  peace  offering. 
But  no  decided  measures  should  be  taken  until  I  see  you."^* 
The  cause  of  the  sacrifice  of  these  men  upon  an  altar  of  peace, 

="  Pickering  Mss.,   December  23,    1799. 

''  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  442.— McHenry  to  Hamilton  :  "I  re- 
quested the  President's  permission  to  resign  the  office  of  Secretary 
of  War  May  6,  1800." 

"  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  443- 

**  Ibid.,  p.  442. 

18 


according  to  Junto  estimates,  was  the  desire  of  Adams  for 
Southern  favor  in  the  approaching  election.  There  may  have 
been  an  element  of  truth  in  this,  because  the  Junto  were  rapidly 
ruining  his  chances  at  the  North.  The  sacrifice  caused  much 
excitement  in  their  ranks  and  they  used  it  as  evidence  against 
him  later.^^ 

Adams  seems  never  to  have  suspected  any  disloyalty  on  the 
part  of  Oliver  Wolcott,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  He  was 
not  nearly  so  boisterous  and  disturbing  a  man  as  Pickering, 
yet  in  a  very  guarded  way  he  furnished  more  information  than 
any  other  man  for  Hamilton's  denunciation  of  the  President. 
He  wrote  Hamilton,  July  7,  1800,  that  he  would  readily  furnish 
any  statements  desired;  that  the  affairs  of  the  government 
would  not  only  be  ruined  but  the  Federalist  party  disgraced 
if  it  permitted  Adams  to  be  re-elected.^^  He  admitted  in  the 
same  letter  that  many  prominent  Federalists  were  being  dis- 
credited, and  suggests  that  an  apology  must  be  offered  to  the 
public.    We  shall  see  later  how  this  apology  was  presented. 

The  lack  of  system  in  Adams'  Administration  can,  in  a  large 
measure,  be  traced  to  these  Cabinet  officers.  They  were  mem- 
bers of  the  Essex  Junto  and  were  constantly  acting  under  an 
influence  from  without  and  not  in  accord  with  their  chief. 
It  should  be  noticed  that  nearly,  if  not  all,  of  their  complaints 
had  been  addressed  to  Hamilton.  In  short,  Hamilton  dictated 
to  and  led  the  Junto  always  contrary  to  Adams'  policies.  They 
wrote  him  regarding  every  move  by  the  President  and  sought 
instructions  as  to  their  procedure. 

It  was  upon  this  body  of  men,  some  of  whom  were  in  Con- 
gress, some  in  the  Cabinet,  and  others  outside,  that  President 
Adams  fixed  the  name  ''Essex  Junto,"^^  and  because  of  their 
eagerness  for  a  war  with  France  he  called  them  the  "British 
faction,  aided  by  Alexander  Hamilton  and  his  satellites.^'* 

^  Lodge's  "Cabot" ;  Adams'  Works,  vol.  9 ;  Schouler's  "Am.  Hist.," 
vol.  2.  Here  we  have  a  party  of  intriguers  tampering  with  a  disease 
without  offering  a  method  of  cure. 

Dr.  N.  Ames  says  in  his  Diary,  vol.  10,  p.  27 :  "Such  r.eiterated  in- 
solence of  the  British  Junto  cannot  long  be  borne.  Beasts  would  resist 
such  gibes  and  goads  as  the  Administration  are  receiving  from  the 
Junto." 

^"Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  447. 

"Harper's  Encyclopedia,  vol.  3,  p.  246;  Schouler,  vol.  2,  p.  481. 

^  Adams'  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  281 ;  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  20.  Pickering 
says  that  Adams  attributed  his    (3   vote)    majority  over  Jefferson  in 

19 


The  Republicans  rejoiced  at  the  charge  of  ''British  faction," 
but  Hamilton  determined  to  denounce  Adams  publicly;  a  plan 
which  had  long  been  in  his  mind,  and  as  he  had  succeeded  in 
getting  the  necessary  information  he  believed  the  time  ripe 
for  the  blow.^^  Hamilton  had  evidently  been  much  concerned 
as  to  the  most  satisfactory  way  in  which  to  present  the  denun- 
ciation. He  wrote  Wolcott :  "If  I  denounce  him  pubHcly  mem- 
bers of  the  Cabinet  will  be  understood  to  be  the  sources  of  my 
information.  I  could  predicate  it  on  the  fact  that  I  am  abused 
by  the  friends  of  Mr.  Adams,  who  ascribe  my  opposition  to 
pique  and  disappointment;  and  could  give  it  the  shape  of  a 
defense  of  myself."^°  It  is  very  clear  that  Hamilton's  con- 
science was  far  from  being  easy,  for,  if  the  secret  intrigues  of 
the  Junto  were  laid  open,  he  foresaw  the  sad  end  of  its  career. 
He  realized  that  a  bold  move  must  be  made  at  once,  or  the  day 
would  be  lost  for  the  Junto  and  himself.  So  he  again  addressed 
Wolcott  as  follows :  ''I  wait  with  impatience  for  the  facts 
which  you  promised  me.^^  It  is  plain  that,  unless  we  give  our 
reasons  in  some  form  or  other,  Mr.  Adams'  personal  friends, 
seconded  by  the  Jacobins,  will  completely  run  us  down  in  public 
opinion.  Your  name,  in  company  with  mine,  that  of  T.  Picker- 
ing, etc.,  is  in  full  circulation,  as  one  of  the  British  faction  of 
which  Mr.  Adams  has  talked  so  much."*^  Wolcott  was  evident- 
ly slightly  dilatory  in  complying  with  Hamilton's  wishes  for  a 
few  days  later  he  received  another  letter  from  Hamilton,  say- 
ing :  ''You  may  depend  upon  it,  a  very  serious  impression  has 
been  made  on  the  public  mind,  by  the  partisans  of  Mr.  Adams, 
to  our  disadvantage.  That  the  facts  hitherto  known  have  very 
partially  impaired  the  confidence  of  the  Federalists  in  Mr. 
Adams,  who  for  want  of  information,*^  were  disposed  to  regard 
his  opponents  as  factious  men.  If  this  cannot  be  counteracted, 
our  characters  are  the  sacrifice."** 

1797,  to  the  Essex  Junto  and  named  especially  Cabot,  Parsons  and 
Higginson. 

^Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  450. 

*^  Ibid.,  p.  450. 

""  These  are  the  facts  which  Wolcott  had  promised  to  furnish  re- 
lative to  the  confidential  Cabinet  communications. 

*^  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  449. 

*^  All  the  information,  so  far  as  the  Junto  was  concerned,  had  been 
confined  to  secret  correspondence,  from  one  to  another, 

**  Gibbs,  "Administration  of  Washington  and  Adams,"  vol.  2,  p.  422. 

20 


Hamilton  finally  got  the  desired  information  from  the  Cab- 
inet officials*^  and  just  before  the  election  in  1800  published  his 
famous  pamphlet,  entitled :  "The  Public  Conduct  and  Character 
of  John  Adams,  Esq-,  Presidenlof  the  United  States."*^  This 
paper  was  supposed  to  show  why  President  Adams  was  unfit 
for  re-election  and  why  certain  members  of  the  party  were  ad- 
vocating the  election  of  General  Pinckney.  It  degenerated,  how- 
ever, into  a  most  spiteful  attack  upon  the  character  and 
administration  of  Adams.  It  attempted  to  cast  all  public  dis- 
favor upon  the  President  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  place  a  veil 
over  the  foiled  intrigues  of  the  Junto. 

Mr.  Adams  in  commenting  on  Hamilton's  bold  assertions, 
contained  in  the  pamphlet,  wondered  how  he  (Hamilton)  got 
such  minute  information.  He  asked  the  question,  "Had  he  a 
spy  in  the  Cabinet,  who  transmitted  from  day  to  day  the  con- 
fidential communications  between  the  President  and  heads  of 
the  departments  P"*''  Hamilton  has  told  us  very  clearly  whence 
came  his  information.  In  a  letter  to  Wolcott  he  says :  "Some 
of  the  most  delicate  of  the  facts  stated,  I  hold  from  the  three 
Ministers,  you  yourself  particularly,  and  I  do  not  think  myself 
at  liberty  to  take  the  step  without  your  consent.  I  never  mean 
to  bring  proof,  but  to  stand  upon  the  credit  of  my  own 
veracity."  *^ 

We  need  not  give  much  time  to  a  discussion  of  this  publica- 
tion, for  Hamilton  has  m.ade  it  clear  that  it  would  be  a  defense 
of  the  secret  conduct  of  the  Essex  Junto.^^  He  proceeded  to 
unfold  the  faults  of  the  President  chiefly  by  dwelling  on  such 
peculiarities  as  temper,  egotism,  vanity  and  jealousy.  He 
showed  neither  corruption,  insanity,  nor  ruinous  misbehavior 
on  the  part  of  Adams,  as  some  of  his  friends  had  expected  him 
to  do""'^;  nor  that  the  President  was  wrong  and  the  would-be 
directors  were  right  in  the  French  affair.  In  fact,  Hamilton 
had  undertaken  more  than  even  he  could  do,  and  a  very  weak 
and  disgusting^  document  was  the  result.  It  was  held  by  many 
Federalists  to  be  highly  impolitic^^ ;  disclosing  as  it  did  a  deter- 

*^  Pickering,  Wolcott,  and  McHenry. 

"  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  7,  p.  687 ;  the  pamphlet  is  given  in  full. 
"  Adams  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  303. 
*^  Gibbs,  "Washington  and  Adams,"  vol.  2,  p.  421. 
"'Gibbs,  "Washington  and  Adams,"  vol.  2,  p.  422. 
^  Schouler's  "Am.  Hist.,"  vol.  2,  p.  489. 
"  Sullivan's   "Public   Letters,"   p.    103. 

21 


mined  aversion  from  the  continuance  of  Mr.  Adams'  official 
power;  it  was  undoubtedly  the  strongest  instrument  that  con- 
tributed to  the  defeat  of  Adams  at  the  ensuing  election.  This 
publication,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  its  motive,  time  and 
manner,  certainly  broke  the  last  thread  which  held  together 
the  Federalist  party.  The  break  would  have  come  in  time  and 
nothing  could  have  prevented  it,  because  all  of  the  strongest 
men  in  the  party  were  leaders,  all  egotistic  and  all  narrow. 
Therefore,  Hamilton,  aided  by  the  able  leaders  from  New  Eng- 
land, whom  Adams  saw  fit  to  classify  as  a  "Junto"  wrecked 
vengeance  upon  the  party  which  they  had  labored  to  create. 

The  truth  must  be  told.  There  were  a  few  of  Hamilton's 
friends,  the  Junto,  who  had  expected  Adams  to  make  an  un- 
qualified recommendation  of  a  declaration  of  war  against 
France  in  his  message  of  1798.  When  the  President  arrived  at 
Philadelphia,  he  said :  'T  sent  for  the  heads  of  departments  to 
consult,  in  the  evening,  upon  the  points  to  be  inserted  in  the 
message  to  Congress,  which  was  soon  to  meet.  The  conduct  of 
these  gentlemen  upon  this  subject  was  as  I  wished  it  to  be, 
no  one  giving  a  decided  opinion  either  for  or  against  a  declara- 
tion of  war.  That  there  was  disappointment,  however,  in 
Hamilton  and  his  friends,  is  apparent  enough  from  this  con- 
sideration, that,  when  it  was  definitely  known  that  a  declaration 
of  war  was  not  to  be  recommended  in  the  President's  message, 
a  secret  caucus  was  called  of  Federal  members  of  Congress,  to 
see  if  they  could  not  get  a  vote  for  a  declaration  of  war,  with- 
out any  recommendation  from  the  President,  as  they  had  voted 
the  Alien  and  Sedition  law  and  the  Army.  All  that  I  shall  say 
is,  that  Mr.  Hamilton  and  friends  could  not  carry  the  vote."^^ 
President  Adams  says  he  then  asked,  "What  action  should  be 
taken  in  the  case  we  determined  against  a  declaration  of  war? 
Instead  of  silence  and  reserve  which  was  given  my  first  ques- 
tion, it  was  urged  that  France  be  allowed  to  make  the  first 
overture.  I  believe  that  some  of  the  heads  of  departments 
were  confident,  in  their  own  minds,  that  France  would  not  send 
a  minister  here."^^ 

Mr.  Stoddert,  in  a  private  letter,  declares  the  belief  that  the 
result  of  this  Caucus  was  decisive  in  fixing  the  policy  of  the 
country.     He  says:  "A  majority  of  the  Caucus,  composed  en- 

"  Adams'  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  304. 
^^  Ibid.,  p.  304-06. 

22 


tirely  of  Federal  members  of  the  two  Houses,  would  not  agree 
to  a  declaration  of  war;  and  the  result  of  the  meeting  showed 
too  plainly  to  be  mistaken  by  the  President  that  it  was  his  duty 
to  avail  himself  of  the  first  fair  opportunity  that  presented 
itself   for  seeking  reconciliation,   without   debasement."  ^'^ 

Adams,  having  changed  his  position  somewhat,  carefully  left 
an  opening  for  negotiation,  should  France  express  a  desire  to 
treat  with  us.  In  this  message  of  December  8,  1798,  he  says: 
"It  is  peace  that  we  have  uniformly  and  preservingly  cultivated, 
and  harmony  between  us  and  France  may  be  restored  at  her 
option.  But  to  send  another  Minister  there  without  more  de- 
terminate assurances  that  he  would  be  received,  would  be  an 
act  of  humiliation  to  which  the  United  States  ought  not  submit. 
It  must,  therefore,  be  left  with  France,  and  if  she  desires  ac- 
commodation we  will  respect  the  sacred  right  of  embassy. "^^ 

Therefore,  the  question,  "why  did  the  Jimto  so  ardently 
desire  war  with  France,"  naturally  presents  itself.  In  one  of 
Mr.  Adams'  papers  printed  in  the  Boston  Patriot  he  makes  the 
following  statement:  "They  could  not,  or  would  not,  distin- 
guish between  Jacobinism  and  neutrality.  Every  thing  with 
them  was  Jacobinism,  except  a  war  with  France  and  an  alliance 
with  Great  Britain.  They  all  panted  for  a  war  between  the 
United  States  and  France  as  sincerely,  though  not  as  ardently, 
as  Alexander  Hamilton."  Mr.  Liston^^  repeatedly  suggested, 
according  to  Adams"  that  he  was  ready  to  discuss  that  ques- 
tion. "And  there  were  not  wanting  insinuations  and  instiga- 
tions to  me,"  says  Adams,  "to  confer  with  Mr.  Liston  on  the 
subject  of  an  alliance."^® 

Pickering  denied  that  he  ever  wished  to  bring  about  an  alli- 
ance with  Great  Britain,  but  he  says,  "In  1798,  I,  in  company 
with  others,  deemed  a  rupture  with  France  inevitable  and  it 
was  certainly  natural  and  proper  to  ally  ourselves  with  Great 
Britain. "^^  That  is,  they  desired  a  rupture  with  France  as  the 
only  means  of  justifying  the  alliance  with  Great  Britain;  but 

"*  Stoddert  to  Adams,  in  Lodge's  "Life  of  Cabot,"  p.  200;  also  noted 
by  C.  F.  Adams,  "Life  of  J.  Adams,"  vol.  9,  p.  305. 
•""^  Adams'  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  128. 
^^  English   Minister  to   the   United   States. 
"Adams'  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  286. 
''  Ibid.,  p.  286. 
°^  Pickering,  Mss.,  December  14,  1800, 

23 


we  must  not  forget  the  fact  that  Mr.  Adams  is  defending  him- 
self and  is  Icnown  to  have  been  egotistic,  self-reliant,  and  un- 
bending. We  must  remember  also  that  if  there  is  one 
characteristic  which  always  marked  the  lives  of  John  Adams 
and  his  son,  it  was  honesty  of  purpose.  By  whom,  therefore, 
was  shown  the  greater  amount  of  patriotism,  Hamilton  and 
the  Junto,  or  the  President  who  stilled  their  war  cry?"*'*'  I 
would  not  even  suggest  that  Adams  was  a  faultless  man.  I 
would  not  have  any  one  believe  that  he  did  not  make  his  errors, 
many  of  which  were  due  to  flights  of  temper,  etc.,  but  the  fact 
cannot  be  denied  that  Adams'  judgment  was  sound  and  for  the 
best  interests  of  the  Nation.  He  had  the  peace  and  welfare  of 
this  country  at  heart,  while  the  opposition  were  intriguing  to 
prevent  further  negotiations  and  to  hurl  us  into  a  war  with 
France.  For  what?  Largely  because  Alexander  Hamilton 
could  not  see  beyond  the  command  of  a  large  army.  The  Junto 
seemed  to  think  that  anything  was  honest  and  honorable  so 
long  as  it  kept  the  Jacobins  out  of  office. 

Adams,  therefore,  succeeded  in  putting  down  the  Junto  plots 
at  this  period,  and  thus  prevented  a  war  with  France;  but  the 
price  was  his  defeat  and  also  that  of  the  Federalist  party.  I 
think  that  it  would  not  be  unjust  to  Hamilton  and  to  the  Junto 
to  say  that  they  broke  up  their  own  party  because  they  could 
not  control  and  dictate  the  whole  of  its  policy.  Adams  seems 
never  to  have  been  as  confident  of  Hamilton's  genius  and  hon- 
esty as  was  Washington.  Washington  brought  the  best  out  of 
the  fiery  West  Indian ;  Adams  stirred  him  to  do  his  worst. 

During  the  last  few  years  of  Adams'  administration  Hamil- 
ton had  the  advantage  of  being  the  critic,  while  Adams  bore 
the  responsibility.  The  final  collapse  found  Hamilton  and 
Adams  each  in  command  of  a  fragment  of  the  party,  neither 
having  sufficient  strength  to  be  effective. 

**  I  say  Hamilton  and  the  Junto  because  he  was  their  faithful  guide 
and  spokesman  for  a  number  of  years. 


24 


CHAPTER  III 

Plans  for  Secession  i 803-1804 

For  the  first  and  last  time  in  his  administration  John  Adams 
found  himself  popular  after  the  publication  of  the  X.  Y.  Z. 
despatches.  The  moderate  Republicans  in  the  House  were 
swept  away  by  the  current,  and  thus  there  was  built  up  a  com- 
pact Federalist  majority  in  both  houses.  It  then  proceeded  de- 
liberately to  make  sure  of  the  destruction  of  the  party.  The 
newspapers  had  now  reached  an  extraordinary  degree  of  viol- 
ence; attacks  upon  the  Federalists,  and  particularly  upon 
Adams,  were  numerous,  and  keenly  felt.  Many  of  the  journal- 
ists were  foreigners,  Englishmen  and  Frenchmen.  To  the  ex- 
cited minds  of  the  Federalist  leaders,  these  men  seemed  leagued 
with  France  in  an  attempt  to  destroy  the  liberties  of  the  coun- 
try; to  get  rid  of  the  most  violent  of  these  writers  and  at  the 
same  time  to  punish  American-born  editors  who  too  freely 
criticised  the  administration,  seemed  to  them  essential.  To 
meet  both  necessities  they  passed  the  Alien,  Sedition,  and  Nat- 
uralization laws,  the  first  empowering  the  President  to  banish 
from  the  country,  without  giving  a  reason  for  or  a  trial  to,  any 
alien  whom  he  considered  a  dangerous  or  suspicious  person; 
the  second  made  it  a  crime  to  publish  any  false  and  malicious 
writings  against  the  Government,  Congress,  or  the  President, 
with  the  intent  to  defame  them,  to  bring  them  into  contempt,  or 
to  excite  the  hatred  of  the  people  against  them ;  the  third  raised 
the  time  of  residence  for  naturalization  from  five  to  fourteen 
years.  These  laws  were  intended  to  silence  the  Republican 
journalists  and  to  make  permanent  the  Federalist  power  but 
their  effect  was  just  the  opposite  of  what  was  expected  and 
they  practically  assured  the  success  of  the  Republicans  at  the 
next  election. 

In  1 80 1,  after  it  was  known  that  there  would  be  a  Republican 
President,  with  a  majority  in  both  houses  of  Congress,  the 
Federalists  resolved  to  bolster  up  their  power  in  the  third  de- 
partment   of    government.      A   Judiciary    Act    was    therefore 

25 


passed,  creating  new  courts,  new  judges,  and  new  salaried  of- 
ficials. All  the  resulting  appointments  were  made  by  Adams 
and  are  known  as  *'  midnight  judges"  because  of  their  twelfth 
hour  appointment. 

But  the  assurances  that  a  Republican  had  been  elected  did 
not  end  the  difficulties  for  the  Jeffersonians.  The  Constitution 
had  neither  specified  which  candidate  should  be  voted  for  as 
the  presidential  preference  nor  which  should  receive  the  sec- 
ond honors.  The  Constitution  said :  "The  person  having  the 
greatest  number  of  votes  shall  be  President,  if  such  number  be 
a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  electors  appointed,  and  the 
person  receiving  the  second  highest  number  of  votes  shall  be 
Vice-President.''  When  returns  were  in  Mr.  Jefferson  and 
Mr.  Burr  were  found  to  have  an  equal  number  of  votes.  The 
responsibility  of  electing  a  President  was  then  thrown  upon  the 
House  of  Representatives. 

It  is  thought  by  some  that  a  lack  of  party  organization  w^as 
responsible  for  Jefferson  not  getting  a  larger  electoral  vote  than 
Burr.^  But  it  is  also  thought  by  others  that  Mr.  Burr  employed 
secret  agents  and  sent  them  into  some  of  the  states  when  the 
Legislatures  were  appointing  the  electors  to  use  their  influence 
in  his  favor.-  Mr.  Davis,  in  his  Life  of  Burr,  says  that  Timothy 
Green  of  New  York  vvas  sent  to  South  Carolina,  and  Abraham 
Bishop  of  New  Haven  to  Pennsylvania.  Both  of  these  men 
flatly  deny  any  such  connection  with  Burr.  Burr  also  denies 
the  charge.^  Despite  these  denials  there  is  much  evidence  to 
prove  that  Burr  was,  in  truth,  intriguing  with  disappointed  Fed- 
eralists to  obtain  the  seat  intended  for  Jefferson.^  Hamilton 
wrote  Bayard  before  the  election  saying,  "Burr  is  intriguing 
with  all  his  might  in  New  Jersey,  Rhode  Island,  and  Vermont 
with  a  possibility  of  success."^ 

The  Junto  came  out  openly  and  declared  themselves  in  favor 
of  Mr.  Burr  when  the  vote  was  known  to  be  equal.  Almost 
all  the   federal  newspapers^  advocated  the  election  of   Burr. 

^Powell's  "Nullification  and  Secession,"  pp.  116-117;  Von  Hoist,  vol. 
I,  p.  168. 
^M.  L.  Davis'  "Memoirs  of  A.  Burr,"  vol.  2,  pp.  91-gS;  printed  letters. 
'Ibid. 

"John  Wood's  "Views  of  Burr's  Political  Conduct." 
""  Hamilton's  '^Republic,"  vol.  7,  P-  402. 
®  Papers  for  1801,  Harvard  Library. 

26 


Different  reasons,  however,  were  assigned  for  this  preference. 
The  Connecticut  Courant  was  in  favor  of  him,  because  he  was 
of  New  England  extraction ;  the  New  York  Gazette  intimated 
that  Burr  would  give  up  his  bad  principles;  and  the  Boston 
Centinel  preferred  him  because  it  thought  his  character  some- 
what like  that  of  Bonaparte,  but  possessed  of  none  of  the  cold 
hearted  qualities  of  the  Gallic  Consul!  Such  is  the  sentiment 
to  be  gathered  from  the  leading  newspapers  on  the  subject. 

When  the  balloting  began  in  the  House,  the  Federalists,  hav- 
ing a  majority,  attempted  to  elect  Burr  over  Jefferson,  or  pre- 
vent an  election  altogether.'^  In  the  last  event  the  President  of 
the  Senate  would  have  been  made  acting  President,  but  in  case 
there  had  been  no  President  of  the  Senate,  the  Speaker  of  the 
House  would  have  acted  President,  pro-tempore,  until  a  new 
election  could  be  held.^ 

Burr  promised  to  commit  himself  to  the  Junto  in  the  event 
of  success  through  their  instrumentality.^  The  electors  of  New 
Jersey  were  federal.  Dr.  Samuel  Smith,  President  of  the 
College  of  New  Jersey,  was  an  elector.  It  was  boldly  charged 
that  Dr.  Smith  was  secretly  to  have  voted  for  Mr.  Burr  and 
thus  make  him  President  of  the  United  States. ^^ 

Hamilton,  who  had  led  the  Junto  through  the  Administration 
of  John  Adams,  broke  with  them  when  they  proposed  to  put 
Burr  in  the  President's  chair  or  to  prevent  an  election  al- 
together. It  is  evident,  however,  that  he  was  willing  to  provoke 
a  quarrel  between  Jefferson  and  Burr,  for  he  wrote  Wolcott, 
December  i6,  1800:  'Tt  may  be  well  enough  to  throw  out  a  lure 
for  him  (Burr),  in  order  to  tempt  him  to  start  for  the  plate, 
and  then  lay  the  foundation  of  dissention  between  the  two 
chiefs.  You  may  communicate  this  letter  to  MarshalP^  and 
Sedgwick."^^  Perhaps  he  thought  this  would  cause  a  rupture 
in  the  Republican  party  and  finally  reinstate  the  Federalists ;  or, 
perhaps,  he  hoped  that  Burr  would  challenge  Jefferson  and 

'Von  Hoist,  vol.  I,  p.  186;  Powell's  "Nullification  and  Secession," 
p.  116;  Hamilton's  "Republic,"  vol.  7,  pp.  424-468. 

^Act  of  March  i,  1792,  W.  W.  Willoughby  "Constitution,"  vol.  2,  p. 
1141. 

^  Davis'  "Memoirs  of  A.  Burr,"  vol.  2,  p.  89. 

^^  Ibid.,  Dr.  Smith  denied  the  charge. 

"  Chief  Justice. 

"  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  486. 

27 


both  be  killed.  It  is  difficult  to  say  just  what  Hamilton  had  in 
mind  at  this  time. 

Hamilton  received  letter  after  letter  from  members  of  the 
Junto  giving  reasons  why  Burr  should  be  preferred  to  Jeffer- 
son.^^ Sedgwick  wrote  that  he  believed  Burr  would  commit 
himself  to  Federalist  policy  if  elevated  to  the  Presidency  by 
them.^^  Ames,  less  confident  and  with  an  eye  directed  to  the" 
future,  wrote:  ''I  doubt  whether  Burr  will  be  Federal,  if 
chosen  by  the  Federalists.  He  would  reconcile  himself  to  his 
old  friends  as  soon  as  possible.  Will  Jefferson  forget  or  for- 
give your  efforts  to  bring  in  Burr,  if  they  should  fail  of  suc- 
cess? Will  resentment  precipitate  him  to  adopt  violent  coun- 
sels, to  attack  the  funds,  to  restrict  British  commerce,  to  hug 
France  closer,  etc.  ?"^^ 

To  these  and  many  similar  letters,  Mr.  Hamilton  replied  de- 
nouncing the  idea  and  advising  that  Federalists  support  Mr. 
Jefferson.  Hamilton  and  Burr  were  bitter  political  rivals  in 
New  York  and  the  idea  of  the  latter  being  elevated  to  the 
Presidency  provoked  many  harsh  accusations  from  Hamilton. 
In  regard  to  their  preventing  an  election  he  said:  "This,  if  it 
could  succeed,  would  be,  for  obvious  reasons,  a  most  dangerous 
and  unbecoming  policy.  But  it  is  well  it  should  be  understood 
that  it  cannot  succeed."^^  He  wrote  Wolcott  some  days  later 
saying:  "The  idea  that  Burr  is  to  be  elevated  to  the  Presidency 
by  the  Federalists  forces  causes  me  pain.  Will  any  reasonable 
calculation  on  the  part  of  the  Federalists  uphold  the  poHcy  of 
assuming  so  great  a  responsibility  in  the  support  of  so  unprom- 
ising a  character?  Adieu  to  the  Federal  Troy,  if  they  introduce 
this  Grecian  horse  into  their  citadel."^'  'Tf  there  is  one  man 
in  this  world,"  Hamilton  wrote  G.  Morris,  'T  ought  to  hate, 
it  is  Jefferson. "^^  Yet  when  he  was  fully  convinced  that  the 
Junto  had  entered  into  such  a  plot,  his  pen  produced  letter  after 
letter  urging  his  followers  to  exert  their  influence  for  Mr.  Jef- 

"  Hamilton's  ''Republic,"  vol.  7,  pp.  434-465 ;  the  correspondence  in  this 
regard  was  very  extensive.  The  above  will  furnish  an  idea  of  what 
actually  transpired. 

"Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  511. 

"  Seth  Ames,  "Fisher  Ames,"  vol.  i,  p.  291. 

'"Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  508. 

''Ibid.,  pp.  487-489. 

'^  Ibid.,  p.  499- 


ferson.^^  He,  therefore,  stood  out  alone  opposed  to  the  in- 
trigues of  those  whom  he  had  led  against  John  Adams  until 
Jefferson  was  elected. 

Burr's  refusal  to  denounce  his  Republican  friends  and  to 
commit  himself  definitely  to  the  Federal  yoke  was  the  one  great 
reason  why  he  was  not  elected  President. ^^  He  was  perfectly 
willing,  however,  to  accept  anything  offered  to  him.^^  But  on 
this,  as  on  all  other  subjects,  he  refused  to  commit  himself  to 
the  Junto  policy.  There  was  no  man  more  thoroughly  despised 
by  the  Federalists  than  Aaron  Burr.  Why  then  did  they  wish 
to  throw  him  upon  the  country  as  its  chief?  ''Whatever  they 
may  imagine,"  says  Hamilton,  "the  desire  of  mortifying  the 
adverse  party  must  be  the  chief  spring  of  the  disposition  to 
prefer  Burr."-^ 

No  one  saw  more  plainly  than  Alexander  Hamilton  that  the 
American  people,  especially  the  followers  of  Thomas  Jefferson, 
would  not  be  content  with  the  election  of  Mr.  Burr.  The  Junto 
were  certainly  not  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  Jefferson  was  the 
people's  choice  and  that  they  were  sowing  seeds  for  a  revolu- 
tion ;  yet  Bayard  says,  "We  had  several  caucuses  in  the  House. 
All  acknowledged  that  nothing  but  desperate  measures  remain- 
ed, which  several  were  disposed  to  adopt,  and  but  few  willing 
openly  to  disapprove. "^^  If  Burr  had  been  the  people's  choice, 
Jefferson  would  doubtless  have  acquiesced  without  a  murmur, 
but  Burr  being  a  Junto  choice,  Jefferson's  attitude  can  only  be 
a  matter  of  conjecture.  But  there  was  every  reason  to  doubt 
the  sanction  of  the  people,  in  such  an  event,  and  Hamilton 
clearly  understood  it.  The  campaign  brought  out  the  fact 
that  Mr.  Jefferson  was  the  best  loved  and  most  soundly  hated 
man  in  America. 

Not  until  the  thirty-sixth  ballot,  did  Jefferson  get  a  majority. 
He  was  then  declared  elected.  Again  the  country  was  rescued 
from  an  ugly  Junto  plot.  This  time,  we  must  thank  Mr.  Ham- 
ilton for  deserting  the  Junto  and  for  his  unusual  patriotism, 

^^  Ibid.,  see  letter  to  Governor  Jay,  N.  Y.,  in  which  Hamilton  asks 
the  Legislature  be  assembled  for  the  purpose  of  changing  in  Jefferson's 
favor,  the  number  of  electors.    Jenkinson's  "Life  of  Burr,"  p.  6i. 

^*'  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  487 ;  Von  Hoist,  vol.  I,  p.  173. 

^^  Ibid.,  p.  522.  Bayard  to  Hamilton ;  "The  means  existed  for  electing 
Burr,  but  this  required  his  co-operation." 

"/61U,  p.  489. 

"Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  523. 

29 


and  Mr.  Burr  for  maintaining  an  ambiguous  position.  The 
people  undoubtedly  voted  for  and  intended  that  Mr.  Jefferson 
should  be  President.  If  Mr.  Burr  had  been  elected  we  may 
still  wonder  what  would  have  been  his  policies.  Unfortunately 
we  can  think  of  nothing  but  civil  strife  and  discord. 

We  have  seen  how  Hamilton  had  led  the  Junto  against  the 
Administration  of  John  Adams ;  how  he  halted  and  displayed 
symptoms  of  patriotism  w^hen  it  was  desired  to  place  Burr  in 
the  President's  chair;  and  now  we  are  to  see  him  discarded 
because  he  would  not  lead  to  the  desired  extremes. 

It  is  a  significant  fact  that  from  this  time  on  the  Junto  began 
to  seek  another  leader,  for  Hamilton  had  proved  himself  not 
as  radical  as  themselves  when  it  came  to  a  point  of  action. 
The  party  was  in  a  hopeless  condition.  Jefferson's  election  had 
not  caused  the  internal  revolution  which  they  had  expected. 
The  New  England  leaders  had  become  desperate.  Fisher  Ames 
in  a  letter  to  Gore  sums  up  the  situation  thus :  "The  Federal- 
ists are  already  stigmatized  as  an  oligarchy,  as  a  British  fac- 
tion. Hamilton  is  obnoxious  and  persecuted  by  popular  clam- 
ors, in  which  Federalists,  to  their  shame,  join."^^ 

The  most  important  question  which  Jefferson  had  to  face 
during  his  first  administration  was  the  right  of  navigating  the 
Mississippi  river.  Spain  had  on  the  ist  of  October,  1800, 
ceded  the  whole  of  Louisiana  to  France.  Our  depositing  sta- 
tion and  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  were  temporarily  closed. 
The  situation  demanded  an  immediate  solution.  The  real 
statesmanship  of  Jefferson  flashed  forth  at  once  showing 
every  one  his  attitude  on  such  questions,  even  though  it  was 
with  France.  He  wrote  Ambassador  Livingston  in  Paris  say- 
ing :  "This  session  completely  reverses  all  the  political  relations 
of  the  United  States  and  will  form  a  new  epoch  in  our  political 
course.  There  is  one  spot  on  the  globe,  the  possessor  of  which 
is  our  natural  and  habitual  enemy.  It  is  New  Orleans,  through 
which  the  produce  of  three-eights  of  our  territory  must  pass. 
.  .  .  France,  placing  herself  in  the  door,  assumes  to  us  the 
attitude  of  defiance."^^  Negotiations  were  immediately  begun 
and  on  the  30th  of  April,  1803,  the  treaty  ceding  the  whole  of 
Louisiana  to  the  United  States  for  the  sum  of  $15,000,000  was 
concluded  at  Paris. 

^  Ames,  "Life  of  Ames,"  vol.  i,  p.  289. 
^Jefferson's  Works,  vol.  4,  pp.  431-432. 

30 


Hamilton  again  manifested  true  statesmanship  by  declaring 
with  Jefferson :  "I  have  always  held  the  unity  of  our  empire, 
and  the  best  interests  of  our  nation  that  we  shall  annex  to  the 
United  States  all  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi,  New  Or- 
leans included."-*^  But  not  so  the  Junto !  This  position  placed 
a  greater  barrier  between  Hamilton  and  the  Junto.  Nor  did 
the  majority  of  the  Federalist  party  share  this  broad  view, 
but  ridiculed  the  President  for  making  the  purchase.  For  what 
reason?  Because  New  England  believed  that  this  expansion 
of  territory  gave  the  Southern  states  a  preponderance  for  all 
time."-^  It  was  the  old  battle  cry,  balance  of  power.  One  sec- 
tion must  not  be  allowed  more  representation  than  the  other. 
This  extension  would  give  the  South  the  advantage. 

It  was  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  therefore,  which  gave  im- 
petus to  a  plan  which  had  been  creeping  upon  New  England, 
aided  and  stimulated  by  the  Essex  Junto.  They  agreed  that 
the  inevitable  consequences  of  the  annexation  of  this  vast  terri- 
tory would  be  to  diminish  the  relative  weight  and  influence  of 
the  Northern  section ;  that  it  would  aggravate  the  evils  of  slave 
representation  and  endanger  the  Union  by  the  enfeebling  exten- 
sion of  its  line  of  defense  against  foreign -invasions.  But  the 
alternative  to  annexation  was, — Louisiana  and  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi  in  the  possession  of  France  under  Napoleon 
Bonaparte. 

The  acquisition  of  Louisiana,  although  the  immediate  cause 
for  this  project  of  disunion,  was  not  its  only,  nor  even  its  most 
operative  cause.  The  election  of  Mr,  Jefferson  to  the  Presi- 
dency had  meant  to  those  swayed  by  sectional  feelings  the  tri- 
umph of  the  South  over  the  North, — of  the  slave  representation 
over  the  free.  On  party  grounds  it  was  the  victory  of  pro- 
fessed democracy  over  Federalism.  Louisiana  was  accepted 
as  the  battle  ground,  however,  and  from  that  point  the  war 
was  waged. 

Mr.  Griswold,  Representative  from  Connecticut,  said  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  October,  1803 :  "The  vast  and  un- 
manageable extent  which  the  accession  of  Louisiana  will  give 
the  United  States;  the  consequent  dispersion  of  our  population, 
and  the  destruction  of  that  balance  of  power  which  is  so  im- 
portant to  maintain  between  the  Eastern  and  Western  States, 

^  Hamilton's  Works,  vol.  6,  p.  552. 
"Von  Hoist,  vol.  I,  p.  185. 

31 


threatens,  at  no  distant  day,  the  subversion  of  our  Union. "-^ 
Plumer  of  New  Hampshire,  declared  in  the  Senate:  "Admit 
this  Western  World  into  the  Union  and  you  destroy,  at  once 
the  weight  and  importance  of  the  Eastern  States,  and  compel 
them  to  establish  a  separate  and  independent  empire."  -^ 

The  Junto  stoutly  maintained,  not  only  on  the  floor  of  Con- 
gress, but  also  among  their  constituents,  that  the  balance  of 
power  between  the  North  and  South  was  disturbed.^*'  They  be- 
came active  in  stirring  up  the  Federal  press  of  New  England 
to  clamor  for  separation,  and  by  all  the  means  in  their  power 
encouraged  the  leaders  of  their  faction  in  Congress  to  lay  plans 
for  secession. ^^  Massachusetts  was  the  leading  commonwealth 
in  raising  the  cry  of  disunion.^-  The  Massachusetts  Federalists 
asked  for  an  amendment'^"  to  the  Constitution  which  sets  forth, 
at  length,  the  principle  that  the  Union  of  States  could  not  exist 
on  terms  of  inequality;  that  the  representation  of  slaves  was  a 
concession  of  the  East  to  the  South,  and  that  the  representa- 
tion was  injurious  and  hurtful  from  the  first. ^*  The  advocates 
of  the  proposed  amendment  stoutly  maintained  that  Massachu- 
setts was  in  danger ;  that  her  sovereignty  and  her  independence 
were  swiftly  and  surely  being  taken  away;  that  the  power  of 
the  South  over  the  North  was  due  to  slaves  and  that  a  crisis 
was  at  handj^  Thus  the  sons  of  Massachusetts  argued 
that  separation  was  the  only  means  of  preserving  their 
independence.^^ 

In  view  of  subsequent  history,  it  is  interesting  to  reflect  that 
the  earliest  talk  of  disunion  came  from  those  who  upheld 
and  profited  by  the  institution  of  slavery,  but  from  men  who 

^^  Annals  of  Congress,  No.  13,  Eighth  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  p.  465. 

^  Ibid.,  Wm.  Plumer,  at  first,  was  an  ardent  supporter  of  the  North- 
ern Confederacy  plan,  but  later  changed  his  position  and  furnished 
much  valuable  information  about  the  Junto. 

^Ann.  Rep't  of  the  Am.  Hist.  Asso.,  1897,  p.  152;  eleven  years  later 
this  same  question  was  debated  in  the  Hartford  Convention,  and  an 
amendment  was  prepared  to  so  amend  the  Constitution  that  New 
England  might  hold  her  power  in  the  National  Gov. 

'^^  Ihid.,  p.  152. 

"^Ihid.,  p.  152. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  153;  McMaster,  vol.  3,  p.  45;  known  as  the  "Ely  Amend- 
ment," passed  by  Mass.  Legislature  and  presented  to  Congress  by  T. 
Pickering  but  there  perished. 

"^Ibid.,  p.  153- 

""Ibid.,  p.  153. 

32 


were  descendants  of  the  founder  of  civil  liberty  in  New 
England. 

The  disunion  project  was  under  secret  discussion  in  the 
eastern  quarter  of  the  Union,  fermented  by  those  most  hostile 
to  the  new  order  of  things.  It  had  its  origin,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  Washington  where  the  New  England  coterie  in  Congress 
comprised  ambitious  and  disappointed  men.^*^ 

The  Connecticut  Courant  comments  upon  the  situation  as 
follows :  ''Although  our  National  Government  must  fall  a  sac- 
rifice to  the  folly  of  Democracy,  and  to  the  fraud  and  violence 
of  Jacobinism,  yet  if  our  state  governments  can  be  preserved, 
tranquilty  may  yet  be  lengthened  out.  These  observations  are 
made  in  full  view  of  that  most  deplorable  event,  the  fall  of  the 
National  Government.  But,  I  hope  that  our  state  governments 
may  yet  be  preserved  from  the  claws  of  Jacobinism. "^^  The 
Eastern  Argus,  on  the  other  hand,  hostile  to  the  Junto  move- 
ment, declares  that  the  time  has  arrived  when  the  cloven  foot 
of  Federalism  has  made  its  appearance  without  a  covering. 
"The  plots  of  these  leaders  of  aristocracy,"  it  says,  ''have  been 
showing  their  hideous  deformity,  at  different  periods,  ever 
since  the  establishment  of  our  Government.  But  that  which 
discloses  their  ultimate  design  to  overthrow  our  happy  Govern- 
ment and  establish  a  monarchy,  appears  in  the  declaration  of 
Uriah  Tracy,  Senator  from  Connecticut."^^  The  Argus  goes 
on  to  quote  the  letter  from  Mr.  Tracy  to  General  Skinner  "and 
others"  in  which  he  declared  that,  "Republican  forms  of  gov- 
ernment will  never  answer" — that  "our  Constitution  is  good  for 
nothing," — that,  "the  President  and  Senators  must  be  heredi- 
tary,"— that,  "it  must  be  here  as  in  Great  Britain." 

Mr.  Jefferson  said :  "The  'Essex  Junto'  alone  desire  separa- 
tion. The  majority  of  the  Federalists  do  not  aim  at  separation. 
Monarchy  and  separation  is  the  policy  of  the  Essex  Federalists ; 
Anglomany  alone,  that  of  those  who  call  themselves  Federalists. 
The  last  are  as  good  Republicans  as  the  brethren  whom  they 
oppose  and  differ  only  in  their  devotion  to  England  and  hatred 
of  France  imbibed  from  their  leaders. "^^  No  one  has  given  a 
better   summary  of  the  shattered  Federalist  desires  than  this. 

■'"  Schouler's  "Am.  Hist.,"  vol.  3,  P-  68. 
"  The  Conn.  Courant,  March  8,   1812. 
^  The  Eastern  Argus,  February  10,   1804. 
^'Jefferson's  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  182. 

Z3 


The  Junto  had  been  working  for  some  time  without  any  cen- 
tral head  or  rallying  point.  They  had  no  leader  since  Hamilton 
forsook  them,  and  this  had  proved  to  be  a  great  impediment 
and,  perhaps,  a  greater  blessing  to  the  country.  There  was  no 
organization  working  toward  a  desired  end."^*^  They  were  sim- 
ply trying  to  get  as  accurate  an  idea  as  possible  of  the  sentiment 
of  the  people  upon  whom  they  must  depend.  They  maintained 
the  utmost  secrecy*^  and  went  about  on  their  tiptoe  lest  the 
awful  monster  leading  the  opposing  forces  be  acquainted  with 
their  plans.  They  were  sensible  of  the  fact,  however,  that  there 
must  be  some  central  point  around  which  they  could  cluster, 
and  someone  as  reckless  as  themselves  to  lead.  I  think  we  can 
say  that  ^Jr.  Pickering,  from  this  time,  assumes  the  position 
of  leader  and  does  more  than  any  other  man  to  effect  their 
schemes. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Cabot,  Pickering  gives  us  a  pretty  clear 
idea  what  the  Junto  had  in  mind  and  what  they  hoped  to  ac- 
complish. To  quote  him :  ''The  last  refuge  of  Federalism  is 
New  England,  and  immediate  exertion,  perhaps,  its  only  hope. 
It  must  begin  in  Massachusetts.  The  proposition  would  be 
welcomed  in  Connecticut ;  and  we  doubt  of  New  Hampshire  ? 
But  New  York  must  be  associated ;  and  how  is  her  concurrence 
to  be  obtained?  She  must  be  made  the  center  of  the  confed- 
eracy}- \"ermont  and  New  Jersey  would  follow,  of  course,  and 
Rhode  Island  of  necessity.  Who  can  be  consulted,  who  will 
take  the  lead?  The  Legislatures  of  Massachusetts  and  Con- 
necticut meet  in  May,  and  of  New  Hampshire  in  June. 

'The  subject  has  engaged  the  contemplation  of  many.  The 
gentlemen  of  Connecticut  have  seriously  meditated  on  it.  We*"' 
suppose  the  British  provinces  in  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia,  at 
no  remote  period,  perhaps,  without  delay,  and  with  the  assent 
of  Great  Britain,  may  become  members  of  the  Northern  Con- 
federacy. Certainly  that  Government  can  only  feel  disgust  at 
our  present  rulers.  She  will  be  pleased  to  see  them  crestfallen. 
She  will  not  regret  the  proposed  division  of  the  Empire.  A 
liberal  treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce  will  form  a  bond  of 

""Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  19. 

*^  Henry  Adams'  "Xew  England  Federalism,"  p.  164. 
■*^  Italics  my  own. 

*^This  refers  to  the  Junto  members  in  Congress  as  mentioned  above, 
from  time  to  tim.e.     They  discussed  it  a  great  deal  as  we  will  see  later. 

34 


union  between  Great  Britain  and  the  Northern  Confederacy 
highly  useful  to  both/'** 

Mr.  J.  Q.  Adams,  a  member  of  Congress  says  that  during 
the  Spring  Session  of  1804,  the  author  of  the  written  plan  was 
named  to  him  by  Mr.  Tracy.*^  And  that  he  was  a  distinguished 
citizen  of  Connecticut.  "I  was  told/'  says  Adams,  "it  origin- 
ated there;  had  been  communicated  to  individuals  at  Boston, 
at  New  York,  and  at  Washington."*^  The  plan,  according  to 
Mr.  Adams,*^  had  three  alternatives  of  boundary,  "i.  If  pos- 
sible, the  boundary  was  to  extend  to  the  Potomac,  2.  to  the 
Susquehanna,  3.  to  the  Hudson.  That  is,  the  Northern  Con- 
federacy was  to  extend,  if  it  should  be  found  practicable,  so 
as  to  include  Maryland.  This  was  the  maximum.  The  Hud- 
son, that  is.  New  England  and  a  part  of  New  York,  was  the 
minimum.  The  Susquehanna,  or  Pennsylvania,  was  the  middle 
term."     The  plan,  if  possible,  was  evidently  destroyed. 

In  the  Hfe  of  Mr.  Plumer*^  by  his  son,  various  extracts  are 
given  from  his  contemporary  journals  and  correspondence, 
exhibiting  special  and  definite  particulars  of  the  plan  of  dis- 
union, and  of  interview  in  reference  to  it  with  its  projectors 
and  followers.  'T  recollect  and  am  certain,"  says  Plumer, 
"that  on  returning  early  one  evening  from  dining  with  Aaron 
Burr,  Mr.  Hillhouse,  after  saying  to  me  that  New  England 
had  no  inffuence  in  the  Government  added  that,  'The  Eastern 
States  must  and  will  dissolve  the  Union,  and  form  a  separate 
government,  and  the  sooner  the  better.  But  I  think  the  first 
man  who  mentioned  the  subject  to  me  was  Samuel  Hunt,  a 
Representative  from  New  Hampshire.  He  conversed  often 
and  long  upon  the  subject.  He  was  very  eager  for  the  North- 
ern Confederacy  and  thought  it  could  be  effected  peaceably  and 
entered  into  a  detailed  plan  for  effecting  it.  I  often  talked 
with  Robert  Griswold.  He  was,  perhaps,  the  most  eager  of 
all  whom  I  talked  with,  and  was  practically  of  the  same  opinion 
as  Mr.  Hunt.     Next  to  Griswold,  Uriah  Tracy  conversed  most 

**  Pickering  Mss.,  January  19,  1804;  Adams,  "New  England  Fed- 
eralism," p.  338;  appendix.  This  indicates  that  they  expected  the  pro- 
posed Confederacy  to  be  recognized  by  Great  Britain.  A  treaty  of 
Amity  and  Commerce  would,  otherwise,  be  impossible. 

^'^  Undoubtedly  Robert  Griswold  if  such  a  plan  was  written. 

*^  Randall's  "Jefferson,"  vol.  3,  p.  636,  appendix. 

*'Ibid.,  p.  636. 

*'  Plumer  was  yet  in  Congress  and  in  sympathy  with  the  Junto. 

35 


freely  and  fully  regarding  the  plan.  It  was  he  who  informed 
me  that  Hamilton  had  consented  to  attend  a  meeting  of  select 
Federalists  at  Boston,  in  the  autumn  of  1804.  Mr.  Pickering 
told  me  of  the  plan  while  we  were  walking  around  the  north- 
erly and  easterly  lines  of  the  city."*^ 

Under  date  of  November  23,  1806,  Plumer  mentions  in  his 
journal,  that  in  the  winter  of  1804,  Pickering,  Hillhouse,  and 
himself  dined  with  Aaron  Burr ;  that  Hillhouse,  ''unequivocally 
declared  that  it  was  his  opinion  that  the  United  States  would 
soon  form  two  distinct  governments";  that  '*Mr.  Burr  con- 
versed very  freely  on  the  subject"';  ''and  the  impression  made 
on  his  (Plumer's)  mind  was,  that  Burr  not  only  thought  a 
separation  would  not  only  take  place  but  that  it  was  necessary." 
Yet,"  he  says,  "on  returning  to  my  lodgings  and  critically  ana- 
lyzing his  words,  there  was  nothing  in  them  that  committed  him 
in  any  way."'^  These  quotations  leave  us  no  longer  in  doubt  as 
to  where  the  conspiracy  began  and  that  there  were  a  great  many 
plans  being  made.  These  plans,  we  regret  to  say,  were  hatched 
in  the  National  Congress  and  by  some  of  its  ablest  members. 

The  Junto  seems  not  to  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  con- 
siderable expense  would  be  attached  to  their  plan  and  Robert 
Griswold,  according  to  Mr.  Pickering,-"^^  made  a  careful  examin- 
ation of  the  finances.  He  found  that  the  States  above  men- 
tioned, to  be  embraced  by  the  Northern  Confederacy,  were  then 
paying  as  much,  or  more,  of  the  public  revenues  as  would  dis- 
charge their  share  of  the  public  debt  due  those  states  and 
abroad,  leaving  out  the  millions  given  for  Louisiana.  In  the 
same  letter  he  assumes  that  our  mutual  v/ants  would  render  a 
friendly  and  commercial  intercourse  inevitable;  that  the  South- 
ern States  would  require  naval  protection  of  the  Northern 
Union,  and  that  the  products  of  the  former  would  be  important 
to  the  navigation  and  commerce  of  the  latter. ■'^- 

Many  of  the  Junto  believed  that  separation  could  be  brought 
about  peaceably.  Indeed,  they  had -a  perfect  right  to  think  so 
for  the  right  of  secession  had  not  been  very  seriously  question- 
ed at  this  time.     The  Constitution  was  in  its  infancy  and  no 

^^Plumer's  "Life  of  Plumer,"  p.  298;   Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.   106; 
Randall's  "Jefferson,"  vol.  3,  appendix. 
'^  Randall's  "Jefferson,"  vol.  3,  p.  637,  appendix. 
'"^  Letter  to  Cabot.     Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  338. 
'''  Ibid.,  p.  338. 

36 


one  seems  to  have  had  a  very  clear  idea  just  what  it  could  be 
made  to  cover.  Secession,  therefore,  was  not  held  to  be  an  un- 
pardonable sin.  It  was  spoken  of  frequently  on  the  floors  of 
Congress  and  no  one  was  censured  for  such  utterances. 

But  in  case  forceful  means  should  be  necessary  they  looked 
to  General  Hamilton  as  military  leader.'"'^  We  can  scarcely  be- 
lieve that  Hamilton  had  consented  to  this,  for  he  disapproved 
of  the  plan.  It  is  very  likely,  however,  that  the  Junto  expected 
it  of  him  and  he  may  have  given  his  consent.  It  is  interesting 
to  reflect  whether  or  not,  in  view  of  his  expressed  sentiments 
on  the  subject  of  separation,  he  would  have  listened  to  a  call 
to  lead  forces  of  a  Northern  Confederacy  against  "the  South 
and  West,  if  such  a  crisis  had  arisen.  Would  his  patriotism 
have  wavered  when  weighed  in  the  balance  against  his  military 
ambitions?  Eager  as  he  was  for  military  glory,  the  prospects 
would  not  have  been  sufficiently  alluring  to  satisfy  his  ambitious 
desires.  He  wished  to  lead  a  great  National  army  and  noth- 
ing less  would  have  sufliced. 

Therefore,  with  their  plans  fairly  complete,  the  Junto  began 
again,  without  any  open  organization,  to  apprise  their  innocent 
constituents  of  these  plans  and  to  ascertain,  as  far  as  possible, 
just  what  percentage  could  be  depended  on  to  follow  them  into 
the  proposed  haven  of  rest.  Their  mode  of  enlightenment  was 
a  secret'"'^  correspondence.  These  letters  are  full  of  the  vilest 
denunciations  of  Jefferson  and  his  policies.  Any  one  who  may 
desire  to  read  them  will  be  convinced  that  our  present-day 
politicians  have  tongues  and  pens  unusually  discrete  when  com- 
pared to  this  minority  wing  of  that  once  dominant  party. 

The  Federal  editors,  who  under  the  late  administration  were 
devoted  to  the  principles  of  passive  obedience  and  who  en- 
forced the  necessity  of  unqualified  submission  to  the  Constituted 
authorities,  were  soon  imbued  with  Juntoism.  These  same  edi- 
tors, therefore,  in  1803  were  in  the  true  spirit  of  disorganiza- 
tion, vilifying  the  President  and  administration  and  further 
encouraging  the  people  to  resist  the  Constituted  authorities.^"' 

°^  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  147 ;  Plumer's  'Tlumer,"  p.  303 ;  Adams 
to  Plumer :    "Much  of  my  information  was  collected  from  Mr.  Tracy." 

"*  Lodge's  "Cabot";  Hamilton's  "Republic,"  vol.  3;  Adams'  "Fed- 
eralism,"   for  much   of   the   correspondence. 

^American  Mercury,  April  9,  1803;  see  also.  The  Pittsfield  Sun;  The 
Statesman,  The  Republican  Spy,  The  Boston  Gazette,  The  Democrat, 
The  Essex  Register,  and  many  other  papers  might  be  cited  filled  with 
the  bitterest  possible  articles. 

37 


One  of  their  bitterest  thrusts  was  leveled  against  Jefferson 
for  unseating  their  ''midnight  judges."  They  claimed  that  he 
was  surely  destroying  the  Constitution  with  an  eye  single  to  his 
own  glory  and  to  that  of  the  common  folk.^^  This  proved  to 
be  always  an  effective  argument,  even  though  called  from  the 
past.  The  Louisiana  purchase,  of  course,  was  proclaimed  to 
be  a  destruction  of  that  balance  of  power,  established  and 
ordained,  once  and  forever,  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution. 
The  new  Constitutional  Amendment,  they  purported  to  believe 
was  solely  a  party  amendment  designed  to  keep  Republican  in 
office  to  the  complete  exclusion  of  Federalists.  But  perhaps 
the  weightiest  argument  of  all  was  what  they  termed  the  "Vir- 
ginia influence."  This  influence,  they  claimed,  supported  every 
suggestion  of  Jefferson's  and  could  only  be  broken  up  by  a  dis- 
solution of  the  Union. ^^ 

The  Vermont  Centinel,  November  21,  1804,  has  the  follow-, 
ing  to  say  regarding  the  popularity  of  the  recent  amendment: 
"The  recent  excellent  amendment  to  the  Constitution  proves 
that  Mr.  Jefferson's  Administration  has  been  the  most  popular 
that  the  United  States  has  ever  experienced.  Fourteen  of  the 
seventeen  free  and  independent  states  adopted  the  Amendment, 
some  unanimously,  too."  No  possible  objection  could  justly 
have  been  found  to  an  amendment  simply  providing  that  it  be 
specified  which  candidate  was  to  be  President  and  which  Vice- 
President.    The  other  points  need  no  comment. 

But,  the  lack  of  a  regular  leader  had  not  been  the  only 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  success  for  the  Junto's  plans.  There 
were  some  of  the  members  who  agreed  that  New  England  was 
unprepared  and  that  there  must  be  a  more  definite  and  wide- 
spread complaint  before  she  could  act.  George  Cabot  said :  *Tt 
is  not  practicable  without  the  intervention  of  some  cause  which 
would  be  very  generally  felt  and  distinctly  understood  as 
chargeable  to  the  misconduct  of  our  Southern  masters;  such 
for  example,  as  a  war  with  Great  Britain.^^  manifestly  pro- 
voked by  our  rulers. "^^ 

■*•  Adams'   "Federalism,"   pp.   331-336. 

"Schouler,  vol.  3,  pp.  68-71;  Von  Hoist,  vol.  i,  p.  187;  Hamilton's 
"Republic,"  vol.  7,  p.  772.  See  particularly  Pickering's  letter  to  Lyman ; 
Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  343. 

**  Does  this  mean  that  in  the  event  of  war  New  England  would  cast 
strength  with  Great  Britain?  We  will  see  much  more  of  this  in  the 
next  chapter. 

"  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  341 ;  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  346. 

38 


Tapping  Reeve'^^  commented  sarcastically  upon  their  "unpre- 
paredness"  as  pointed  out  by  Cabot  and  suggested  that,  if  the 
members  in  Congress  would  come  out  with  glowing  comments 
upon  the  ruinous  tendencies  of  the  measures  of  the  Adminis- 
tration before  the  sitting  of  the  Legislatures,  that  would  bring 
about  all  the  "preparedness"  necessary.®^  In  the  same  letter 
Reeve  suggested  a  very  ingenious  plan  by  which  a  foundation 
might  be  laid  for  separation.  *'I  do  not  know,"  he  says,  "in 
what  manner  this  separation  is  to  be  accomplished  unless  the 
Amendment  ^^  is  adopted  by  three-fourths  of  the  legislatures, 
and  rejected  by  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  and  Connecti- 
cut upon  the  last  ground  taken  by  Delaware.^^  In  such  case, 
I  can  see  a  foundation  laid."  Presumably  he  meant  by  this, 
that  if  several  of  the  New  England  States  would  reject  it  as 
not  having  been  passed  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  Congress,  the 
people  would  immediately  fall  in  line  and  clamor  for  seperation. 
The  problem  confronting  the  Junto  was  how  to  get  the  people 
prepared  and  willing  to  follow  them.  However  firmly  con- 
vinced that  their  plan  was  good,  they  found  many  a  "doubting 
Thomas"  and  this  work  progressed  slowly. 

It  has  been  shown  that  the  Junto  believed  it  to  be  absolutely 
necessary  that  New  York  be  made  the  central  point  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  question,  therefore,  was  how  to  get  control 
of  it.  They  must  capture  New  York  and  find  some  one  to  lead 
in  the  final  dash.  Pickering,  although  never  wanting  in  argu- 
ment, was  not  the  person,  they  felt,  to  place  at  the  head  of 
their  Confederacy.  At  length  they  saw  a  chance  to  elect  Aaron 
Burr  Governor  of  New  York,  and,  in  this  way,  estabhsh  the 
man  they  most  despised  as  leader  and  ruler  of  the  Northern 
Union. 

The  silent  but  persistent  determination  of  Jefferson's  friends 
to  force  Burr  into  retirement  produced  much  bitterness  in  New 
York,  where  the  Vice-President  had  a  nest  of  young  followers 
gaping  for  office.     There  was  no  effort  to  re-nominate  Burr 

•°  A  lawyer  and  judge  in  Connecticut ;  a  brother-in-law  of  Burr,  and 
well  acquainted  with  the  Junto  schemes. 

'*  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  342;  see  note  added  by  Pickering. 

^  Twelfth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution. 

"^  That  the  amendment  had  not  been  passed  by  two-thirds  of  the  en- 
tire number  composing  the  respective  Houses. 


39 


for  the  Vice-Presidency.  Governor  Clinton,  the  new  nominee 
for  the  office,  decHned  to  be  re-nominated  as  New  York's  Gov- 
ernor. It  became  necessary,  therefore,  to  choose  a  candidate 
for  the  Governorship.  The  regular  Republican  nomination  fell 
upon  Chief  Justice  Lewis. ^'^  The  opposing  faction  of  the  same 
party  nominated  Aaron  Burr,  with  the  confident  expectation 
that  the  Federalists  would  cast  their  votes  for  him. 

It  was  the  work  of  the  Burrites  in  New  York  that  opened 
the  way  for  the  Junto.  Before  Congress  adjourned,  therefore, 
the  Eastern  separatists  conferred  with  Burr  regarding  the  sit- 
uation in  New  York.*'"^  They  believed  that  Mr.  Burr  ought  to 
commit  himself  definitely  to  other  policies  if  they  should  con- 
sent to  throw  all  of  their  weight  into  the  contest  and  elect  him. 
The  Junto  knew  that  they  could  not,  even  in  conjunction  with 
the  New  York  Federalists,  elect  a  Governor  because  the  last 
election  had  exhibited  so  large  a  Republican  majority."**  But 
they  saw  a  chance,  in  conjunction  with  the  Burrites,  to  elect 
Mr.  Burr,  thereby  scoring  two  points :  ( i )  The  capture  of  New 
York  for  the  center  of  their  Union;  (2)  the  election  of  a  man 
whose  only  virtue,  in  their  opinion,  was  that  he  w^as  unscrupu- 
lous enough  to  do  their  bidding. 

Mr.  Griswold  made  an  engagement  to  call  on  Burr  in  New 
York  after  the  close  of  Congress.  Griswold  wrote  Wolcott 
saying:  "Burr  has  expressed  a  wish  to  see  me,  and  to  con- 
verse, but  his  situation*'"  in  this  place  does  not  admit  of  it ;  and 
he  begged  me  to  call  on  him  in  New  York.  Indeed,  I  do  not  see 
how  he  can  avoid  a  free  and  full  explanation  with  Federal 
men."*^'^  According  to  Hamilton's  Republic*'^  the  interview  took 
place  between  Griswold  and  Burr  at  the  home  of  the  latter  in 
New  York,  on  the  4th  of  April.  And  with  the  same  cautious 
non-committal  he  had  shown  during  the  Presidential  election, 
Burr  stated  that  he  must  go  on  as  a  democrat  to  obtain  the 
Government ;  that,  if  he  succeeded,  he  would  administer  it  in 

"*  Mr.  Lansing  was  first  nominated  but'  declined,  and  Judge  Lewis 
was   nominated. 

*"  Schouler,  vol.  3,  p.  70. 

"^  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  354;  Griswold  to  Wolcott.  Hammond's 
"Political  Hist,  of  X.  Y.,"  vol.  i,  p.  202. 

^  He  refers  to  his  position  as  Vice-President. 

^^  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  354;  note  the  expression  "Federal  men" 
not  party. 

*"*  Hamilton's  "iRepublic,"  vol.  7,  p.  786. 

40 


a  manner  that  would  be  satisfactory  to  the  FederaUsts.  In 
respect  to  the  affairs  of  the  Union  Burr  said :  "The  Northern 
States  must  be  governed  by  Virginia,  or  govern  Virginia,  and 
there  is  no  middle  course." 

In  the  letter,  referred  to  above,  Griswold  adds  :  "He  (Burr) 
speaks  in  the  most  bitter  terms  of  the  Virginia  faction,  and  of 
the  necessity  of  a  Union  at  the  Northward  to  resist  it;  and  it 
may  be  presumed  that  the  support  given  to  him  by  Federal 
men  would  tend  to  reconcile  the  feeling  of  those  Democrats 
who  are  becoming  dissatisfied  with  their  Southern  masters." 
Thus  they  were  forced  to  accept  Burr  in  a  "Just  as  I  am"  atti- 
tude. It  was  too  great  a  chance,  however,  to  be  recklessly  flung 
away.  So  the  Junto  aid  and  the  influence  were  tendered  Burr 
with  hope  pitted  against  fate. 

The  question  then  arises,  by  what  great  process  of  juggling 
patriotism  and  statesmanship,  could  a  few  New  England  Fed- 
eralists control  an  election  in  New  York?  By  what  great 
stretch  of  moral  principles  could  they  relieve  their  consciences 
after  thrusting  such  a  character  as  Aaron  Burr  upon  New 
York  as  Governor?  We  will  again  quote  Robert  Griswold  for 
our  answer.  "Although  the  people  of  New  England,"  he  says. 
"have  not  on  ordinary  occasions,'^^  a  right  to  give  an  opinion 
in  regard  to  New  York,  yet  upon  this  occasion  we  are  almost 
as  deeply  interested  as  the  people  of  that  state  can  be.  If  any 
other  project  can  be  fallen  upon  which  will  produce  the  effect 
desired  of  creating  a  union  of  Northern  States,  I  should  cer- 
tainly prefer  it.  ...  The  election  of  Colonel  Burr  is  the  only 
hope  which,  at  this  time  presents  itself  of  rallying  in  defense  of 
the  Northern  States."  ^^ 

Mr.  Pickering  in  his  attempt  to  influence  Rufus  King^-  wrote 
from  Washington,  March  4,  1804:  "The  Federalists  here,  in 
general,  anxiously  desire  the  election  of  Mr.  Burr  to  the  Chair 
of  New  York ;  for  they  despair  of  a  present  ascendancy  of  the 
Federal  party.  Mr.  Burr  alone,  we  think,  can  break  your  Dem- 
ocratic phalanx ;  and  we  anticipate  much  good  from  his  success. 

™This  was  certainly  an  extraordinary  one.  If  Burr  had  been  placed 
over  a  Northern  Confederacy,  the  sectional  questions,  would  probably 
have  been  settled  early  in  our  history,  and  under  different  circumstances. 

^^  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  354;  Hamilton's  "Republic."  vol.  7,  p.  782. 

"  King  and  Hamilton  were  never  persuaded  to  adopt  a  secession 
policy. 

41 


Were  New  York  detached  (as  under  his  administration  it 
would  be)  from  the  Virginia  influence,  the  Union  would  be 
benefited.  Jefferson  would  be  forced  to  observe  some  caution 
and  forbearance  in  his  measures. "^^  Pickering  evidently 
meant  that  the  Northern  Union  would  be  much  more  likely  to 
succeed. 

There  is  one  figure  that  we  must  not  lose  sight  of  who  was 
able,  at  any  moment,  to  stay  or  forward  the  plot  of  the  Junto. 
Alexander  Hamilton  leading  a  quiet  life  at  his  home  in  New 
York  was  watching  the  movement  of  the  New  England  Fed- 
eralists with  an  eagle's  eye,  ready  to  swoop  down  and  devour 
their  dearest  plans  if  they  did  not  accord  with  his  ideas.  Ham- 
ilton was  the  man  whose  yea  or  nay,  at  this  critical  moment, 
could  decide  the  destiny  of  the  Union.  There  is  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  his  and  only  his  leadership,  could  rally 
the  New  York  people  to  action.  Once  he  had  defeated  Aaron 
Burr  and  the  Junto;  would  he  do  it  again? 

About  the  time  the  nominations  were  being  made  in  New 
York  a  few  leading  Federalists  held  an  informal  conference  at 
Albany  to  consider  the  expediency  of  either  nominating  a  Fed- 
eralist candidate,  or  if  this  should  not  prove  expedient,  of  sup- 
porting either  of  their  opponents'  candidates.^*  Hamilton 
knowing  the  intention  of  the  Junto,  and  viewing  it  as  a  question 
far  beyond  the  politics  of  New  York,  was  present.^^  To  his 
mind  it  was  a  question  of  the  preservation  or  of  the  dissolution 
of  the  Union.  He  read,  therefore,  a  paper  of  very  great  im- 
portance before  the  conference,  entitled :  ''Reasons  why  it  is 
desirable  that  Mr.  Lansing,'^^  rather  than  Colonel  Burr,  should 
succeed. "^^  The  point  which  Mr.  Hamilton  made  in  this  paper 
was  that  Mr.  Burr  had  always  pursued  the  track  of  Democratic 
politics.  This,  he  had  done  either  from  principle  or  from  cal- 
culation. If  the  former  he  would  not  at  that  time  change  his 
plan  when  the  Federalists  were  prostrate.  If  the  latter,  he 
certainly  would  not  relinquish  the  ladder  of  his  ambition,  and 
espouse  the  cause  of  a  weaker  party.     He  went  further,  how- 

"  Pickering  Mss.,  March  4,  1804. 

'■•Hamilton's  "Republic,"  vol.  7,  p.  770;  Von  Hoist,  vol.   i,  p.   198. 
''Ibid. 

^'  Lansing  had  not  yet  resigned  the  nomination. 

"  Hamilton's  "Republic,"  vol.  7,  p.  7/0.  The  paper  is  here  printed  in 
full. 

42 


ever,  and  said  that,  "It  would  probably  suit  Mr.  Burr's  views  to 
promote  this  result,  to  be  the  chief  of  the  Northern  Portion ; 
and,  placed  at  the  head  of  the  State  of  New  York,  no  man 
would  be  more  likely  to  succeed."  Hamilton  contended  that 
Burr  would  not  be  true  to  his  promises,  if  he  had  made  any 
to  the  Federalists,  but  when  they  had  elevated  him  to  power  in 
New  York,  he  would  desert  them,  and  simply  use  his  office  to 
form  a  greater  Democratic  wing  in  the  North,  in  opposition 
to  the  Jefferson  wing,  in  the  hope  of  being  the  next  President. 

In  spite  of  Hamilton's  protests  the  Burr  press,  two  days  after 
Burr's  nomination  as  Governor,  opened  with  the  following: 
**Burr  is  the  man  who  must  be  supported  or  the  weight  of  the 
Northern  States  in  the  scale  of  the  Union  is  irrecoverably  lost. 
If  the  southern  and  particularly  the  Virginia  interests,  are  al- 
lowed to  destroy  this  man,  we  may  give  up  all  hope  of  ever 
furnishing  a  President  to  the  United  States."^® 

Jefferson  had  divined  their  scheme  from  the  coalition  of  the 
Eastern  Federalists  with  the  Burrites ;  but  it  gave  him  no  un- 
easiness. "The  object,"  he  said,  "of  the  Federalists  is  to  divide 
the  Republicans,  join  the  majority,  and  barter  with  them  for 
the  cloak  of  their  name;  .  .  .  the  price  is  simple.  .  .  .  The 
idea  is  clearly  to  form  a  basis  of  a  separation  of  the  Union. "'^^ 

What  a  deplorable  and  dangerous  state  of  affairs!  The 
Junto  supporting  Burr  as  the  only  hope  of  carrying  through 
their  Northern  Confederacy  plot;  the  New  York  wing  of  the 
Republican  party,  or  the  Burrites,  supporting  him  in  opposition 
to  Virginia  influence,  as  the  only  ^ope  of  ever  furnishing  a 
President  to  the  United  States.  One  contemplating  a  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Union  with  Burr  as  leader  of  the  northern  section ; 
the  other  hoping,  at  some  future  day,  to  elect  this  dangerous 
man  President  of  the  United  States.  Either  scheme,  if  suc- 
cessful, would  have  been  disastrous.  Colonel  Burr's  prospects, 
too,  seemed  to  assume  an  imposing  prospect.  His  Republican 
friends  in  New  York,  though  not  numerous,  were  talented,  in- 
dustrious and  indefatigable  in  their  exertions ;  and  in  view  of 
Federal  support,  his  chances  were  very  encouraging. 

The  election  was  carried  by  the  united  friends  of  the  admin- 

'**  The  Morning  Chronicle,  February  22,  1804 ;  Hamilton's  "Republic," 
vol.  7,  p.  777- 
'*  Jefferson's  Works,  vol.  4,  p.  542. 

43 


istration,  Lewis  receiving  35,000  votes,  while  Burr  received 
28,000.^^^  Mr.  Burr  undoubtedly  received  a  very  considerable 
number  of  Republican  votes  ;  he  failed,  however,  in  consequence 
of  the  defection  of  a  portion  of  the  Federal  party.  This  ele- 
ment of  the  Federal  party  was  controlled  and  influenced  by  the 
paper  read  at  Albany,  just  before  the  nomination,  by  Alexander 
Hamilton.  It  was  New  York's  portion  of  the  Federal  party 
which  the  Junto  could  not  control.  Hamilton's  prophecy,  that 
no  reliance  could  be  placed  in  Burr,  had  very  great  weight  with 
this  class  of  voters.  It  was  that  class  whom  the  Federalists 
claimed  should  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Government. 

It  was  Mr.  Hamilton's  paper,  therefore,  coupled  with  the 
sound  judgment  of  the  New  York  Federalists,  that  defeated 
Aaron  Burr.  This  was  the  second  time  that  Hamilton  had  come 
to  the  rescue  of  his  country  and  defeated  Aaron  Burr ;  twice 
he  had  defeated  the  "Essex  Junto" ;  but  it  was  the  last  defeat 
for  Burr's  bullet  was  soon  to  place  his  most  bitter  rival  beyond 
the  vale  of  political  strife.  Hamilton  was  the  barrier  over 
which  the  dizzy  ambitions  of  the  Union  breakers  could  not 
climb.  Burr'r  political  defeat,  followed  by  Hamihon's  tragic 
death,  therefore,  checked  the  Eastern  Confederacy  plot  in  its 
first  state  of  development.  This  proved  to  be  the  greatest  blow 
that  had  yet  befallen  the  Junto  and  its  members  sank  into  deep 
despair.  Unfortunately,  however,  there  was  a  later  growth 
from  the  same  root.  The  plan  of  separation  was  not  abandon- 
ed^^ but  only  allowed  to  He  dormant  for  a  while.  "Not  dead 
but  sleepeth.'' 

The  returns  of  the  national  election  proved  beyond  question 
that  the  Eastern  Federalists  had  no  national  issue  against  the 
administration  which  had  been  peaceful,  popular,  and  very  suc- 
cessful. JeiTerson  and  Clinton  swept  the  country  with  ease  in 
November  carrying  the  greater  part  of  New  England,  Massa- 
chusetts unexpectedly  included.'^-  Pinckney  and  King  did  not 
get  an  electoral  vote  in  their  respective  states.  Connecticut, 
Delaware,  and  two  votes  from  Maryland  gave  them  14  against 
162  for  Jefferson  and  Clinton.''^  The  election  proved  very  clear- 

'"  Hammond's  "Political  Hist,  of  N.  Y.,"  vol.  i,  p.  208;  Schouler,  vol. 

3,  p.  70. 

''Tracy  to  Plumer,  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  106. 

■■*"  Schouler,  vol.  3,  p.  75- 

^'' Ibid.,  appendix  electoral  table. 

44 


ly  that  Mr.  Griswold's  fears  were  not  without  foundation  when 
he  said :  ''Whilst  we  are  waiting  for  the  time  to  arrive  in  New 
England,  it  is  certain  that  Democracy  is  making  daily  inroads 
upon  us,  and  our  means  of  resistance  are  becoming  less  every 
day."®*  The  Republicans  were  daily  creeping  up  to  the  very 
doors  of  the  Junto ;  Vermont  and  Rhode  Island  having  gone 
Republican  in  the  State  elections,  and  the  National  election  be- 
ing so  decisive,  it  showed  up  the  plotters  in  a  light  that  needs 
no  comment  and  is  severe  enough. 

Throughout  the  period  from  1800  to  1808,  Massachusetts 
changed  her  method  of  choosing  her  electors  three  times.  Gov- 
ernor Strong,  in  1800,  sanctioned  a  resolve  to  have  the  Legis- 
lature choose  the  electors  of  the  President  and  Vice-President. 
A  republican  addressing  the  electors  in  1805,  declared  that  this 
sanction  had  been  influenced  by  the  Junto  for  the  purpose  of 
excluding  a  Republican  from  the  Presidency.®^  In  1804,  the 
Junto  discovered  that  electors  had  best  be  elected  by  general 
ticket  in  order  to  preserve  the  Constitution  and  the  liberty  of 
the  people.®*'  But  again  in  1808,  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution 
and  the  rights  of  the  people  required  that  the  choice  should  be 
transferred  from  the  people  to  a  federal  majority  in  the  Legis- 
lature, which  majority  being  the  Essex  Junto,  could  by  no 
means  represent  the  character  of  the  State. ®^ 

The  remarkable  facility  with  which  the  Junto  could  destroy 
systems  without  substituting  anything,  reminds  one  of  the 
words  of  a  pious  Connecticut  priest :  ''Even  hogs,"  said  he,  "can 
root  up  a  garden ;  but  they  can  never  plant  one." 

***  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  345,  appendix. 

"'  Political  Tracts,  1805-1812.     Compiled  from  original  documents. 

^  The  Democrat,  Boston,  June  15,  1808. 

''Ibid. 


45 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Embargo  of  1807  and  the  Junto's  Plans  for  a 
British  Alliance 

After  the  overthrow  of  Aaron  Burr  in  New  York  and  the 
death  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  the  plotters  were  without  a  lead- 
er other  than  Mr.  Pickering,  whose  leadership  consisted  prin- 
cipally in  the  preparation  of  illogical  but  optimistic  documents. 
Therefore,  we  find  the  Northern  Confederacy  plan  lying  dor- 
mant for  quite  a  long  period.  In  fact,  the  next  secession 
movement  which  presents  itself  is  in  connection  with  Jeffer- 
son's Embargo  Act  of  1807. 

The  Junto,  mortified  as  they  had  constantly  been  since  1798 
in  national  affairs,  though  influential  on  their  own  grounds, 
felt  the  humiliation  of  being  gradually  cast  aside  by  an  ex- 
panding democracy.  More  states  were  in  full  attune  with  the 
Jefferson  administration  during  this  protracted  Junto  sleep  than 
ever  before.  Merchants  without  distinction  of  party  had  but 
of  neutral  frauds.^  Mr.  Pickering,  in  a  letter  to  Mr.  Lowell 
many  years  later,  says :  "Much  against  his  will,  and  contrary 
to  his  own  better  judgment,  Mr.  Cabot  was  placed  at  the  head 
of  a  committee  which,  in  1806,  subscribed  and  sent  to  Wash- 
ington the  remonstrances  drawn  by  Lloyd  -  against  the  British 
doctrine  concerning  neutral  trade.  He  signed  it  simply  as  a 
merchant."  ^ 

The  Junto  men  decried  the  Administration  for  mean  temper 
and  a  reliance  upon  moral  suasion  to  protect  American  com- 
merce, and  yet ,  strangely  inconsistent,  they  counselled  to 
tamest  submission  to  British  search  and  impressment.  When 
the  Chesapeake  affront  came,  Hke  a  blow  in  the  face,  to  peace 
and  neutrality,  their  first  thought  was,  how  to  persuade  others 
to  bear  it  meekly. 

Every  reader  of  history  is  more  or  less  familiar  with  Jef- 

^  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  315. 

-James  Lloyd  later  succeeds  J.  Q.  Adams  in  U    S.  Senate. 

'  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  542. 

46 


f arson's  embargo ;  but,  in  order  to  hinge  the  next  secession 
movement  upon  it  (where  it  certainly  belongs),  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  explain  its  purpose,  as  frequent  references  to  it  must 
be  made  throughout  this  chapter.  Jay's  treaty  had  not  re- 
moved very  many  of  the  well  grounded  grievances  of  the 
United  States  against  Great  Britain  and,  by  degrees,  new  ones 
were  added  to  the  old.  The  prospect  of  a  more  friendly  un- 
derstanding seemed  to  be  diminishing  as  time  went  on.  This 
was  due  partly  to  the  fact  that  Jefferson  would  have  all  or 
nothing  and  partly  because  Great  Britain,  despite  occasional 
advances,  grew  more  overbearing  every  day. 

Napoleon  found  herein  a  convenient  pretense  to  assert 
"might  before  right,"  and  ere  long  both  France  and  England 
began  to  disregard  the  laws  of  recognized  neutrality.  There- 
fore, England's  declaration  of  a  blackade  of  May  i6,  1806,  and 
the  Order  in  Council  of  November  11,  1807,*  on  the  one  hand 
and  Napoleon's  Berlin  decree  of  November  26,  1806,  and  his 
Milan  decree  of  December  17,  1807,^  on  the  other,  made  it 
quite  impossible  for  neutral  seafaring  nations  to  sail  uninjured. 
Neither  interest  nor  self  respect,  therefore,  would  seem  to  war- 
rant the  United  States  quietly  acquiescing  in  this  violence.  But 
there  were  still  two  very  strong  parties  pulling  in  opposite 
directions.  The  Federalists  washed  to  center  our  warth  upon 
France  and  thus  induce  England  to  adopt  a  more  favorable 
policy  toward  us.  The  administration  party  would  hear  noth- 
ing of  war ;  they  did  not  want  to  fight  France  and  feared  war 
with  Great  Britain. 

Jefferson  and  the  Congressional  majority,  therefore,  soon 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  necessary  to  take  a  very 
decided  stand.  So  on  the  i8th  of  December  the  President 
recommended  an  embargo.^  Congress  immediately  passed 
such  a  bill  as  recommended  and  it  became  a  law  December  21, 
1807.'^  This  measure  closed  all  American  ports  to  all  foreign 
commerce  with  the  hope  that  it  would  show  France,  and  es- 
pecially England,  that  we  were  really  a  national  power,  and 

*Von  Hoist's  "Constitutional  Hist,  of  U.  S.,"  vol.  i,  p.  200. 

"  Ibid. 

'Randall's  "Jefferson,"  vol.  3,  p.  242. 

'^Von  Hoist's  "Constitutional  Hist,  of  U.  S.,"  vol.  i,  p.  202.  Moore's 
"Int.  Law  Digest,"  vol.  5,  pp.  1445-1454,  gives  the  above  mentioned  de- 
crees in  full. 

47 


force  them  to  recognize  and  respect  our  commerce  and 
seamen. 

Lord  Eldon,  Chancellor  of  England,  said  in  Parliament: 
"The  Order  in  Council  of  November  ii,  was  intended  to  make 
America,  at  least  sensible  to  the  policy  of  joining  England 
against  France.^  Although  we  have  no  authority  except  the 
newspapers  of  the  day,  it  seems  a  fair  confession  of  the  British 
Government's  views  and  we  have  no  reason  to  question  its 
truth  since  the  Chancellor  of  England  is  a  member  of  the 
Privy  Council,  and  called  the  keeper  of  the  King's  conscience. 

But  the  Administration  did  not  wish  to  join  England  against 
France.  It  did  not  wish  to  join  France  against  England.  It 
only  wished  to  maintain  a  strict  neutrality,  aiding  neither  the 
one  or  bowing  down  to  the  other.  Sir  William  Scott  was  presi- 
dent of  the  British  Prize  Court  from  1806  to  1807,  and  moulded 
their  doctrines  and  decisions  in  conformity  with  the  views  of 
his  Government.  Under  the  pretence  of  supporting  what  were 
claim.ed  to  be  British  maritime  rights,  he  extinguished  many 
of  the  just  rights  and  privileges  of  other  nations." 

It  is  not  necessary  to  say  that  the  embargo  fell  as  heavily 
upon  New  England  as  did  the  Highway  robbery  of  Great 
Britain.  New  England  certainly  was,  owing  to  her  commerce, 
punished  most  severely  by  both  England  and  America. 
France  and  England  were  robbing  their  ships  and  impressing 
their  seamen.  The  United  States  forbade  their  ships  going 
to  sea  and  the  ships  of  these  nations  from  landing  in  their 
ports,  both  of  which  were  severe  upon  the  New  England  com- 
merce. But  her  motives  were  very  different,  and  should  have 
appealed  to  New  England  patriotism  accordingly.  It  would 
have  been  next  to  impossible  for  the  United  States  to  have  at- 
tempted any  means  of  redress  without  striking  New  England 
harder  than  any  other  portion  of  the  young  nation.  That  does 
not  argue  that  the  embargo  was  the  wisest  method  of  coercion. 
It  does  not  say  that  it  was  a  successful  measure.  It  is  simply 
explaining  a  situation  which  had  to  be  met.  We  have  seen 
how  the  United  States  Government  attempted  to  meet  it,  hence 
it  only  remains  for  us  to  discover  how  the  Embargo  was  sup- 
ported by  New  England  and  the  Junto. 

It  is  very  gratifying  to  be  able  to  say  that  while  New  Eng- 

'  The  Essex  Register,  Aug.  31,  i8o8- 
'^Perkin's  "Late  War,"  p  .21. 

48 


land  has  gasped  and  struggled  against  the  increasing  hardships 
imposed  by  France  and  England,  and  afterwards,  against  the 
constraints  of  the  embargo  which  pressed  heavily  upon  her. 
yet  most  of  her  sons  remained  loyal  and  consonant  with  the 
general  determination  of  this  country  to  fight  rather  than  sub- 
mit to  the  injustice  of  Europe.  Bound  up  in  commerce,  and 
not  being  able  to  divert  her  capital  on  such  sudden  notice,  sub- 
mission to  the  embargo  policy  was  to  her  somewhat  like  suicide 
to  prevent  dishonor.  But  while  thus  suffering,  the  thread  of  her 
immediate  interest  was  skillfully  separated  from  that  of  the 
nation  into  which  it  was  corded,  and  the  Northern  Confederacy 
remnant  began  to  lead  her  whither  they  had  sought  to  lead 
before.  The  embargo  was  like  the  "bloody  shirt"  of  later  times 
and  it  was  not  waived  without  effect. 

This  time  the  movement  was  far  more  secret  than  before. 
In  fact,  it  is  so  secret  that  very  little  is  known  about  it.  Their 
plans  are  distinct,  however,  and,  giving  them  the  advantage  of 
every  doubt,  there  is  still  sufficient  evidence  to  show  that  the 
Northern  plotters,  in  this  stage  of  our  narrative,  conceived  and 
gave  life  to  a  plan  by  which  they  could  resist  the  embargo  on 
Constitutional  grounds ;  withdraw  from  the  Union  by  refusing 
all  aid  and  obedience ;  peaceably  if  they  could,  by  means  of 
civil  war  if  they  must ;  and  ally  themselves  with  Great  Britain. 
British  America  was  of  course  to  join  the  confederacy.  This, 
therefore,  is  the  next  step  toward  a  Northern  Confederacy, 
beginning  soon  after  the  pas\sage  of  ithe  embargo,  living 
throughout  the  years  1808  and  1809,  and  expiring  at  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Non-intercourse  Act. 

Before  taking  up  the  real  agitation  favoring  separation  and 
a  British  Alliance  there  is  an  interesting  convention  in  con- 
nection with  the  approaching  national  election  which  should 
not  be  overlooked.  It  is  interesting  and  important  for  two 
reasons:  i.  It  was  the  first  attempt  at  a  national  nominating 
convention.  2.  It  was  organized  and  made  a  reality  by  a  secret 
movement  of  the  "Essex  Junto."  A  letter  appearing  in  the 
Boston  Gazette,  June  2y,  1808,  discussing  the  embargo  con- 
cludes: "All  the  grandees^"  say,  we  must  do  something,  or 
our  party  will  be  ruined.  The  Federalists  talk  of  supporting 
Clinton  for  President,  because  he's  against  the  embargo;  and 
Madison  is  in  favor  of  it ;  but  they  say  we  must  do  something." 

"The  reference  is  to  the  Junto. 

49 


The  great  question  before  the  Federahst  party  was  to  de- 
feat Madison.  How  was  this  to  be  done  ?  Some  method  was 
necessary  which  would  be  binding  on  the  whole  party.  They 
had  found  the  caucus  ineffective  for  party  harmony  in  1800. 
In  1808,  moreover,  there  were  too  few  Federalists  at  Wash- 
ington to  make  a  caucus  practicable.  A  convention  of  dele- 
gates seemed  to  be  the  only  alternative.^^  The  Republican 
nominees  were  Madison  for  President,  and  George  Clinton  for 
Vice-President.  Indications  soon  proved  that  the  Clintonians 
were  bidding  for  Federalist  backing.  Clinton  disapproved  of 
the  embargo,  or  he  let  it  be  understood  that  he  did,  because  he 
had  hoped  for  the  Presidential  honors  for  himself.^-  Here 
was  the  Federalists'  opportunity.  Clinton  had  endorsed  their 
policies ;  why  not  support  him  instead  of  going  down  to  defeat 
with  candidates  of  their  own? 

It  may  be  stated  that  the  early  state  elections  had  not  been 
wholly  without  encouragement,  although  the  Republicans  had 
succeeded  in  electing  a  Governor  in  Massachusetts.  New 
York  retained  a  majority  of  Federahsts  in  her  assembly,  and 
Vermont  and  Connecticut  were  solid  for  the  Federalists.^^ 
These  results  were  brought  about  mainly  through  the  skillful 
use,  by  Junto  members,  of  a  potent  electioneering  weapon  fur- 
nished them  by  Jefferson — the  embargo.  They  were  quick  to 
see  the  possibilities  of  this  weapon  for  arousing  the  people 
and  did  not  fail  to  use  it.  "The  embargo  will  touch  their  bone 
and  their  flesh,  when  they  must  curse  its  authors,"  wrote 
Pickering.^'^ 

With  these  considerations  in  their  minds,  the  Junto  began 
in  earnest  the  work  of  deciding  on  the  moot  question  of  the 
Presidential  nomination.  Details  of  the  action  of  Federalist 
leaders  in  Massachusetts,  are  preserved  in  two  letters  from 
Christopher  Gore  to  Rufus  King.^^  The  Federalist  legislative 
caucus  at  Boston  appointed  a  committee  of  twenty,  which  in 
turn  appointed  a  committee  to  correspond  with  the  Federal- 

^^Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  No.  4,  July,  1912,  pp.  744-745- 

"J.  D.  Hammond's  "Political  Parties,"  N.  Y.,  vol.  i,  p.  269;  "Am. 
Hist.  Rev.,"  No.  4,  July  1912,  p.  746. 

''Ibid. 

"Adams'  "Federalism,"  Pickering  to  Rose,  p.  366;  "Am.  Hist.  Rev.," 
No.  4,  July  1912,  p.  747. 

^' These  letters  of  June  8  and  16,  are  in  King's  "Rugus  King,"  vol.  5, 
pp.  ICO-102. 

=;o 


ists  in  other  states  on  the  business  of  the  next  election  of 
President  and  Vice-President,  and  for  the  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining their  weight  and  concerting  arrangements  for  the  elec- 
tion/^ The  committee  consisted  of  George  Cabot,  H.  G.  Otis, 
President  of  the  Senate,  Christopher  Gore,  member  of  the 
House,  Timothy  Bigelow,  Speaker  of  the  House  and  James 
Lloyd,  a  Boston  merchant  who  had  just  been  chosen  Adams' 
successor  in  the  United  States  Senate.^^  All  were  Boston  men 
and  all  of  Junto  persuasion,  recognizing  Pickering  as  their 
leader. 

The  committee  held  a  meeting  on  June  lO,  when  after  a 
considerable  debate,  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  propose  a 
meeting  of  Federalists,  from  as  many  states  as  could  be  sea- 
sonably notified,  at  New  York  the  last  of  that  or  the  beginning 
of  the  next  month.^^  Here,  then,  is  the  original  proposition  for 
a  would-be  national  nominating  convention.^''  The  idea,  in  this 
instance,  was  revolutionary  in  party  machinery,  both  from  a 
Federalist  and  from  a  national  point  of  view.  Nominations 
by  conventions  of  self-chosen  delegates  was  necessarily  revo- 
lutionary and  despotic.  The  people  were  bartering  away  their 
franchise  in  promising  to  support  candidates  chosen  by  self- 
delegated  bodies. 

The  work,  of  securing  a  national  representation  in  the  con- 
vention was  carried  on  by  personal  communications  from  Bos- 
ton, New  York,  and  Philadelphia.  The  Massachusetts 
committee  of  correspondence  at  their  meeting  on  June  lo,  sent 
Livermore^*'  to  New  Hampshire,  Bigelow  to  Vermont,  and  Otis 
to  Rhode  Island,  to  arrange  for  some  person,  or  persons,  to 
represent  their  states  in  the  New  York  Convention. ^^  The 
committee,  in  this  manner,  sent  men  into  every  Federal  strong- 
hold possible. 

On  August   15,    1808,  and  the  third  Monday,  this  embryo 

"Gore  to  King,  July  16,  King's  "King,"  vol.  5,  p.  loi. 

"  Adams  had  resigned  his  seat  in  Senate  on  account  of  friction  be- 
tween Junto  members  and  himself. 

""' King's  "Rufus  King,"  vol.  5,  p.  loi. 

"  The  curious  student  will  search  in  vain  for  very  much  information 
on  this  subject.  A  few  letters  by  the  Junto  is  all  the  material  to  be  had 
on  this  movement. 

^"Originally  a  New  Hampshire  man;  member  of  Congress  from  the 
Essex  North  district,   1807-1811. 

^King's  "King,"  vol.  5,  p.  loi ;  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  July  1912,  p.  750. 

51 


national  convention  met  in  New  York.--  Its  existence  could 
not  even  be  guessed  from  the  Federalist  journals,  but  the 
coming  together  of  so  many  noted  Federalists  did  not  escape 
the  eyes  of  the  Republican  press.  The  Boston  Independent 
Chronicle,  August  22,  says :  "On  Friday  last  a  detachment  from 
the  Essex  Junto  passed  through  Hartford,  on  their  way  to 
New  York,  there  by  agreement,  to  meet  the  other  Choice 
Spirits,  for  the  purpose  of  appointing  a  king  to  rule  over  us." 
Where  the  session  was  held  can  only  be  a  matter  of  conjecture. 
We  do  not  know. 

Eight  states  were  represented,  says  Mr.  S.  E.  Morison,  "New 
York,  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  South  Carolina."-^  The  number 
and  personnel  of  the  members  is  also  largely  a  matter  of  con- 
jecture; but  it  is  certain  that  Massachusetts  sent  three  mem- 
bers because  we  have  a  letter  from  Cabot  to  Pickering,  August 
10,  1808,  stating:  "The  gentlemen  from  this  place  are  Mr. 
Otis,  Mr.  Gore,  and  Mr.  Lloyd. "^*  We  do  not  know  the  num- 
ber of  representatives.  We  have  no  direct  evidence  as  to  how 
the  delegates  were  chosen  but  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
they  were  selected  by  exclusive  committees.  We  have  extracts 
from  letters  by  Hare  of  Philadelphia  and  Benson  of  New  York 
to  the  Corresponding  Committee  indicating  that  such  a  method 
was  employed. ^^ 

Of  the  proceedings  of  the  1808  Convention  we  know  no 
more  than  the  bare  results ;  but  the  whole  question  of  whether 
Clinton  should  be  supported  or  whether  separate  nominations 
should  be  made,  was  so  thoroughly  threshed  out  in  the  corres- 
pondence that  we  cannot  mistake  its  object,  and  the  trend  of 
the  discussion.  We  know,  too,  that  Charles  C.  Pinckney  was 
nominated  for  the  office  of  President  and  Rufus  King  for  the 
office  of  Vice-President.  Gore  wrote  King  from  Boston,  June 
16,  1808,  saying:    "Our  people  are  anxious  to  support  a  Fed- 

^  Cabot  to  Pickering,  Aug.  10,  says :  "Oh  Monday  next  a  conference 
will  be  held  in  New  York,  for  the  purpose  of  settling  on  a  Presidential 
Candidate."  "August  15,  was  date  agreed  upon,"  says  Morison;  see 
Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  July  191 2,  p.  753. 

"  Morison  quotes  this  information  from  the  Otis  Mss.,  giving  as  a 
quotation  the  above  from  the  N.  Y.  Committee  to  the  Charleston  Com- 
mittee, September  1808.    See  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  July  1912,  p.  753. 

^Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  397. 

^  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  July  1912,  pp.  748-52. 

52 


eral  candidate  from  New  York  instead  of  one  from  South 
Carolina ;  provided  there's  the  possibiHty  of  success."-*^ 

Pinckney's  nomination  was  due  largely  to  the  hope  of  cap- 
turing his  native  state  and  to  the  wish  of  avoiding  the  stigma 
of  sectionaHsm.-^  And  the  above  was  about  the  only  opposition 
to  his  nomination  after  Clinton  was  ruled  out. 

The  Convention  having  been  summoned  and  conducted  in 
secret,  was  to  be  extremely  discreet  in  announcing  its  nomin- 
ations. The  original  plan  for  the  public  announcement,  and  the 
reasons  for  making  an  eleventh  hour  change  are  given  in  a 
letter  from  Thomas  Fitzsimon's  of  Philadelphia  to  Gore,  Otis, 
and  Lloyd,  the  Massachusetts  delegation.  "When  we  separa- 
ted at  New  York,"  it  says,  "it  was  understood  that  the  result 
of  our  Conference,  should  not  be  made  public  until  the  event 
of  the  election  in  Pennsylvania-^  should  be  made  known  and 
until  the  Conferees  from  that  state  should  deem  a  publication 
of  it  proper.  Circumstances  have  since  occurred  which,  in 
their  opinion,  rendered  any  publication  of  that  kind  inexpedi- 
ent, and  led  them  to  conclude  that  the  safer  course  would  be 
to  let  our  friends  in  each  state  announce  the  candidates  to  their 
fellow  citizens,  at  such  time,  and  in  such  way  as  they  should 
think  best.  We  were  led  to  this  conclusion  from  having  ob- 
served something  like  a  jealousy  in  our  friends  at  having 
a  nomination  so  important  decided  upon  by  so  small  a  number 
as  we  were,  and  without  any  special  authority  for  the  purpose. 
Hence  we  deem  it  most  prudent  that  it  should  appear  the  result 
of  general  sentiment  rather  than  the  choice  of  a  few  to  bind 
their  party."^^ 

An  article  in  the  Boston  Gazette,  October  20,  entitled, 
"Grand  Federal  Nomination,"  makes  the  following  statement : 
"We  have  the  satisfaction  to  learn,  from  information  collected 
from  every  part  of  the  Union,  that  one  common  sentiment 
prevails  among  the  Federalists,  with  regard  to  candidates  for 
the  first  offices  in  the  National  Government ;  that^  the  men  se- 
lected by  the  approving  voice  of  the  whole  American  party, 
to  preserve  the  Union,  and  to  prevent  a  calamitous  war,  are  for 
President  Hon.  C.  C.  Pinckney,  for  Vice-President  Hon.  R. 

^  King's  "Rufus  King,"  vol.  5,  p.  loi. 

""  Ant.  Hist.  Rev.,  July  1912,  p.  758. 

^  State  election. 

^'  Printed  in  the  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  July  1912,  p.  759. 

S3 


King.  In  Massachusetts,  a  formal  announcement  of  the  nom- 
ination of  these  great  parties  has  been  delayed  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  collecting  the  sentiments  of  the  great  body  of  Fed- 
eralists— the  true  Americans  in  other  states."  In  several  lines 
above  we  notice  that,  ''These  m.en  were  selected  by  the  approv- 
ing voice  of  the  whole  American  party,"  but,  "A  formal  an- 
nouncement had  been  delayed  to  collect  the  sentiments  of  the 
great  body  of  Federalists."  ''Consistency,  thou  art  a  jewel." 
There  was  no  formal  announcement,  therefore,  until  two  or 
three  weeks  before  the  election,  although  it  was  pretty  general- 
ly known  before  that  time.^*^ 

The  frankness  of  the  letters  quoted  and  referred  to  in  con- 
nection with  the  Convention  makes  comment  almost  superflu- 
ous, but  the  writer  cannot  refrain  from  making  a  few  thrusts 
at  this  select  body  of  "well  born"  and  congenial  gentlemen  who 
were  chosen  by  their  friends  to  settle,  in  a  quiet  and  leisurely 
manner,  the  great  questions  which  so  deeply  concerned  the 
party.  The  body  of  voters  had  absolutely  no  voice  in  the 
convention's  deliberations.  This  1808  conference  (or  conven- 
tion) compares  favorably  wnth  other  Federalist  machinery  of 
the  time.  It  was  based  on  the  old  dictum:  "We,  the  'well 
born,'  must  govern  without  the  slightest  co-operation  by  the 
people.  We  do  not  ask  their  advice  but  their  impHcit  obedience 
is  required.  They  are  to  vote  for  candidates  nominated  they 
know  not  how,  because  it  was  thought  best,  ordained  and  es- 
tablished by  the  Federal  fathers,  that  we,  the  choicest  spirits, 
should  lead  them.  This  machinery  failed  for  the  same  reason 
that  the  party  failed.  It  ought  to  suppress  and  to  curb  public 
opinion  rather  than  to  guide  and  lead  it. 

The  secret  convention,  representing  only  the  leaders,  was 
again  employed  in  1812,  after  which  it  passes  out  of  existence 
with  the  Federalist  party.  It  remained  for  the  Democrats  of 
the  thirties  to  discover  that  nomination  by  convention  could 
be  made  a  more  satisfactory  method.. 

The  first  gun  of  the  Massachusetts,  and  incidentally,  of  the 
presidential  campaign,  was  Pickering's  violent  attack  on  the 
administration  policy  in  his  letter  to  Governor  Sullivan,  Feb- 
ruary 16,  1808.^^    In  this  most  extraordinary  letter^-  by  Pick- 

'"*  Ibid.,  many  letters  and  journals  are  quoted  from  in  this  number  of 
the  Review  in  support  of  this  statement. 
^  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  380,  Pickering  confidentially  to  Cabot.     Adams' 

54 


ering  we  have  a  very  good  duplicate  of  Hamilton's  attack  upon 
the  Adams'  administration.  The  burden  of  Pickering's  pen  is 
that  Jefferson  withheld  papers  from  the  Emperor  of  France 
which  should  be  made  public.  That  the  withholding  of  such 
papers  was  responsible  for  the  passage  of  the  embargo,  is  the 
point  he  makes,  or  hopes  to  make.  He  says :  "Had  these 
papers  been  honorable  he  would  have  been  anxious  to  disclose 
them.  That  they  are  of  an  entirely  different  nature,  that  they 
are  dishonorable,  that  they  are  ruinous  to  our  commercial  in- 
terests, and  dangerous  to  our  liberty  and  independence,  we  are 
left  to  infer.  Above  all,  let  him  unfold  our  actual  situation 
with  France."  In  short,  Mr.  Pickering  tells  his  people  that 
Jefferson  is  pushing  them  into  a  war  with  Great  Britain  by 
withholding  papers,  which  if  disclosed,  would  satisfy  every 
one  that  France  is  the  common  enemy.  No  attack  upon  Jeffer- 
son could  have  been  more  effective  than  this,  and  it  was  care- 
fully calculated  to  stir  up  resistance  in  the  commercial  states. 

It  is  still  more  wonderful  how  the  Junto  attempted  to  justify 
England's  impressment  policy.  To  quote  again  from  Picker- 
ing's letter:  "The  British  ships  of  war  agreeable  to  a  right 
claimed  and  exercised  for  ages, — a  right  claimed  and  exercised 
during  the  whole  of  the  administrations  of  Washington, 
Adams,  and  Jefferson, — continue  to  take  some  of  the  British 
seamen  and  with  them  a  small  number  of  ours,  because  of  the 
difficulty  to  always  distinguish  an  Englishman  from  an  Ameri- 
can."^^  Of  course  England  would  not  take  Americans  but 
through  mistaken  identity. 

We  cannot  but  wonder  in  that  written  and  received  authority 
we  would  be  most  Hkely  to  find  a  justification  of  the  rights 
Pickering  claims  for  Great  Britain's  conduct?  In  what  usage, 
except  her  own  will,  could  it  be  found?  It  can  imply  nothing 
but  the  right  to  search  neutral  vesesls  upon  the  high  seas  in 
time  of  peace.  ''We  consider  a  neutral  flag,"  says  Monroe, 
January  5,  1804,  *'on  the  high  seas  as  a  safeguard  to  those 
sailing  under  it."  Whether  we  consult  the  Law  of  Nations 
or  the  dictates  of  justice,  no  pretext  can  be  found  for  the 
British  impressments  from  American  ships  on  the  high  seas. 

'Tederalism,"  p.  193-197:  Hildreth's  "Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,"  vol,  3,  pp. 
76-77;  King's  "Rufus  King,"  vol.  5,  p.  87,  Gore  to  King. 

"*  Original  copy  in  "Political  Tracts,"  1805-1812;  Boston  Gazette,  July 
25,    1808. 

^  Niles'  Register,  vol.  4,  p.  22,2,,  speech  of  Gov.  Strong. 

55 


Mr.  Pickering  waited  until  it  was  ascertained  that  the  Rose 
Mission"^^  would  fail,  and  then  wrote  his  letter  to  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Massachusetts,  denouncing  the  embargo  and  caUing 
for  joint  resistance  against  it  by  the  Commercial  States.^^  It 
was  both  in  form  and  substance  an  appeal  from  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Union  to  the  Government  of  the  State  of  Massa- 
chusetts, with  no  other  purpose  than  to  stimulate  the  power 
of  the  separate  state  to  a  resistance  of  force  against  a  law  of 
the  Union;  and  it  contained  the  first  proposal  for  a  concerted 
move  by  the  commercial  states  for  the  same  purpose.^^  It  was 
the  plan  of  1804  reproduced  by  the  same  individual  who  had 
then  appealed  to  Hamilton  to  lead  the  Junto  through  the  "deep 
waters."  As  in  1804,  also,  a  few  plain  spoken  letters,  for- 
tunately preserved  from  the  flames,  disclose  to  posterity  plots 
which  statesmen  of  that  day  denounced  without  proving.  What 
the  English  called  "Colonel  Pickering's  Party"^^  certainly  ex- 
isted at  this  time  and  its  leader,  the  ex-Secretary  and  Massa- 
chusetts Senator,  tunneled  like  a  mole  to  undermine  a  mountain. 

The  embargo,  therefore,  was  yet  only  an  experiment,  and 
a  temporary  precaution,  so  to  speak,  when  Pickering  put  quill 
to  a  lengthy  diatribe  against  the  Administration,  and  hurled  a 
firebrand  upon  the  stage.  One  copy  of  this  paper  was  ad- 
dressed to  Cabot  to  go  to  the  printer  in  case  Governor  Sullivan 
failed  to  act  as  his  publisher."^  The  Governor,  be  it  to  his 
honor,  refused  on  the  ground  that  it  was,  "A  seditious  and  disor- 
ganizing production. "^^  More  than  that,  Pickering  says :  "The 
letter  was  rudely  returned.''**^  Mr.  Cabot,  in  his  reply  to 
Pickering's  request  that  he  superintend  its  publication,  said : 
"This  day  will  issue  from  the  press  a  copy  of  your  letter  to 
the  Governor,  which  he  dared  not  to  communicate.  Five  thou- 
sand copies  will  be  struck  in  pamphlet  form  and  it  will  be 
reprinted  in  the  newspapers.  Probably,  you  will  receive  a 
pamphlet  with  this  letter.     This  excellent  address  is  well  cal- 

**  Mr.  Rose,  a  special  Envoy,  despatched  to  the  United  States,  to  dis- 
cuss through  the  winter  the  Chesapeake  affair  with  Madison,  and  then 
do  nothing. 

"'Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.   195. 

^®  See  above  references  to  letter. 

'^  Schouler,  vol.  2,  p.  181. 

"*  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  367;  Hildreth,  vol.  3,  p.  77- 

""  Hildreth,  vol.  3,  P-  77- 

""  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  380,  Pickering  to  Cabot. 


culated  to  rouse  us  from  our  apathy;  and,  if  we  are  fit  for 
anything  but  slavery,*^  all  New  England  might  be  brought  to 
act  with  effect.'"^^ 

The  letter  was  unexampled  and  in  principle  unconstitutional. 
The  Senate  of  the  United  States  is  a  branch  of  the  legislature ; 
and  each  senator  is  a  representative,  not  of  a  single  state  but 
of  the  whole  Union.  His  vote  is  not  the  vote  of  his  state,  but 
his  own  individually;  and  his  constituents  have  not  even  the 
power  of  recalling  him,  nor  of  controlling  his  constitutional 
action  by  their  instructions.  "This  was  the  first  instance  in 
the  history  of  the  Constitution,"  says  J.  Q.  Adams,  "where 
a  Senator  of  the  United  States  had  made  such  an  appeal  to  the 
government  of  a  state  by  whose  legislature  he  had  been  chosen. 
Its  principle  was  itself  a  dissolution  of  the  Union, — a  transfer 
of  the  action  of  the  national  government  to  that  of  the  separ- 
ate state  upon  objects  exclusively  delegated  to  the  authority 
of  the  Union."« 

In  1828,  when  Adams  was  President,  a  body  of  Massachu- 
setts FederaHsts  addressed  a  letter  to  him  demanding  proof  of 
such  statements  as  had  been  given  out  regarding  the  Junto 
twenty  years  before.  Adams  replied  that  he  had  never  doubt- 
ed that  the  object  of  Mr.  Pickering  was  the  ultimate  substitu- 
tion of  a  Northern  Confederacy,  in  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
for  that  of  the  United  States;  and  that  he  had  good  reasons 
for  believing  that  James  Hillhouse,**  then  Senator  from  Con- 
necticut, concurred  in  these  views.*^  Adams  was  at  that  time 
(1808)  Senator  with  Pickering  from  Massachusetts,  but  later 
resigned  his  position  and  supported  the  embargo. 

To  his  letter,  a  step,  even  more  reprehensible,  succeeded. 
Pickering,  being  at  Washington  during  the  period  of  Rose's 
negotiations,  held  secret  communications  with  that  individual, 
his  object  being  plainly  to  stiffen  this  Chesapeake  diplomat, 
who  bore  terms  disgraceful  enough,  and  through  him  to  as- 

"  Slaves  to  the  Republican  administration  and  to  the  South.  Italics 
my  own. 

"  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  380.     Italics  my  own. 

"^Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  195. 

**  Pickering  admits  as  much  in  a  letter  to  Cabot  March  it,  1808.  See 
Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  380. 

**  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  107 ;  His  second  reply  to  the  Mass.  Feds. 
The  first  reply  begins  on  p.  46,  same  work.  Correspondence  complete, 
as  far  as  we  know. 

57 


sure  the  English  ministry  that  they  had  only  to  let  us  alone  in 
order  to  find  that  the  embargo  would  curse  its  authors.'^^  "You 
have  only  to  travel  to  Boston,"  he  assured  him,  ''to  find  that 
our  best  citizens  consider  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
interwoven  with  those  of  Great  Britain,  and  that  our  safety 
depends  on  hers.  Men,  thus  enlightened,  could  they  but  con- 
trol the  measures  of  their  own  government,  would  give  them 
a  direction  mufiiaUy  beneficial  to  the  two  nations}''  And  it  was 
for  this  purpose  chiefly  that  I  have  more  than  once  expressed 
to  you  my  hope  that  you  would  see  them  in  person,  by  traveling 
through  the  country  as  far  as  Boston.^^  Given  up  as  the  people 
are  to  strong  delusions,  to  beheve  lies,  it  seems  impossible  that 
the  general  deception  should  continue  much  longer."^''  In  other 
words,  "I  am  doing  everything  in  my  power  to  poison  the 
minds  of  the  New  England  people  against  the  Jefferson  Ad- 
ministration, and  resorting  to  this  secret  and  underhand  rela- 
tion with  you,  in  the  hope  that  you  will  prepare  your  home 
government  for  an  alliance  in  case  New  England  can  be  per- 
suaded to  revolt." 

Pickering  went  so  far  as  to  hand  over  to  Rose  his  private 
letters  from  Cabot  and  King  for  confidential  perusal. '^^  He 
sent  him  Sullivan's  letter  explaining  why  he  (Governor  Sulli- 
van) did  not  publish  Pickering's  letter;  he  sent  Boston  news- 
papers and  kept  Rose  informed  generally  as  to  public  opinion 
in  New  England."^  He  impressed  upon  Rose  the  social  and  the 
political  importance  of  the  Essex  Junto,  to  which  he  belonged, 
and  tried  to  show  how  the  brakes  could  be  put  on  after  the 
close  of  "Jefferson's  reign, "■^'-  even  though  Mr.  Madison  should 
succeed,  which  was  extremely  problematical. 

When  Rose  left  the  United  States,  Pickering  besought  him 
to  keep  up  a  correspondence,  designating  his  own  nephew, 
Samuel  Williams,  a  London  merchant,  and  formerly  Consul, 
as  a  suitable  person  through  whom  their  letters  could  be  deliv- 

^^^  Private  correspondence  between  Pickering  and  Rose.     See  Adams' 
"Federalism,"  pp.  366-373;  Ibid.,  pp.  46-107;  Schonler,  3.181.2. 
^^  Italics  my  own. 
*^  He  refers  to  the  Junto. 

'"  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  366.     Pickering  to  Rose. 
'Uhid.,  p.  366. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  369. 
'"''Ibid.,  p.  367. 

58 


ered.^^  Rose  indulged  this  request  after  his  return  home,^* 
but  whether  he  imparted  ministerial  confidence  in  return,  or 
whether  he  simply  used  adroit  flattery  and  encouragement 
while  more  subtle  agencies  were  employed,  we  cannot  say.  In 
the  light  of  subsequent  events,  however,  we  are  safe  in  assum- 
ing the  latter. 

In  order  to  give  some  idea  as  to  how  Mr.  Rose  met  Picker- 
ing's advances  I  will  quote  from  a  letter  written  just  after 
he  had  received  the  letter  sent  him  from  King:  "I  avail  my- 
self thankfully  of  your  permission,"  he  says,  "to  keep  that  gen- 
tleman's letter,  which  I  am  sure  will  carry  high  authority 
where  I  can  use  it  confidentially,  and  whither  it  is  most  im- 
portant that  what  I  conceive  to  be  right  impressions  should 
be  conveyed.  It  is  not  to  you  that  I  need  protest  that  rancor- 
ous impressions  of  jealousy  or  ill-will  have  never  existed  here; 
but  it  is  to  be  feared  that  at  some  time  or  another  the  ex- 
tremest  point  of  human  forbearance  may  be  reached.  The 
night  of  delusion  appears  to  vanish  rapidly;  may  no  clouds 
obscure  the  rising  sun.  If  the  day  breaks  fairly,  it  will  be 
daylight,  not  only  to  yourselves,  but  to  dear  and  important 
and  universal  objects,  seem  more  clearly  through  the  darkness 
which  blinds  so  many,  by  none,  or  more  forcibly  than  by  your- 
self."^^  This  quotation  needs  no  comment,  for  the  beauty  of 
its  construction  and  the  patriotic  impulses  which  alone  could 
prompt  such  an  utterance  are  able  to  stand  alone. 

"Rejoice  with  us,"  says  a  Boston  correspondent  to  the  St. 
James  Chronicle;'^  "our  efforts  are  at  last,  I  am  delighted  to 
believe,  about  to  succeed.  By  the  papers^'^  you  will  see  that 
Massachusetts  has  yielded  good  fruits  for  our  labor  and  money. 
We  have  hard  work  to  do  yet,  but  the  prospect  of  success  gives 
us  new  vigor.  It  was  a  master  stroke,  your  sending  Rose  here 
to  amuse  this  Government,  to  gain  time  and  multiply  the  means 
for  our  last  resort — the  election.  Everywhere  things  look 
promising.    Your  Government  has  no  need  to  give  an  inch." 

Another  article^^  dated  London,  June  28,   1808,  furnishes 

""Ibid.,  p.  370. 
"  Schoiiler,  vol.  3,  p.  182. 

^'  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  2,^y.     Rose  to  Pickering. 
""  The  Democrat,  Boston,  June  18,  1898.    The  above  copied  from  the 
St.  James  Chronicle. 

®'  Papers  sent  by  the  Junto  for  the  English  ministry  to  peruse. 
**  The  Democrat,  Boston,  June  8,  1808. 

59 


us  the  English  view  of  the  situation.  It  says :  "The  last  files 
from  Boston  and  other  papers  from  the  United  States  give  us 
most  pleasing  accounts  of  Federalism  and  its  growth.  That 
Federalism  is  gaining  ground  in  Vermont,  New  Hampshire, 
Massachusetts,  and  New  York,  in  particular,  indeed,  seems 
to  assure  the  season  close  at  hand  when  we  shall  reap  a  glori- 
ous reward  for  all  the  labor  and  expense  lavished  in  that 
country." 

If  we  can  credit  these  newspaper  articles,  and  their  testi- 
mony will  be  well  supported  later,  we  must  believe  that  Pick- 
ering and  Rose  were  not  the  only  interested  parties.  Indeed, 
Pickering  is  only  the  mouthpiece  of  the  Junto,  but  that  is 
giving  him  the  leadership,  when  we  remember  that  talk,  "Yea, 
much  fine  talk"  was  the  greater  part  of  their  programme.  It 
can  only  be  a  matter  of  conjecture  what  amount  of  influence 
was  exerted  by  Rose.  He  undoubtedly  gave  Canning-"*^  the 
cue  for  managing  the  American  situation.^*^  Pickering  we  may 
believe  used  the  Rose  information*"*^  in  furthering  fomenting 
discontent  in  New  England  against  the  embargo.  The  one 
thing  that  made  the  embargo  grind  so  severely  upon  the  sus- 
ceptibilities of  New  England  was  the  charge  so  constantly 
reiterated  and  more  especially  after  the  failure  of  the  Rose 
mission,  that  Jefferson's  policy  was  being  constantly  dictated 
by  Napoleon,  in  preparation  for  a  French  alliance. 

The  question,  therefore,  naturally  arises :  Whence  this  in- 
jurious calumny?  J.  Q.  Adams  insisted  that  it  came  from  the 
eastward,  though  British  authorities  over  the  border  in  cor- 
respondence with  citizens  of  Massachusetts.^-  Mr.  Adams  says 
that  he  told  Jefferson  in  a  confidential  interview,  March,  1808, 
that  he  (Adams)  had  seen  a  letter  from  the  Governor  of  Nova 
Scotia^^  which  made  the  charge,  obviously  intended  to  propa- 
gate the  calumny  that  Mr.  Jefferson  and  his  Administration 
were  corruptly  subservient  to  the  influence  of  France;  and 
that  this  influence  was  exercised  to  kindle  a  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  and  to  effect  a  revolution 
in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  and  the  conquest  by 

^  British   Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
^  Schouler,  vol.  3,  p.  182. 

*'^  Some  of  the  letters  which  passed  are  missing,  hence  we  do  not  know 
very  much  about  the  intrigue. 
*^  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.   112. 
*"  Niles'  Register,  vol.  35,  p.  138. 

60 


France  of  the  British  possessions  on  this  continent.*^*  Mr.  Jef- 
ferson stated  that  the  interview  took  place  and  repeated  the 
conversation  as  he  remembered  it,  agreeing  with  Adams.®^  His 
information  is  further  substantiated  by  the  ''Henry  Mission" 
of  which  we  shall  speak  later.  John  Lowell  makes  an  analy- 
sis'^ of  the  correspondence  between  the  American  Administra- 
tion and  that  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  with  an  attempt  to 
show  the  real  causes  of  failure  on  the  part  of  America.  In  this 
remarkable  analysis  the  Jacin  leaders,  Jefferson  and  Madison, 
were  governed  all  the  time  by  French  instructions.  He  ac- 
counts in  this  way  for  the  great  injustice  shown  Great  Britain, 
and  quotes  Mr.  Jefferson  as  saying  to  the  Emperor:  ''Repeal 
so  much  only  of  your  degrees  as  relate  to  us,  or  give  assurances 
and  explanations  to  the  same  effect,  and  we  will  declare  war 
against  your  enemy."  But  to  Great  Britain  he  says :  Repeal  all 
your  orders — repeal  them  in  their  entirety  and  we  will  restore 
you  to  your  old  place — nothing  more."  Such  volcanic  out- 
bursts from  Mr.  Lowell  were  intended  to  have  and  could  have 
but  one  influence,  namely,  to  inflame  the  people  with  an  intense 
hatred  for  the  administration.  Partiality  to  France  instead  of 
Great  Britain  was  the  nearest  way  to  the  hearts  of  many  of  the 
New  England  people.  He  tells  us  in  No.  7,  "That  the  only 
cause  for  the  embargo  is  to  be  found  in  the  demands  and 
threats  of  France."®^  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  Mr.  Lowell  does 
not  give  some  idea  of  the  nature  of  these  threats  which  so 
greatly  moulded  the  Jacobin  policies.  We  know  of  a  French 
sympathy  in  America,  and  have  spoken  of  it,  but  we  must 
admit  that  Mr.  Lowell's  statements,  or  some  of  them  at  least, 
were  made  to  order.  Only  a  man  embarked  on  a  mission  of 
evil  could  blaspheme  his  own  government  and  praise  that  of 
Great  Britain  for  the  purpose  of  causing  a  revolt. 

Mr.  James  Russell,  in  a  series  of  Articles  signed  "falkland," 
and  published  in  the  Columbian  Centinel,  beginning  September 
10,  1808,  discusses  the  subject  in  a  very  different  manner. 
These  articles  are  entitled,  "A  Separation  of  the  States,"  and 
attempt  to  show  by  statistics  that  New  England's  area,  popu- 
lation, and  resources  are  sufficient  to  enable  her  to  maintain 

'"Adams'  "Federalism,'  pp.    1 12-1 13. 

'^  Ibid.,  p.  136.    Jefferson's  statement. 

•"'Tracts  on  American  Politics,"  1795-1808,     Nine  documents. 

*"  These  papers  were  numbered  from  i  to  9. 

61 


an  independent  government.  With  New  York  included,  as 
a  matter  of  course,  in  the  Confederacy,  a  comparison  is  made 
between  that  section  and  the  Southern  States,  particularly  be- 
tween Massachusetts  and  Virginia.  With  the  amount,  increase, 
and  kind  of  population ;  with  the  number  of  acres,  population 
per  acre,  and  value  per  acre,  he  gets  a  ratio  of  about  2  to  i  in 
favor  of  New  England.  That  is.  New  England  has  grown  pro- 
portionately about  twice  as  fast  as  the  South.  He  concludes, 
therefore,  that  with  the  State  of  New  York  added  to  New 
England  the  Confederacy  could  probably  maintain  a  population 
equal  to  that  of  Great  Britain  and  certainly  greater  than  that 
of  Spain. 

Mr.  Russell  gives  the  following  reason  for  his  articles :  "The 
policy  of  Virginia  demands  nothing  less  than  the  sacrifice  of 
greater  interests  of  New  England  as  the  only  condition  on 
which  she  will  adhere  to  the  Union.  She  must  and  will  govern 
us,  with  a  policy  that  will  forever  cripple  and  destroy  us,  or 
separate  from  us  and  leave  us  to  pursue  our  own  systems, 
supported  by  our  own  resources.  These  I  have  attempted  to 
estimate  to  assist  the  people  of  New  England  in  forming  their 
judgment  of  the  consequences  of  such  an  event." 

This  was  the  most  dignified  argument  offered  to  the  people 
of  New  England  in  regard  to  a  new  government ;  but  perhaps 
the  dignity  of  it  was  overbalanced  by  its  narrowness.  He 
either  lost  sight  of,  or  chose  to  ignore,  the  fact  that  the  Great 
West  and  Southwest  would  sooner  or  later  join  the  southern 
dynasty  if  New  England  should  withdraw  into  a  little  corner 
of  the  Continent.  Therefore,  he  must  have  made  the  argument 
with  the  belief,  at  least,  that  British  America  would  readily 
join  the  New  England  Union,  and  the  Great  Britain  herself, 
would  immediately  join  in  alliance,  otherwise  the  Confederacy 
would  have  been  impossible. 

This  brings  us  to  the  election  of  1808  and  we  will  pause 
long  enough  to  notice  its  results.  We -know  that  Madison  re- 
ceived more  than  two-thirds  of  all  the  electoral  votes,  122  out 
of  176.  The  Federalists,  as  we  have  seen,  renominated  Pinck- 
ney  and  King ;  and  they  carried  no  electroal  college  outside  of 
New  England,  excepting  that  of  Delaware.  In  New  England 
state  elections,  however.  Federalism  met  with  much  greater 
success  because  of  its  opposition  to  the  National  policy.  Em- 
bargo  candidates  were  defeated   in  New   Hampshire,   Rhode 

62 


Island,  and  Vermont.  In  this  section,  the  opposition  grew 
constantly  more  defiant.  Pickering's  Public  Letter  with  its  bold 
imputations  and  base  motives  made  itself  felt  at  this  election. 

There  were  many  other  ingenious  arguments  advanced  by 
the  Junto  to  show  why  Madison  ought  not  to  have  been  elected. 
Perhaps  the  most  amusing  one  was  that  he  was  ruled  by  his 
wife,®^  and,  one  this  account,  was  unfit  for  such  high  office. 
To  this  we  can  only  say  that  it  is  a  pity  that  this  lady  was  not 
taken  and  kept  as  a  hostage  in  New  England  during  the  good 
behavior  of  her  husband.  He  might  then  have  performed  the 
duties  of  a  distinguished  statesman,  as  ably  as  he  had  in  the 
Revolution  before  these  alarming  petticoats  were  put  on.  But, 
of  course,  the  embargo  was  the  one  great  argument  advanced 
by  Federalist  opposition. 

The  Boston  Ga::ette  of  July  25,  1808,  says :  ''The  Democrats 
have  brought  themselves  and  the  country  into  this  vile  scrape, 
and  now  they  shift  the  blame  to  Pickering  and  his  set.  They 
stigmatize  the  Federalists  as  traitors  for  their  opposition  to 
the  wonder-working  embargo ;  but  all  their  cunning  and  all 
their  wisdom  consists  in  hiding  their  foolish  and  fatal 
measures." 

It  is  not  just,  however,  to  say  that  all  radical  and  violent 
statements  were  confined  to  Federalist  papers  and  Federalist 
writers.  Republicans  were  wholly  convinced  that  the  Essex 
Junto  was  doing  much  more  harm  than  the  embargo  and  they 
did  not  fail  to  assert  as  much.  For  example,  the  Baltimore- 
American^  June  II,  1808,  makes  the  following  comment: 
*'Since  by  artifice,  chicanery,  and  juggling,  the  Essex  Junto 
succeeded  in  throwing  the  legislative  power  of  Massachusetts 
into  the  hands  of  a  faction,  disposed  to  be  subservient  to  a 
foreign  power,  their  first  act  of  legislation  was  an  anathama 
against  the  embargo.  They  admit  it  to  be  the  duty  of  govern- 
ment to  cultivate  peace  and  amity  with  all  nations ;  and  yet 
denounce  the  only  measure  capable  of  enforcing  its  existence. 
They  deny  that  Congress  has  the  right  to  pass  such  a  law  and 
yet  admit  that  a  temporary  embargo,  on  some  occasions  may 
be  necessary.  The  British  Monarch  invites  our  citizens  to  in- 
fringe our  laws  by  formal  proclamation,  and  the  Legislature 
of  Massachusetts  organizes  itself  in  formal  opposition  to  the 
general  government  as  far  as  words  will  go,  in  order  to  furnish 

'^  The  Columbian  Detector,  Boston,   November   18,   180S. 

63 


our  enemies  sustenance  and  comfort  while  they  continue  their 
depredations." 

The  opinion  spread  that  the  embargo  was  unconstitutional, 
and,  if  so,  that  it  ought  to  be  resisted.  This  was  a  Junto  doc- 
trine and  the  people  were  beginning  to  embrace  it  as  though  it 
were  true.  In  town-meeting  addresses  the  language  of  petition 
gave  place  to  remonstrance,  and  that  of  remonstrance  to  threat ; 
"passive  obedience  and  non-resistance,"  said  one  of  these  in 
November,  "can  no  longer  be  considered  a  virtue."*'^ 

The  people  were  constantly  instigated  by  the  Junto^*^  to  for- 
cible resistance  against  the  embargo,  and  jury  after  jury  ac- 
quitted the  violators  of  it,  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  un- 
constitutional, assumed  in  the  face  of  a  solemn  decision  of  the 
district  court  of  the  United  States. '^^  A  separation  of  the 
Union  was  openly  advocated  in  the  public  prints  and  a  Conven- 
tion of  delegates  of  the  New  England  States,  to  meet  at  New 
Haven,  was  intended  and  proposed."^- 

At  the  beginning  of  the  final  session  of  Congress,  November, 
1808,  Hillhouse  of  Connecticut,  and  Lloyd  and  Pickering,  of 
Massachusetts  introduced  resolutions  for  the  immediate  repeal 
of  the  embargo. '^^  Added  to  this  was  a  long  exposition  of  east- 
ern troubles ;  and  it  became  very  clear  to  the  supporters  of  the 
measure  that  the  Junto  was  clearly  but  surely  inviting  trouble. 

Mr,  Giles  and  several  other  members  of  Congress  wrote 
J.  Q.  Adams  (then  a  private  citizen  in  Boston)  informing  him 
of  the  Junto  measures  and  solicited  his  advice  upon  the  sub- 
ject.'^* Adams  replied  frankly,  and  in  confidence,  as  he  had 
been  addressed,  and  had  recommended,  most  earnestly,  the 
substitution  of  a  non-intercourse  bill  for  the  embargo.  He 
urged  that  a  continuance  of  the  embargo  much  longer  would 
certainly  be  met  by  forcible  resistance,  supported  by  the  Leg- 
islature, and  probably  by  the  judiciary  of  the  state.^^  That  to 
quell  that  resistance,  if  force  should  be  resorted  to  by  the 
government,  would  produce  a  civil  war;  and  in  that  event,  he 

*®  Schouler's  "Am.  Hist.,"  vol.  3,  pp.  184-185. 

'"•Niles  Register,  vol.  35,  138. 

''Ibid. 

''Ibid. 

"  Schouler's  "Am.  Hist.,"  vol.  3,  P-  185 ;  Von  Hoist,  vol.  i,  p.  226,  note. 

'*Niles  Register,  vol.  35,  p.  138;  Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  46. 

"""Ibid.,  also  see  Von  Hoist,  vol.  i,  pp.  222-222,,  note. 

64 


had  no  doubt  the  leaders  of  the  party  would  secure  the  co- 
operation with  them  of  Great  Britain.  That  their  object  was, 
and  has  been  for  several  years  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  and 
the  establishment  of  a  separate  confederation.  "This,"  he  says, 
*T  know  from  unequivocal  evidence,  although  not  proveable 
in  a  court  of  law ;  and  that  in  the  case  of  civil  war,  the  aid  of 
Great  Britain  to  effect  the  purpose  would  be  as  surely  resorted 
to,  as  it  would  be  indispensably  necessary  to  the  design. ""^^^ 

In  support  of  Mr.  Adams'  position  let  us  notice  the  opinions 
of  some  gentlemen  who  are  not  so  likely  to  be  discredited, 
owing  to  Mr.  Adams'  relations  with  the  Junto.  DeWitt  Clinton 
made  the  following  statement,  January  31,  1809,  in  a  speech 
in  the  Senate  of  New  York :  "It  is  perhaps  known  to  but  few, 
that  the  project  of  a  dismemberment  of  this  Union  is  not  a 
novel  plan,  growing  out  of  the  recent  measures  of  the  Govern- 
ment, as  has  been  pretended.  It  has  been  cherished  by  a  num- 
ber of  individuals  for  a  series  of  years.  A  few  months  before 
the  death  of  a  distinguished  citizen,^^  it  was  proposed  to  him 
to  enlist  his  great  talents  in  the  promotion  of  this  nefarious 
scheme."^^ 

In  a  letter  to  Joseph  White,  Jr.,  dated  Washington,  January 
4,  1809,  Joseph  Story^^  makes  this  statement:  'Tf  I  may  judge 
from  the  letters  I  have  seen  from  the  various  districts  of  Massa- 
chusetts, it  is  a  prevalent  opinion  there — and,  in  truth  many 
friends  from  New  England  States  write  us,  that  there  is  great 
danger  of  resistence  to  the  laws,  and  great  probability  that  the 
Essex  Junto  have  resolved  to  attempt  a  separation  of  the 
Eastern  States  from  the  Union ;  and  if  the  embargo  continues, 
that  their  plan  may  receive  support  from  our  Yeomanry."^^ 
Again  on  January  9,  1809,  we  find  Mr.  Story  writing  Samuel 
Fay  in  this  regard.  He  says :  'Tt  seems  almost  impossible  that 
Massachusetts  will  ever  come  to  this  scheme;  yet,  I  confess 
that  I  have  great  fears  when  I  perceive  that  the  public  prints 
openly  advocate  a  resort  to  arms,  to  sweep  away  the  present 
embarassment  of  commerce."  ^^ 

^®*Niles'  Register,  vol.  35,  p.  138;  Adams  Federalism,  p.  46;  Von  Hoist, 
vol.  I,  pp.  2.22-222),  note. 
"Alexander  Hamilton, 
"Plumer's  "Life  of  Plumer,"  p.  302. 

"Associate  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 
**  Story's  "Life  of  Story,"  vol.  I,  p.  174. 
^Ihid.,  p.  182. 


Mr.  Adams'  statements  would  seem  to  be  sufficiently  sus- 
tained, by  the  quotations  we  have  used,  but  in  order  to  show 
that  Mr.  Jefferson  himself  was  alarmed,  we  will  quote  a  few 
lines  from  a  letter  written  to  Mr.  Randolph  January  2,  1809. 
It  reads  in  part:  "The  Monarchists  of  the  North  have  been 
able  to  make  so  successful  use  of  the  embargo  as  to  have  feder- 
alized the  South  Eastern  States  and  endangered  New  York, 
and  they  now  mean  to  organize  their  opposition  by  the  regular 
powers  of  their  State  Governments.  The  Massachusetts  legis- 
lature which  is  to  meet  the  middle  of  the  month,  it  is  believed, 
will  call  a  convention  to  consider  the  question  of  a  separation 
of  the  Union,  and  to  propose  it  to  the  whole  country  east  of  the 
North  River,  and  they  are  assured  the  protection  of  Great 
Britain."  ^^  In  the  same  letter  he  goes  on  to  say  that,  "We 
must  save  the  Union !  But  our  difficulties  do  not  end  here  ;  for 
if  war  takes  place  with  England  we  have  no  security  that  she 
will  not  offer  neutrality  and  commerce  to  New  England  and 
that  the  latter  will  not  accept  it."  These  men  saw  plainly  the 
situation  and  knew  that  something  must  be  done  to  check  the 
onward  march.  That  is  why  non-intercourse  was  urged  by  the 
friends  of  the  Administration  at  this  time. 

But,  before  the  discussion  of  a  non-intercourse  bill  got  fairly 
under  way.  Congress  passed  the  "Force  Bill"  January  9,  1809.^=^ 
This  bill  is  a  familiar  bit  of  history  and  every  one  knows,  per- 
haps, that  it  was  passed  simply  to  enforce  the  embargo.  The 
embargo  was  only  in  theory  a  national  measure.  American 
commerce  was  centered  in  the  East.  It  could  be,  in  reality, 
therefore,  nothing  but  a  sectional  measure,  and  nothing  leads 
to  rebellion  so  surely  as  sectional  discontent.  But  as  we  have 
said  any  check  attempted  on  Great  Britain's  impressment  policy 
would  have  fallen  most  heavily  upon  this  section. 

The  newly  enacted  Force  Bill,  therefore,  was  ushered  into 
the  presence  of  a  people  whose  spirits  already  boiled  with 
rebellion  and  discontent.  What  did  it  mean  ?  It  meant  simply 
this:  each  Governor  was  requested  and  expected  to  appoint 
some  officer  of  the  militia  of  known  respect  for  the  laws,  in 
or  near  each  port  of  entry  of  his  State,  with  orders  when  ap- 
plied to  by  the  Collector  of  the  District,  to  assemble  a  sufficient 
force  of  his  militia  and  to  employ  them  efficaciously  to  main- 

■"Mass.  Hist.  Papers,  vol.  I,  p.  130,  seventh  series. 

^^  Annals  of  Cong.,  loth  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  1808-1809,  p.  1798. 


tain  the  embargo.  It  was  therefore,  a  radical  measure  at  this 
time,  and  it  only  added  fuel  to  the  flame.^* 

The  people  in  the  Eastern  Section  were  now  stirred,  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  Junta,  and  memorials  were  sent  to  the 
State  Legislature  declaring  the  embargo  unconstitutional  and 
the  raising  of  troops  to  enforce  it  a  menace  to  civil  liberty. 
Anticipating  the  Force  Act,  Otis  and  Gore  wrote  Quincy  and 
Pickering,  who  were  in  Congress,  to  ask  what  to  do  next.^^  In 
the  letter  sent  by  Otis  to  Quincy  we  have  the  first  mention  of  a 
Hartford  Convention.  "Will  you,"  he  adds,  "talk  over  this 
subject  with  Our  Little  Spartan  Band,  and  favor  me  in  season 
with  the  result  of  your  collected  wisdom  ?"^^  Pickering's  reply 
to  Gore  is  of  the  most  vital  interest  and  in  no  sense  should  it 
be  omitted.  "Pray  look  into  the  Constitution,  and  particularly 
into  the  loth  article  of  the  Amendments.  How  are  the  powers 
reserved  to  the  States  respectively,  or  to  the  people,  to  be  main- 
tained, but  by  the  respective  states  judging  for  themselves 
and  putting  their  negative  an  the  usurpations  of  the  general 
government  ?"  ^^ 

What  was  this  but  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Nullification  and 
by  the  very  men  who  had  then  (1796)  so  bitterly  condemned 
it?  Prominent  judges  and  theologians  even  began,  at  this 
time,  to  foment  a  New  England  insurrection.^^  Dr.  Dwight, 
it  is  said,  preached  a  sermon  using  the  text :  "Wherefore,  come 
out  from  among  them,  and  be  separate,  saith  the  Lord." 

The  legislatures,  particularly  of  Massachusetts  and  of  Con- 
necticut, sent  remonstrances  to  the  National  Congress  and  in 
no  uncertain  terms  expressed  their  opinions  of  these  Acts.  The 
downfall  of  this  forcible  embargo  must  be  attributed  to  the 
panic  which  New  England  produced  at  Washington.  No 
doubt  the  careworn  Jefferson  never  forgot  how  these  New 
England  towns  pelted  and  pattered  resolutions  upon  his  head. 
We  must  also  credit  this  Junto  panic  with  the  change  of  the 
date  for  the  next  Congress  from  May  22,  to  March  4.    Jeffer- 

**  Sohouler,  vol.  2,  pp.  190-193 ;  Sullivan's  "Public  Men  of  the  Revo- 
lution"; Adams'  "Federalism." 
•"Adams'  "Federalism,"  pp.  373-375- 
*' Adams'  "Federalism,"  p.  375;  Otis  to  Quincy. 
'"Ibid.,  p.  378.     The  italics  are  my  own. 
"^Schouler,  vol.  2;  Adams'  "Federalism." 


67 


son  thought  ^^  that  by  promising  a  repeal  of  the  embargo  he 
could  keep  the  East  quiet  until  that  time,  but  his  supporters  in 
Congress  saw  very  plainly  that  the  Union  would  not  be  pre- 
served that  long.  The  fourth  of  March  was  set,  therefore,  for 
the  assembling  of  Congress  and  the  embargo  was  repealed  on 
the  ninth.  "The  alternative,"  said  Jefferson  later,  *'was  repeal 
or  Civil  War." 

It  is  necessary  now  to  consider  the  "Henry  Mission"  before 
attempting  any  discussion  of  "What  might  have  been," 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1809  the  Governor  General  of 
Canada,  J.  H.  Craig,  opened  communications  w^ith  one  John 
Henry,^^  then  residing  at  Montreal,  asking  this  gentleman  if 
he  would  undertake  a  secret  and  confidential  mission  to 
Boston.^^  Mr.  Henry  assured  the  Governor  that  he  would 
undertake  the  mission  and  would  be  ready  to  start  before  his 
instructions  could  be  made  out.^- 

The  instructions  which  Mr.  Craig  gave  Henry,  dated  Febru- 
ary 6,  1809,  and  marked  "most  secret  and  confidential,"  throw  a 
bright  and  illuminating  light  upon  the  British-New  England 
Alliance,  which  we  are  trying  to  reveal.  We  will,  therefore, 
make  some  quotations  from  this  document  and  see  if  the  real 
object  of  the  mission  is  not  disclosed  so  that  there  can  be  no 
doubt. 

"The  principal  object  which  I  commend  to  your  attention," 
says  Mr.  Craig  in  these  instructions,  is  the  endeavor  to  obtain 
the  most  accurate  information  of  the  true  state  of  affairs  in 
that  part  of  the  Union,  which,  from  its  wealth,  the  number  of 
inhabitants,  and  the  known  intelligence  and  ability  of  several 
of  its  leading  men,  must  naturally  possess  a  very  considerable 
influence  over,  and  will  indeed,  probably  lead,  the  other  Eastern 
States  of  America,  in  the  part  that  they  may  take  at  this  im- 
portant crisis.^^     The  Federalists,  as  I  understand,  have,  at  all 

"^See  Correspondence,  Mass.  Hist.  Collection,  vol.  i,  p.  135,  seventh 
series. 

""Very  little  seems  to  be  known  about  Mr.  Henry.  Niles  Register, 
vol.  2,  states  that  he  was  a  Captain  in  the  Provincial  Army,  of  the 
U.  S.  1798.  Fisk's  speech,  p.  28,  same  reference  says:  "he  was  an 
Englishman  but  had  long  resided  in  this  country.  He  had  evidently 
been  in  the  service  of  Great  Britain,  also." 

*'Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  vol.  3,  P-  54^;  Niles'  Register,  vol. 
2,  p.  20. 

''Ibid. 

"Italics  are  my  own. 

68 


times,  discovered  a  leaning  to  this  disposition,  and  their  being 
under  its  pecuHar  influence  at  this  moment  is  the  more  to  be 
expected,  from  their  having  ill-founded  ground  for  their  hopes 
of  being  nearer  the  attainment  of  their  object  than  they  have 
been  for  some  years  past.  It  has  been  supposed  that  if  the 
Federalists  of  the  Eastern  States  should  be  successful  in  ob- 
taining that  decided  influence  which  may  enable  them  to  direct 
the  public  opinion,  it  is  not  impossible  that,  rather  than  submit 
to  a  continuance  of  the  difficulties  and  distress  to  which  they 
are  now  subject,  they  will  exert  that  influence  to  bring  about 
a  separation  from  the  general  Union.  The  earliest  informa- 
tion on  this  subject,  may  be  of  the  greatest  consequence,  to 
our  Government,  as  it  may  also  be  that  it  should  be  informed 
how  far,  in  such  an  event,  they  would  look  up  to  England  for 
assistance,  or  be  disposed  to  enter  into  a  connection  with  us."  ^* 

Mr.  Craig  further  instructed  Henry  to  get  all  the  information 
possible  in  passing  through  Vermont.  He  inclosed  credentials 
which  read :  "The  bearer,  Mr.  John  Henry,  is  employed  by  me, 
and  full  confidence  may  be  placed  in  him  for  any  communica- 
tion which  any  person  may  wish  to  make  to  me  in  the  business 
committed  to  him,  etc."  ^^  They  then  agreed  upon  a  cipher 
for  carrying  on  a  secret  correspondence,  using  the  letters,  A.B. 
for  Henry's  signature.^® 

When  the  matter  came  up  before  the  House  three  years  later 
Mr.  Fisk,  in  a  very  pointed  speech  declared  that,  "Erskine,^^ 
while  here,  at  that  very  time,  was  in  the  same  business  that 
Henry  was  sent  to  perform."  ^^  He  goes  on  to  affirm  that 
Erskine  wrote  a  letter,  to  his  knowledge,  in  which  he  informed 
his  home  government  that  he  (Erskine)  "Had  endeavored  by 
the  most  strict  and  diligent  enquiries  into  the  views  and 
strength  of  the  Federal  party,  to  ascertain  to  what  extent  they 
would  be  willing  and  able  to  resist  the  measures  of  the  party 
in  power,  and  how  far  they  could  carry  the  opinions  of  this 
country  with  them  in  their  attempt  to  remove  the  embargo."^* 
Mr.  Fisk  quotes  from  other  letters  written  by  Minister  Erskine 

^Ibid.    The  entire  correspondence  as  submitted  by  Henry  is  printed 
in  the  two  references  above. 
^  Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  2,  p.  547 ;  Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  20. 
''Ibid. 

"^British  Minister  to  America. 

*'  Niles'  iRegister,  vol.  2,  p.  28.    Copy  of  Fisk's  speech  printed  here. 
""Ibid. 


that  it  would  seem  without  making  further  quotations,  that  we 
are  justified  in  assuming  upon  the  evidence  given  that  Rose, 
Craig,  and  Erskine,  were  all  working  under  instructions  from 
their  home  Ministry. 

Of  course,  it  is  clear  that  the  Junto  and  British  sympathizers 
were  halting  upon  "unpreparedness"  as  we  used  that  term  in 
our  last  chapter.  How  far  would  public  opinion  and  the  votes 
of  New  England  support  them?  The  embargo  was  being  used 
just  as  the  "bloody  shirt"  of  later  times,  and  to  what  extent  the 
people  were  being  influenced  and  were  prepared  to  act  it  was 
a  part  of  Mr.  Henry's  business  to  find  out.  His  instructions 
not  only  covered  this  point  but  every  other  possibility  that  sug- 
gested itself. 

Supplied,  therefore,  with  everything  but  manhood,  Henry 
began  his  journey  to  Boston.  According  to  instructions  his 
first  stop  was  Burlington,  Vermont,  from  which  place  he  ad- 
dressed two  letters  to  Mr.  Craig.^°°  The  impressions  and 
information  gained  in  this  State  were  highly  satisfactory  to  the 
scheme.  He  says:  "The  people  are  so  disgusted  with  the 
embargo  and  the  Administration  that  if  Massachusetts  should 
take  a  bold  step  toward  resisting  the 'execution  of  these  laws, 
the  people  of  Vermont  would  lend  their  hearty  co-operation." 

The  next  document  we  have  from  Henry  is  dated  Amherst, 
New  Hampshire.^^^  In  this  State  he  finds  the  sentiment  pretty 
much  as  in  Vermont.  He  adds  the  bit  of  information,  how- 
ever, that  the  United  States  will  not  go  to  war  with  Great 
Britain  unless  they  can  force  His  Majesty's  Government  to 
commit  some  act  of  hostility,  thereby  placing  the  responsibility 
upon  Great  Britain.  This  declaration  suggests  quite  a  new  line 
of  thought.  We  had  not  looked  upon  the  acts  of  the  Admin- 
istration as  intended  to  provoke  further  hostility  from  Great 
Britain,  but  we  are  glad  to  record  this  as  an  opinion  of  Henry's 
that  he  found  such  to  be  true  in  New  England.  He  concludes, 
however,  by  saying:  "It  is  highly  probable  that  other  means 
will  be  employed  to  excite  England  to  such  an  act."  ^^^ 

We  next  follow  Henry  into  Boston  where  he  remains  for 
about  three  months  watching  and  reporting  the  trend  of  affairs 
to  Mr.  Craig.     In  a  document  of  March  7,  1809,  he  sums  up 

'**Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  P-  547- 

''"Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  P-  548;  Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  22. 

^""Ibid.,  p.  549. 

70 


the  situation,  as  it  is  revealed  to  him  there,  as  follows :  "I  have 
now  ascertained,  with  as  much  accuracy  as  possible,  the  course 
intended  to  be  pursued  by  the  party  in  Massachusetts  that  is 
opposed  to  the  measures  and  pohtics  of  the  administration  of 
the  General  Government.  I  have  always  given  an  opinion  that 
a  declaration  of  war  is  not  to  be  expected;  but,  contrary  to  all 
reasonable  calculations,  should  the  Congress  possess  spirit  and 
independence  enough  to  place  their  popularity  in  jeopardy  by 
so  strong  a  measure,  the  Legislature  of  Massachusetts  will  give 
the  tone  to  the  neighboring  states,  will  declare  itself  permanent 
until  a  new  election  of  members,  invite  a  congress,  to  be  com- 
posed of  delegates  from  the  Federal  States,  and  erect  a  separate 
government  for  their  common  defense  and  common  interests.^^^ 

The  Congress  would  probably  begin  by  abrogating  the  of- 
fensive laws,  and  adopting  a  plan  for  the  maintenance  of^the 
power  and  authority  thus  assumed.  By  such  an  act  they  would 
be  in  a  position  to  make  or  to  receive  proposals  from  Great 
Britain.  Scarcely  any  other  aid  would  be  necessary,  and  per- 
haps none  other  required,  than  a  few  vessels  of  war  from 
Halifax  station  to  protect  the  maritime  towns  from  the  little 
navy  which  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  National  Government. 
What  permanent  connection  between  Great  Britain  and  this 
section  might  grow  out  of  the  civil  commotion,  no  one  is  pre- 
pared to  describe ;  but  it  seems  that  a  strict  alliance  must  result 
of  necessity."  ^^* 

The  Non-intercourse  law  of  March  9,  1809,  raised  the  em- 
bargo with  all  foreign  states  except  France  and  England.  This 
law  quieted  the  cry  for  separation  and  practically  crushed  the 
Northern  Confederacy  plan  for  the  tirrie  being.  Mr.  Henry's 
mission  to  Boston  loses  interest  to  our  narrative,  therefore,  and 
we  must  soon  follow  him  back  to  -Canada.  He  thought  it 
necessary,  however  to  remain  some  weeks  longer  to  sketch 
passing  events.  He  did  so  and  made  some  very  interesting 
observations  after  the  above  date. 

For  instance,  on  March  13,  he  writes:  *T  lament  the  repeal 
of  the  embargo,  because  it  was  calculated  to  accelerate  the 
progress" of  these  states  toward  a  revolution  that  would  put  an 

'"'Niles*  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  185.  See  article  entitled  "New  England 
Convention,"  and  having  for  its  subject  the  above  few  lines:  "Should 
the  Congress  possess  the  spirit  and  independence  enough,"  etc.  It  is 
article  No.  i  of  a  series.  ^ 

'°*Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  P-  549- 

71 


end  to  the  only  Republic  that  remains  to  prove  that  a  Govern- 
ment founded  on  political  equality  cannot  exist  in  a  season  of 
trial  and  difficulty,  or  is  calculated  to  insure  either  security  or 
happiness  to  a  people.""^ 

Again  on  April  13,  he  reports  much  fear  as  existing  among 
men  of  talents  and  property  that  an  alliance  with  France  and 
a  war  with  Great  Britain  is  intended  by  the  Administration.  "I 
am  convinced,"  he  says,  ''that  in  such  a  measure  not  one  of  the 
new  England  States  would  be  a  party  to  it.''  ^*^®  And  in  a  final 
report  given  after  his  return  to  Montreal  he  makes  this  interest- 
ing observation :  "The  present  hopes  of  the  Federalists  are 
founded  on  the  probabihty  of  a  war  with  France;  but,  at  all 
events,  this  party  is  strong  and  well  organized  enough  to  pre- 
vent a  war  with  Great  Britain."  Later  in  the  same  report  he 
adds :  "It  would  now  be  superfluous  to  trouble  Your  Excellency 
with  an  account  of  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  arrangements 
made  by  the  Federalist  party  to  resist  any  attempt  of  the  Gov- 
ernment unfavorable  to  Great  Britain}^'^  They  were  such  as 
do  great  credit  to  their  ability  and  principles."  ^^^ 

It  is  very  significant  of  the  Junto's  secrecy  that  Henry  in  all 
of  his  reports  to  Craig  does  not  mention  a  single  name,  and 
it  certainly  is  unfortunate  not  to  have  one  item  from  those  who 
told  Henry  about  the  Federal  arrangements  to  resist  the  Admin- 
istration. We  cannot  doubt,  if  we  give  any  credit  to  these 
reports,  that  Henry  was  constantly  in  communication  and  con- 
sultation with  members  of  the  Junto.  It  cannot  be  shown  that 
he  ever  mentioned  a  single  source  of  information,  and  yet  we 
cannot  believe  that  he  gathered  this  information  from  mere 
observation.  He  was  evidently  in  touch  with  the  Junto  and 
must  certainly  have  been  warned  not  to  divulge  the  names  of 
his  informants. 

Soon  after  Henry's  return  to  Canada  he  naturally  opened 
communications  with  the  Governor  General  in  regard  to  a  just 
compensation  for  his  services.  Mr.  Craig,  apparently  had  not 
considered  paying  Henry  anything  for  his  services  while  on 
this  mission,  although  he  said  in  his  first  letter  that,  "Such  a 
service  would  give  him  a  claim,  not  only  upon  the  Governor 

''^'Ihid.,  p.  S50. 

'"^  Ibid.,  p.  551. 

^^^  The  italics  are  my  own. 

'''Ibid.,  p.  552. 

72 


General,  but  upon  his  Majesty's  Ministry."^ ''^  A  correspond- 
ence was  kept  up  for  some  time  but  to  no  avail.  Henry  then 
went  to  England  to  place  the  matter  before  the  Ministry  there. 
Having  arrived  he  addresed  a  memorial  to  Lord  Liverpool.^^^ 
In  this  memorial  to  Liverpool  by  Henry  we  get  the  clearest 
statement  of  the  plot  which  was  then  much  in  evidence  between 
the  English  party  in  the  United  States  and  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. 

He  says :  "Soon  after  the  Chesapeake  affair,  when  the  Gov- 
ernor General  of  British  America  had  reason  to  believe  that  the 
two  countries  would  be  involved  in  war,  and  had  submitted  to 
His  Majesty's  Ministers  the  arrangements  of  the  English  party 
in  the  United  States  for  an  effective  resistence  to  the  general 
Government,  which  would  probably  terminate  in  a  separation 
of  the  Northern  States  from  the  general  Government,  he  ap- 
plied to  the  undersigned  to  undertake  a  mission  to  Boston, 
where  the  whole  concerns  of  the  opposition  were  managed. 
The  object  of  the  mission  was  to  promote  and  encourage  the 
Federal  party  to  resist  the  measures  of  the  general  Governm,ent, 
to  offer  assurances  of  aid  and  support  from  His  Majesty's 
Government  of  Canada,  and  to  open  communication  between 
the  leading  men  engaged  in  that  opposition  and  the  Governor 
General,  upon  such  a  footing  as  circumstances  might  sug- 
gest,-'^'^'^  and,  finally,  to  render  the  plans  then  in  contemplation 
subservient  to  the  views  of  His  Majesty's  Government." 

Failing  in  England  as  in  Canada,  Henry  next  turns  his  face 
toward  America,  arriving  early  in  the  year  1812.  Feeling  a 
just  sense  of  anger  toward  the  English  Ministry  for  its  treat- 
ment of  his  valuable  services  he  decided  to  reap  a  just  ven- 
geance upon  the  English.  He,  therefore,  addrssed  a  letter  to 
Mr.  Monroe,  Secretary  of  State,  (Feb.  20,  181 2)  and  disclosed 
the  plot  of  1809.  He  transmitted  by  the  same  packet  the 
documents  and  correspondence  relating  to  this  important  mis- 
sion in  which  he  was  employed.  Henry  denounced  most 
bitterly  the  English  Ministry  and  said  he  hoped  that  the  wound 
resulting  from  his  exposure  would  be  felt  where  it  was  most 
justly  merited — upon  Craig.^^- 

These  papers  were  turned  over  to  President  Madison  who 

"'Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  p.  54^- 

-V&tc/.,  p.  533. 

"^The  italics  are  my  own. 

""^  Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  p.  545 ;  Niles'  iRegister,  vol.  2,  p.  20. 

73 


sent  them  to  Congress  with  a  message  of  March  9,  1812,  in 
which  he  said:  'These  documents  furnish  proof  to  the  plot 
for  resisting  the  laws,  destroying  the  Union,  and  forming  a 
political  connection  between  the  Eastern  States  and  Great 
Britain. ^^^  There  was  a  rumor  that  Madison  had  paid  Henry 
$50,000  for  the  documents  which  amount  was  taken  out  of  the 
Secret  Service  fund.^^^  Nothing  can  be  found  in  support  of 
this  statement,  however,  and  we  should  not  give  much  credit 
to  it.'^' 

Congress,  with  its  usual  willingness  to  discuss  all  things, 
gave  this  their  attention,  and  a  resolution  was  pased  calling 
for  names.  But  names  could  not  be  obtained  because  Henry 
had  no  attention  of  going  before  a  committee  of  investigation 
for  he  himself  was  not  wholly  free  from  the  plot.  The  matter 
was  then  turned  over  to  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations 
which  was  to  establish  the  authenticity  of  the  papers,  after 
which  they  were  to  be  printed. ^^^  They  had  no  difficulty  in 
estabhshing  the  authenticity  of  the  documents,  the  signatures 
of  Lord  Liverpool,  Mr.  Peel,  Sir.  James  Craig,  etc.,  being 
recognized  as  genuine.  The  committee  made  a  formal  re- 
port to  the  House  stating  the  above  and  lamenting  the  fact 
that  they  were  unable  to  do  more.  'Trom  the  careful  con- 
cealment, on  the  part  of  Henry,  of  every  circumstance  which 
could  lead  to  the  punishment  of  any  individuals  who  were 
criminally  connected  with  him,  your  committee  cannot  go 
further." 

They  examined  Count  Edward  de  Crillon,  a  foreigner,  who 
accompanied  Henry  to  this  country  and  reduced  his  testimony 
to  writing.  It  corroborates  and  gives  much  more  information 
in  support  of  Henry's  statement.^^^ 

However,  as  an  exposure  of  Eastern  Separatists,  by  one 
conversant  with  their  counsels,  this  correspondence  fell  short 
of  the  effect  which  might  have  been  anticipated.  This  is 
largely  due  to  the  fact  that  Henry  mentioned  no  names  and 
that  the  letters  were  not  published  until  three  years  after  the 
events  disclosed  in  them.    The  leaders  of  the  party  disavowed 

'''Ibid. 

"'  Sullivan's  Public  Letters,  p.  262. 
"'Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  31. 
''"Ibid.,  pp.  27-31. 

"^Annals  of  Congress,  No.  24,  12th  Cong.,  Part  2,  1811-1812,  pp. 
1220-1223;  Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  31. 

74 


all  connection  with  the  plot,  and  permitted  friends  less 
suspected  to  answer  for  them.  However  this  may  have  been, 
the  Craig  instructions  to  Henry  were  undoubtedly  genuine  and 
the  documents  show  that  Henry's  reports  had  been  officially 
transmitted  by  way  of  Canada  to  the  British  Government.^^^ 
Would  Craig  have  taken  such  a  step  as  this  without  the 
knowledge  or  privity  of  the  British  Ministry?  It  would  be 
absurd  to  entertain  such  an  idea  for  a  moment.  The  chain  of 
communication  from  Pickering  to  Rose,  from  Rose  to  Canning, 
from  Canning  to  Craig,  and  From  Craig  back  again  to  the 
'Tickering  Party."^^^ 

In  concluding  this  chapter  it  is  impossible,  by  any  stretch  of 
the  imagination,  to  find  grounds  to  justify  the  conduct  of  the 
"Essex  Junto,"  or  New  England,  during  this  trying  period. 
We  have  acknowledged  and  tried  to  show  that  the  embargo 
measures  were  radical,  and  in  a  large  sense  sectional,  for  the 
obvious  reason  that  commerce  was  centered  in  the  East.  Was 
it  true  that  they  believed  these  acts  unconstitutional?  Could 
we  not  say  that  it  was  only  a  sham  to  get  from  under  the  Vir- 
ginia rule,  as  they  called  it?  They  believed  that  this  "rule'' 
was  necessarily  bent  upon  destroying  the  very  sources  of  their 
existence.  But  was  this  true?  Could  it  have  been  that  the 
whole  South  and  West  were  in  favor  of  a  destruction  of  com- 
merce? We  believe  that  it  is  in  no  sense  true  that  the  South 
was  hostile  to  commerce  to  the  extent  which  these  New  Eng- 
land people  were  taught  to  beheve.  The  intelHgent  Southerner 
was  in  favor  of  it  in  every  form.  The  people  of  the  South 
had  no  objection  to  commerce  as  such;  they  had  a  system  of 
reasoning  on  the  subject  which  was  rather  abstract;  and  their 
opposition  to  it  resulted  less  from  disHke  than  from  a  fear  that 
all  other  objects  would  be  sacrificed  to  it.  To  destroy  it  would 
have  been  to  strike  at  the  very  vitals  of  the  nation.  The  em- 
bargo was  not  meant  to  destroy  but  to  preserve  commerce. 
What  would  have  been  the  result  if  war  had  been  declared 
with  the  Junto  in  command  in  New  England,  and  with  their 
arrangements  made  for  restricting  the  administration,  as 
Henry  tells  us?  It  can  only  be  a  matter  of  conjecture  and  it 
is  fruitless  to  attempt  a  discussion  of  what  might  have  hap- 
pened. The  next  chapted  will  treat  the  influence  of  Junto  lead- 
ership during  the  War  of  1812. 

""'Ibid. 

"'  Schouler,  vol.  2,  p.  348. 

75 


CHAPTER  V 
Intrigues  During  the  War  of  1812 

We  noted  in  the  last  chapter  that  Congress  in  March  1809 
raised  the  embargo  as  to  all  other  nations  except  France,  Great 
Britain  and  their  dependencies,  and  substituted  a  system  of 
Non-intercourse  as  to  them,  which  prohibited  all  voyages  to 
the  British  or  French  dominions,  and  all  trade  in  articles  of 
British  or  French  product  or  manufacturing;  at  the  same  time 
authorizing  the  President,  in  case  either  of  these  nations 
should  revoke  or  modify  their  edicts  and  cease  to  violate  our 
neutral  commerce,  to  restore  our  trade  by  Proclamation.  This 
measure  was  resorted  to  because,  as  we  have  seen,  it  was  feared 
that  the  Junto,  whose  following  had  become  very  large,  would 
carry  forward  their  designs  at  no  very  distant  day.  It  was, 
therefore,  a  question  of  how  to  preserve  the  Union  and  the 
Constitution  and  at  the  same  time  maintain  our  national  honor. 
It  was  believed  to  be  a  question  of  embargo,  internal  war,  and 
separation,  or  some  form  of  legislation  which  would  still  the 
troubled  waters  at  home  and  merit  respect  abroad.  The  pass- 
age of  this  bills  marks,  therefore,  the  cessation  of  Junto  hostili- 
ties, and  we  pass  over  a  period  of  three  years  (1809-1812)  in 
which  there  is  comparative  quiet  in  the  ranks  of  the  Federalists. 
Only  once  in  that  time  is  there  an  outbreak  of  Juntoism.  The 
occasion  was  an  application  for  statehood  made  by  Louisiana 
on  January  14,  1811,  which  will  be  discussed  later. 

This  chapter  must  deal  primarily  with  the  attempts  of  New 
England  leaders  to  block  the  National  Administration  during 
the  War  of  1812.  It  is  but  the  carrying  forward  of  their  plans, 
as  revealed  to  us  by  Henry,  in  case  there  should  be  a  war  de- 
clared against  Great  Britain. 

But  before  we  attempt  to  hinge  the  actions  of  the  New  Eng- 
land Federalist  upon  Junto  influences  during  this  important 
period  of  history,  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  a  few  general 
observations  concerning  the  attitude  and  sentiments  of  the  New 
England  people. 

1^ 


Perhaps  every  reader  of  history  is  acquainted  with  the  half- 
hearted support  accorded  the  administration  during  the  War  of 
1812  by  this  particular  section  of  the  country.  Doubtless  many 
are,  and  always  have  been  accustomed  to  attribute  this  miserly 
support  to  the  apparent  destruction  of  commerc<^  forced  upon 
the  people  by  an  erring  administration.  This  idea  of  an  erring 
and  malicious  government  is  exactly  what  was  held  up  before 
the  people  of  that  section,  and  with  a  purpose.  There  are  few, 
we  venture  to  assert,  who  have  ever  tried  to  analyze  tlie  true 
feelings  of  this  people ;  and  fewer  still,  who  have  ever  thought 
of  the  tremendous  force  and  influence  which  was  brought  to 
bear  upon  New  England's  inherently  honest  and  loyal  sons  in 
an  attempt  to  tear  down  the  government  and  build  one  upon 
''best  liberty,"  principles  and  ''well  born"  rule. 

When  war  was  declared  against  Great  Britain  instead  of 
France,  the  whole  Junto  came  forward  in  support  of  their 
coveted  ally.  The  Junto  was  so  enraged  at  this  declaration  of 
war  that  they  began  immediately  to  sow  seeds  of  dissension  in 
New  England  in  another  vain  hope  of  effecting  their  design. 
With  the  unpopular  war  as  an  issue,  the  Junto  was  able  to 
work  up  very  early  a  powerful  opposition;  and  many  other 
active  forces  were  enlisted  in  supporting  the  Junto  in  foment- 
ing an  insurrection.  For  instance  we  have  to  encounter  in  this 
chapter  the  preaching  of  the  most  enlightened  ministers  who 
had  become  convinced  that  separation  was  necessary.  There 
are  a  larger  number  of  newspapers  than  before  supporting  the 
secession  doctrine,  and  some  of  the  most  potent  workers  are  at 
the  head  of  the  state  governments. 

On  the  other  hand,  many  prominent  men  were  turning  away 
and  denouncing  the  Junto.  We  already  have  noticed  the 
change  in  Mr.  Plumer.  And  now  Samuel  Dexter  of  Boston, 
formerly  a  Senator  in  Congress,  and  afterwards  Secretary  of 
War  under  John  Adams,  in  a  speech  at  a  town  meeting  in 
Fanueil  Hall,  August  6,  181 2,  denounced  the  measures  of  the 
Junto^  with  great  force  and  earnestness,  as  leading  inevitably 
to  a  separation  of  the  states.  His  convictions  had  indeed  be- 
come so  strong  before  the  end  of  the  war,  that,  although  he 
had  little  sympathy  with  the  Republicans,  he  suffered  himself 
to  be  run  against  Strong,  the  Junto  candidate  for  Governor. 
"Why,"  he  said,  "they  make  publications  and  speeches  to  prove 

^Plumer's  "Life  of  Plumer,"  p.  404;  Niles'  Register,  vol.  6,  p.  9. 

77 


that  we  are  absolved  from  allegiance  to  the  National  Govern- 
ment and  say  that  a  division  might  be  justified.  This  I  cannot 
reconcile  with  the  duties  of  American  citizenship." 

The  first  renewal  of  Federalist  discontent  was  manifested, 
as  has  been  said,  when  a  bill  for  the  admission  of  Louisiana 
as  a  state,  into  the  Union,  was  introduced  in  Congress  on  Janu- 
ary 14,  181 1.  This  bill  gave  occasion  for  a  strong  expression 
of  feeling  by  the  New  England  members  in  Congress.  Since 
they  were  brought  now  to  confront  the  new  and  inevitable  ex- 
pansion of  the  American  Union  beyond  the  Mississippi,  their 
pent-up  jealousy  broke  out  again  into  the  greatest  anger. 

The  new  census  showed  a  rapid  development  of  population 
beyond  the  Alleghanies,  where  their  political  camp-fires  could 
never  kindle.  It  seemed  to  them  as  if  New  England's  sceptre 
and  commerce  were  departing  together.  At  this  point,  there- 
fore, we  are  again  confronted  with  the  antipathy  in  the  East  to 
the  growth  of  the  Southwest,  to  additional  representation  from 
the  South  and  to  slavery  expansion ;  the  origin  of  which,  so  far 
as  concern  Pickering  and  Quincy,  and  the  old  faction  leaders 
of  that  section,  must  be  ascribed  more  to  political  than  humane 
convictions,  however  clear  might  have  been  the  later  objections. 

Quincy's  speech  in  the  House  against  erecting  any  state  be- 
yond the  Mississippi  was  very  violent.^  "If  this  bill  passes," 
he  says,  "it  is  my  deliberate  opinion,  that  it  is  virtually  a  disso- 
lution of  the  Union ;  that  it  will  free  the  states  from  their  moral 
obligation;  and,  as  it  will  then  be  the  right 'of  all,  so  it  will 
be  the  duty  of  some  to  prepare  definitely  for  a  separation, — 
amicably,  if  they  can,  violently,  if  they  must."  At  that  point 
Poindexter*  called  Mr.  Quincy  to  order  and  demanded  of  the 
Speaker  if,  "Amicably,  if  they  can,  violently,  if  they  must," 
was  consistent  with  the  propriety  of  debate.^  The  Speaker 
decided  that  while  great  latitude  was  allowed  in  debate,  "Amica- 
bly, if  they  can,  violently,  if  they  must,"  was  contrary  to  the 
order  of  debate.  His  opinion  was  ruled  out  by  a  vote  of  the 
House. 

Under  the  leadership  of  Hillhouse,  Dana  and  Quincy,  pro- 
digious but  vain  efforts  were  made  by  the  Junto  Federalists  in 

*  Movement  to  abolish  Slavery. 

'Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  22,  3d  Sess',  p.  526;  Plumer's  "Plumer,* 
p.   385;    "Life    and    Speeches    of   J.   Quincy." 

*  Delegate  in  the  House  from  Mississippi  Territory. 
'Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  22,  3d  Sess.,  pp.  525-526. 

78 


Congress  to  prevent  the  admission  of  states  erected  out  of  the 
Louisiana  Purchase  and  without  a  constitutional  amendment.® 
In  regard  to  the  formation  of  new  states,  Quincy  said:  "Sir, 
the  question  concerns  the  proportion  of  power,  reserved  by  this 
Constitution,  to  every  state  in  the  Union.  Have  the  three 
branches  of  this  Government  a  right  at  all  to  weaken  and  out- 
weigh the  influence,  respectively  secured,  to  each  state,  in  this 
compact,  by  introducing  at  pleasure,  new  partners,  situated 
beyond  the  old  limits  of  the  United  States?"' 

Prof.  E.  S.  Corwin  said  in  a  recent  publication®  "The  word 
'Sovereign'  was  first  used  by  Calhoun  as  elevating  the  people 
of  a  state  to  the  highest  political  entity  in  the  United  States." 

In  Josiah  Quincy's  speech  of  January  14,1^11,  on  the  ad- 
mission of  Louisiana  into  the  Union,  was  made  a  most  extra- 
ordinary plea  for  the  political  sovereignty  of  the  states.^  On 
page  530,  he  said:  "The  term  new  states  in  this  article^"  in- 
tends that  New  Political  Sovereignties  be  formed  within  the 
original  Hmits  of  the  United  States ;  and  does  not  intend  new 
political  sovereignties,  with  territorial  annexations,  to  be  erect- 
ed, without  the  original  limits  of  the  United  States."  Again 
on  page  535,  he  said:  "The  proportion  of  the  political  weight 
of  each  sovereign  state,  constituting  this  Union,  depends  upon 
the  number  of  states  having  a  voice  under  the  compact.  This 
number  the  Constitution  permits  us  to  multiply  at  pleasure 
within  the  Hmits  of  the  present  United  States  but  not  outside. 
Now  sir,  what  is  this  power  that  we  propose  to  usurp?  Noth- 
ing less  than  the  power,  changing  all  the  proportion  of  the 
weight  and  influence,  possessed  by  the  potent  sovereignties 
composing  this  Union.  A  stranger  to  be  introduced  to  an  equal 
share,  without  their  consent.  The  Constitution  never  meant 
that  we  could  add  foreign  partners  to  this  compact  at  our 
irresponsible  pleasure." 

Mr.  Tracy,  in  the  Senate  in  1803,  gave  his  reasons  why  he 
could  not  vote  for  the  Louisiana  Treaty,  and  referred  to  the 
states  as  being  so  many  original  sovereignties  or  partners  to  the 
compact.^^ 

'^  Jefferson's  first  idea,  Randolph's  "Jefferson,"  vol.  3,  p. 

^Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  22,  3d  Sess.,  p.  530. 

^  Mich.  Law  of  Rev.,  May  1912,  p.  534. 

'Annals  of  Cong.,  vol.  22,  3d  Sess.,  pp.  524-542. 

^"Article  4,  Sec.  3,  of  the  Constitution. 

"Annals  of  Cong.,  vol.  13,  8th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  p.  55. 

79 


.y 


As  regards  State  Interposition,  Pickering  said  July  8,  1809: 
"How  are  the  powers  of  the  respective  states  to  be  maintaitied 
but  by  individual  states  putting  their  negative  on  the  usurpa- 
tions of  the  general  government  ?"^^  The  newspapers  of  New 
England,  during  the  years  1808-1809,  and  1811-1814,  are  full 
of  such  sentiments.^"  The  Journal  of  the  Hartford  Convention 
in  1814  declares :  "That  the  states  not  only  have  the  right  but 
it  becomes  their  duty  to  interpose  their  authority  when  infrac- 
tions of  the  Constitution  endanger  their  state  sovereignty."^* 

But  returning  to  the  discussion  in  Congress,  we  find  that  the 
Junto  objected  to  Louisiana's  being  admitted  on  account  of  the 
French  influence  which  might  be  manifested  in  that  quarter. 
To  this  old  and  well-worn  objection,  Poindexter  of  Mississippi 
made  some  lively  thrusts.  He  said  :^^  'T  admit  the  existence  of 
French  influence  there,  but  I  cannot  make  it  a  basis  on  which 
to  justify  a  refusal  to  emancipate  the  great  body  of  people  from 
the  trammels  of  territorial  vassalage.  Is  it  a  good  reason,  why 
the  people  who  reside  within  the  circle  of  the  Essex  Junto 
should  not  enjoy  equal  rights  with  the  rest  of  their  fellow 
citizens,  because  those  who  compose  that  association  are  avow- 
edly the  partisans  of  England?  And  I  venture  to  pronounce, 
sir,  that  these  British  attachments,  fostered  and  cherished 
amidst  the  wrongs  and  insults  which  we  have  received  from 
that  nation,  have  already  produced  more  mischief  to  this  na- 
tion, than  the  miserable  French  influence  existing  in  New 
Orleans  would  produce  in  a  half  century." 

In  the  Senate  the  aged  Pickering,  offended  those  who  favor- 
ed territorial  expansion  by  exposing,  in  open  debate,  confidential 
correspondence  relating  to  West  Florida,^^  and  was  therefore 
censured  by  that  body^^  although  this  might  have  been  spared 
him  but  for  his  obstinacy.  Pickering  was  trying  to  prove  that 
the  United  States  had  no  claim  whatever  to  Florida  between 
the  Mississippi  and  the  Perdido  rivers.^«    In  support  of  this 

"Pickering  Mss.,  January  8,  1809. 

"  See  Boston  Gazette,  the  Statesman,  the  Essex  Register,  the  Pitts- 
field   Sun,   and   the   Boston   Centinel. 

"Miles'  Register,  vol.  7,  P-  3o8. 

^'  Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  22,  3d  Sess.,  p.  558. 

^«The  papers  were  letters  from  Talleyrand  to  Livingstone,  in  which 
the  former  denied  that  the  United  States  had  acquired,  by  treaty  of 
1807,  any  title  to  Louisiana  east  of  the  Mississippi. 

"  Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  22,  3d  Sess.,  pp.  65-66. 

''Ibid.,  p.  65. 

80 


argument,  he  read  the  documents  pubHcly  which  were  intended 
only  for  the  ears  of  the  members  of  the  Senate.  In  his  last 
attempt,  therefore,  he  exerted  his  powers  to  limit  Southern 
territory  and  Southern  representation. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  Louisiana  debate  in  1811  was  simply 
a  revival  of  the  debate  of  1803,  when  the  purchase  was  made. 
The  grounds  for  opposition  at  both  times  were,  in  Junto  terms, 
as  follows :  *'If  you  extend  the  Southern  territory  you  destroy 
that  balance  of  power  so  necessary  to  our  Union.  Therefore, 
we  as  a  New  England  Junto,  do  hereby  agree  to  protest  against 
such  extension,  on  every  occasion,  in  token  of  deepest  respect 
and  gratitude  to  the  Fathers  who  said:  "Lest  your  numbers, 
be  equally  balanced,  one  with  another,  at  all  times,  ye  cannot 
hope  to  endure.''  What  the  Fathers  intended  has  been  a  never- 
dying  source  of  debate  for  scheming  politicians  throughout  all 
ages.  Their  efforts  availed  nothing  in  this  connection,  how- 
ever, and  Louisiana  became  a  state  April  8,  1812. 

The  efforts  of  the  Junto  to  block  the  Administration  during 
the  War  of  1812,  being  the  main  topic  of  this  chapter,  we  re- 
gret that  it  is  impossible  to  take  up  in  more  detail  the  causes 
which  led  up  to  the  outbreak.  They  cover  almost  the  entire 
period  from  1793  to  the  declaration  of  war  in  1812,  and,  of 
course,  cannot  be  discussed  here.  Many  of  our  grievances, 
however,  have  been  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  embargo 
and  other  measures  of  retaliation. 

The  American  nation  had  despaired  of  ever  being  free  with- 
out war  from  British  impressment  and  the  constant  inroads 
ypon  our  commerce.  The  British  refused  to  raised  the  long 
standing  Orders  in  Council,  saying  that  the  Non-intercourse 
ought  to  be  raised  and  English  commerce  put  on  the  same  basis 
as  that  of  France.  On  the  ist  of  June,  therefore,  Mr.  Madi- 
son transmitted  to  Congress  a  correspondence^^  between  Mr. 
Russell,  the  American  Charge  d'affaires  at  London,  and  the 
British  Ministry  on  the  subject  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  by 
which  it  appeared  that  the  latter  inflexibly  adhered  to  their 
system,  and  that  all  hopes  of  accommodation  were  at  an  end. 
At  the  same  time  the  President  sent  the  correspondence  be- 
tween Mr.  Foster  and  the  Secretary  of  State  on  the  same 
subject.  Mr.  Foster  based  all  of  his  excuses  on  the  fact  that 
the  French  decrees  had  not  been  repealed,  and  in  this  England 

"Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  P-  385. 

81 


unfolded  her  true  policy.  She  declared^*^  that  the  Orders  in 
Council  should  not  be  repealed  until  France  had  revoked  all  of 
her  internal  restrictions  on  British  commerce.  It  was  either 
tamely  surrender  our  affairs  or  fight.  "Forbearance  had  indeed 
ceased  to  be  a  virtue."-^ 

President  Madison's  message,  which  accompanied  the  docu- 
ments, referred  to  above,  was  referred  to  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations.  The  committee  acted  promptly  and,  with 
an  elaborate  report  of  British  aggressions  upon  our  neutral 
commerce,  recommended  that  Great  Britain's  measures  be  met 
by  force.^-  On  June  5,  the  House  of  Representatives  passed 
a  bill  declaring  war  against  Great  Britain  and  her  dependencies. 
It  was  debated  and  passed  by  the  Senate  and  signed  by  the 
President  June  18,  1812.-^ 

Many  opponents  of  the  Administration  contended  that  Madi- 
son became  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  war  party  in  Congress 
led  by  Clay.  It  is  urged  that  this  war  party  conditioned  Madi- 
son's second  nomination  upon  his  British  policy,  and  that  to  get 
this  favor  he  was  forced  to  recommend  a  thirty  days'  embargo 
followed  by  a  declaration  of  war. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Clay  proposed  the  embargo  which 
became  a  ninety  days'  law  instead  of  a  thirty,  on  April  4, 
1812^* ;  but  whether  it  was  intended  as  a  direct  preliminary  to 
war  or  whether  it  was  a  last  effort  at  peaceful  negotiation,  mat- 
ters little  to  us.  It  is  sufficient  that  war  was  declared  and  that 
the  causes  justified  the  measure.  Madison  says  that  the  em- 
bargo was  a  means  rather  of  negotiation  than  a  prehminary  to 
war.^^ 

Immediately  after  the  passage  of  the  bill,  the  minority  party 
in  Congress  pubHshed  an  address  to  their  constituents,  assign- 

^  Madison  Works,  vol.  9,  p.  2rj2. 

=^See  Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  PP-  405-629,  for  the  diplomatic  cor- 
respondence ;  Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  has  many  of  the  important  reports, 
including  the  report  of  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs  which  enum- 
erates British  aggressions ;  Perkins'  "Late  War,"  gives  the  British  and 
French  decrees  in  their  order,  pp.  1-48;  and  the  Annals  of  Congress, 
vols.  23  and  24,  give  the  entire  discussion  and  the  war  documents. 

"^Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3,  P-  405- 

=^  Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  2%  p.  265;  Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  pp. 
272-273. 

^*  Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  23,  3d  Sess.,  p.  187;  Monroe's  corre- 
spondence,   March    15,    1812. 

="  Madison's  writings,  vol.  8,  April  24,   1812. 

82 


ing  their  reasons  for  not  supporting  the  measure.-^  In  their 
opinion,  a  war  with  England  would  necessarily  lead  to  a  con- 
nection and  alliance  with  France,  hazardous  to  the  liberties  of 
the  United  States.  If  war,  at  all,  were  necessary,  it  ought  to 
be  with  France  as  being  first  and  greater  in  her  aggressions. 
They  would  suffer  American  merchant  men  to  arm  in  their 
own  defense,  and  pursue  such  courses  of  trade  as  their  judg- 
ment should  direct.  They  considered  the  attempt  to  conquer 
Canada  as  unjust  and  impolitic  and  promising  no  good  results. 
The  minority  protest  from  Congress  served  as  a  platform  for 
a  national  "Peace  Party."-^  This  party  comprised  nearly  the 
whole  of  the  Federalists  throughout  the  Union.  Upon  such  a 
platform  the  ^'friends  of  peace,  liberty,  and  commerce,"  as  they 
styled  themselves,  began  to  organize  for  the  Presdential 
campaign. 

Meanwhile,  the  New  England  coterie  set  their  faces  like  flint 
against  active  preparations.  They  obstructed  the  national  re- 
cruitment and  subscriptions  to  the  national  loan.  One  after 
another  of  the  New  England  State  legislatures  protested 
against  the  war  with  Great  Britain,  and  called  upon  the  people 
to  vote  down  the  men  responsible  for  it.  Quincy  presented  a 
protest  from  Massachusetts ;  Chittenden  followed  with  one 
from  Vermont,-^  and  Connecticut  furnished  a  proclamation 
from  her  Governor  Griswold.-^  The  Administration  could  very 
well  evade  resolutions  so  long  as  they  were  allowed  to  remain 
mere  resolutions ;  but  this  could  not  be  for  long,  because  New 
England's  Governors  were  nearly  all  members  of  the  Junto  and 
were  not  afraid  to  act.^'^  The  Administration,  therefore,  was 
yet  to  receive  its  hardest  blows. 

Four  days  after  the  declaration  of  war,  Governor  Strong 
received  a  requisition  from  General  Dearborn^^  to  order  into 
the  services  of  the  United  States  forty-one  companies  of  militia 

^"Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  24,  part  2,  June  1812.  Composed  largely 
of  New  England  Congressmen. 

""  Schouler,  vol.  2,  p.  355 ;  M.  Carey's  Olive  Branch,  p.  225. 

"*  Annals  of  Congress,  vol.  23,  3d  Sess.,  p.  1480. 

^Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  389. 

^The  recent  elections  had  given  as  Governors:  Strong,  to  Massa- 
chusetts; Griswold,  to  Connecticut;  Jones,  to  Rhode  Island;  Galushia, 
to  Vermont;  and  Plumer,  a  converted  Junto  member,  to  New  Hamp- 
shire.    Galushia  was  defeated  by  Chittenden  at  the  beginning  of  1813. 

^^  Senior  Major-Gen.  in  Army  of   U.   S. 

8^ 


for  the  defense  of  the  ports  and  harbors  of  Massachusetts  and 
the  harbor  of  Newport,  Rhode  Island.  The  Governor,  with 
the  advice  of  the  council,  refused  to  comply  with  this  requisi- 
tion and  communicated  his  views  upon  the  subject  to  the  execu- 
tives of  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island.^^  In  support  of  his 
opinions  the  Governor  remarked  that  the  President  had  author- 
ity to  call  the  mihtia  into  actual  service,  but  that  there  being 
no  immediate  danger  of  invasion  either  in  Massachusetts  or 
Rhode  Island,  the  President  was  over-stepping  his  power,  that 
the  State  Governor  should  judge  for  himself  when  the  militia 
should  go  out,  and  that  they  could  not  be  lawfully  commanded 
by  any  officer,  outside  of  the  militia,  except  it  be  the  President 
of  the  United  States.  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  refused 
their  quota  of  militia  on  exactly  the  same  ground. 

The  Constitution  of  Massachusetts  authorized  the  executive 
to  require  the  opinion  of  the  judges  of  the  supreme  court  upon 
any  important  legal  or  constitutional  question.  On  this  occa- 
sion, therefore.  Governor  Strong  submitted  the  following  ques- 
tions for  judicial  decision.^^  Whether  the  exigencies  contempla- 
ted by  the  Constitution  for  placing  the  militia  at  the  service  of 
the  United  States  were  not  questions  to  be  decided  by  the  sev- 
eral states  ?  2.  Whether,  when  any  of  the  exigencies  occur  au- 
thorizing the  employment  of  the  militia  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  they  can  lawfully  be  commanded  by  any  officer 
outside  of  the  militia  except  the  President  of  the  United  States? 
In  answer  to  these  questions,  Judges  Parsons,  Sewal,  and  Par- 
ker, state^* :  "After  reciting  the  clause  in  the  Constitution  relat- 
ing to  the  subject,  we  find  that  no  power  is  given  either  to  the 
President  or  to  Congress  to  determine  that  either  of  the  exigen- 
cies does  in  fact  exist ;  as  this  power  is  not  delegated  to  the 
United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  to  the  states, 
it  is  reserved  to  the  states  respectively,  and  must  be  exercised 
by  those  whom  the  states  have  intrusted  the  chief  command 
of  the  militia."  To  the  second  question,  they  say:  "We  know 
of  no  constitutional  provision  authorizing  any  officer  of  the 
Army  of  the  United  States  to  command  the  militia,  or  any 
officer  of  the  militia  to  command  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 

''  Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  388 ;  Perkins'  "Late  War,"  p.  63. 
^^  Ihid.,  vol.  3,  p.  117.     Strong's  speech  to  Legislature. 
^Decision  in  full  in  "Political  Tracts,"  1805-1812,  Harvard  Library; 
Plumer's  "Life  of  Plumer,"  p.  399;  Perkins'  "Late  War,"  p.  64. 

84 


Congress  may  provide  laws  for  the  government  of  the  mihtia 
when  in  the  actual  service,  but  to  extend  this  power  to  the 
placing  them  under  command  of  an  officer  not  of  the  militia, 
except  the  President,  would  render  nugatory  the  provisions  of 
the  Constitution,  that  the  militia  are  to  have  officers  appointed 
by  the  states." 

The  constitutional  questions  on  the  subject  of  the  militia, 
now  brought  into  view  and  at  issue  between  the  general  gov- 
ernment and  the  States  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and 
Rhode  Island,  were  of  vital  importance.  Without  an  efficient 
army,  the  safety  of  the  nation  rested  at  this  period  on  the 
militia.  If  they  were  to  be  considered  as  eighteen  distinct  and 
independent  bodies  of  troops,  acting  without  concert,  and  sub- 
ject to  being  called  into  service  only  when  the  executives  of  the 
several  states  deemed  it  necssary,  and  not  subject  to  the  direc- 
tion of  any  one  head,  it  was  evident  that  they  could  be  of  Httle 
use  in  defending  the  country.  Who  knew  this  better  than  the 
Junto?  What  bodies  of  men  ever  received  a  judicial  decision 
more  in  keeping  with  its  desires  than  the  above  ?  It  is  impossi- 
ble to  imagine  a  decision  more  nearly  in  keeping  with  Juntoism 
than  this,  because  their  purpose  was  to  block  the  Administration 
in  prosecuting  the  war. 

"The  power,"  says  Monroe,  "which  is  given  Congress  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States  to  provide  for  the  calling  forth  the 
militia  for  the  purpose  specified  in  the  Constitution,  is  uncondi- 
tional. It  is  a  complete  power  vested  in  the  National  Govern- 
ment, extending  to  all  those  purposes.  If  it  were  dependent 
upon  the  assent  of  the  executives  of  the  individual  states,  it 
might  be  entirely  frustrated  at  any  time,  and  we  could  not 
depend  upon  the  militia  for  public  defense."  The  decision  ad- 
vanced by  the  three  judges  of  Massachusetts  on  the  other  hand, 
that  the  regular  troops  and  the  mihtia  were  to  be  considered  as 
independent  allied  bodies,  when  not  directly  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  President  himself,  pushed  the  doctrine  of  "States 
Rights"  further  than  it  had  ever  been  carried  before. 

The  burden  of  the  Junto's  petitions  to  Congress  was :  "An 
alliance  with  England  must  be  our  salvation ;  war  must  be  our 
eternal  ruin."  Madison  may  have  been  duped  into  war,  but  the 
provocation  was  strong,  and  war  or  dishonorable  submission 
was  the  only  alternative  which  England  had  left  us.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  Napoleon  was  in  touch  with  Madison  or  that 

85 


he  influenced  the  administration  in  any  way.  Peace  and  neutral 
commerce  every  one  desired,  but  they  could  not  be  had  to- 
gether. Nor  could  there  be  a  war  for  maritime  and  neutral 
rights  without  involving,  also,  offensive  warfare. 

The  national  election  of  1812  is  of  peculiar  interest  to  our 
narrative,  because  there  was  another  very  decided  attempt  at 
a  national  nominating  convention  by  the  Junto,  or  peace  Fed- 
eralists. They  were  again  face  to  face  with  the  proposition 
of  defeating  RepubUcan  candidates.  In  pursuance  of  the  regu- 
lar custom,  the  Republican  members  of  Congress  assembled 
in  caucus  in  the  senate  chamber  and  nominated  James  Madison 
for  the  office  of  President  and  John  Langdon  of  New  Hamp- 
shire, for  the  office  of  Vice-President,  May  8,  1812.^^  but  Mr. 
Langdon,  who  was  seventy-one  years  of  age,  refused  the  nom- 
ination.^^ Therefore,  at  a  later  caucus,  Elbridge  Gerry  of 
Massachusetts,  was  regularly  nominated  for  the  office  of 
Vice-President.^^ 

Mr.  Madison's  war  policy  had  made  him  unpopular  with  a 
small  portion  of  the  Republican  party  in  New  York.  This 
dissenting  faction  determined  to  defeat  Madison,  and  to  this 
end  nominated  through  caucus  DeWitt  Clinton.  The  Federal- 
ists hoped  that  Madison  had  become  sufficiently  unpopular  by 
the  war  measures  to  lose  the  nomination;  but,  as  he  had  not, 
they  were  again  at  a  loss  to  know  what  to  do.  DeWitt  Clinton 
was  then  a  person  of  some  distinction  in  the  State  of  New 
York.  He  had  expressed  his  detestation  of  mobocracy,  and 
had  been  reprimanded  for  it.  Although  he  had  been  ranked 
with  the  Jeffersonian  school,  yet,  as  he  had  indicated  dissatis- 
faction with  the  policy  of  Mr.  Madison,  it  was  hoped,  not  only 
by  the  nominating  faction  but  by  the  Federalists,  that  he  might 
be  elected.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  any  man  that  could  have  been 
elected  would  have  been  preferred  to  Madison  by  the  Federal- 
ists, and  this  party  was  willing  to  combine  with  any  portion 
of  the  citizens  who  were  willing  to  withdraw  from  the  support 
of  that  gentleman.  Measures  were  taken,  therefore,  to  effect 
a  union  of  these  two  dissatisfied  forces  by  calling  a  conference 
in  New  York  in  the  month  of  September,  1812. 

The  Democratic  convention  which  met  in  Baltimore  in  1831 

^Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  192. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  276. 

''Ibid. 

86 


has  always  stood  as  the  first  National  Nominating  Convention. 
Few  writers,  therefore,  have  ever  mentionel  the  secret  attempt 
at  a  National  Convention^pf,  1808^  and  the  one  of  1812.  The 
latter  is  simply  a  duplicate  of  the  1808  convention  which  we 
have  already  discussed,  and  will  not  be  treated  in  detail.  Those 
who  have  mentioned  the  Convention  of  1812  at  all  have  called 
it  the  first  Secret  Nominating  Convention  and  not  the  second. 
Viewed  with  relation  to  practical  results,  both  were  of  slight 
consequence,  and  perhaps  for  this  reason  they  have  been  neg- 
lected ;  but  as  steps  in  the  development  of  the  present  method 
of  nominating  candidates  for  the  presidency,  these  Federalist 
conferences  of  1808  and  1812  are  of  much  importance.  They 
are  important  to  this  work  because  both  are  undoubtedly  prod- 
ucts of  Juntoism.  So  far  as  is  known,  no  report  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  1812  Convention  was  ever  published,  and  the 
newspapers  of  the  period  contain  very  little  trustworthy  infor- 
mation regarding  it.  The  conference  was  conducted  as  private- 
ly as  possible,  so  what  little  information  the  papers  contain  is 
more  or  less  conjectural.  We  must  again,  therefore,  depend 
upon  a  few  letters  as  our  sources. 

Mr.  Sullivan,  one  of  the  delegates,  gives  the  following  brief 
account  of  its  origin^^:  "Soon  after  the  war  had  been  declared 
I  chanced  to  be  at  Saratoga  Springs,  where  I  met  with  the  Hon. 
Calvin  Goddard,  of  Norwich,  Connecticut,  and  with  the  Hon. 
John  Dwight  of  Springfied,  Massachusetts,  Governor  Griswold, 
of  Connecticut,  was  also  at  the  hoted,  but  confined  to  his 
chamber.  It  was  the  habit  of  these  two  gentlemen  and  myself, 
to  pay  the  Governor  a  daily  visit;  and  when  he  announced 
himself  too  ill  to  receive  us,  we  strolled  into  the  neighboring 
woods  to  talk  over  the  state  of  the  Union,  respecting  the  wel- 
fare and  durability  of  which  we  entertained  serious  and  painful 
fears." 

"On  one  of  these  execursions,  it  was  concluded,  that  a  Con- 
vention should  be  convened  at  New  York  during  the  following 
September,  at  which  as  many  states  should  be  represented  as 
could  be  induced  to  send  delegates.  The  object  of  the  con- 
vention was  to  determine  upon  the  expediency  of  defeating 
Mr.  Madison's  re-election,  by  running  DeWitt  Clinton  as  the 
opposing  candidate  for  the  Presidency.    Goddard  was  intrusted 

^J.  T.  Sullivan's  "Public  Men  of  the  Revolution,"  p.  350;  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  vol.  I,  p.  680. 

87 


with  the  State  of  Connecticut ;  Dwight  with  New  York,  and  I 
was  to  awaken  Massachusetts  to  the  importance  of  this  Conven- 
tion; while  all  three  were  to  assist  in  arousing  the  States." 

They  met  privately,  and  behind  closed  doors,  Sept.  15,  1812, 
and  consumed  three  days  in  eager  debate. ^^  The  Convention, 
during  two  days,  had  been  unable  to  come  to  any  determination. 
Rufus  King,*°  who  had  been  persuaded^^  to  attend,  eagerly  op- 
posed the  adoption  of  Clinton  as  their  candidate,  denouncing 
him  as  a  mere  ambitious  demagogue,  a  second  Aaron  Burr.*^ 
King  said  further:  "As  evidence  of  the  course  he  would  be 
likely  to  follow,  we  should  remember  that  he  disapproved  the 
embargo,  then  receded  from  his  position,  and  in  a  speech  made 
in  the  Senate  of  New  York,  which  he  published,  restored  him- 
self to  the  confidence  of  the  Democrats  by  a  triade  of  abuse 
poured  out  upon  the  Federalists.  If  we  succeed  in  promoting 
his  election  we  might  place  in  the  chair  a  Caesar  Borgia  in- 
stead of  a  James  Madison."*^  These  invectives  against  Clinton 
threw  the  Convention  into  still  greater  confusion  and  it  was 
about  to  be  adjourned  when  H.  G.  Otis,  by  a  rather  clever 
speech,*^  succeeded  in  restoring  order  and  it  was  agreed  to 
support  DeWitt  Clinton  for  President.  Jared  IngersoU,  of 
Pennsylvania,  was  selected  for  Vice-President.  Henry  Adams 
says :  ''No  one  knew  what  pledges  had  been  given  by  Clinton 
in  the  bargain  for  the  electoral  votes,  but  no  man  of  common' 
sense  who  wished  to  preserve  the  Government  and  the  Union 
could  longer  refuse  to  vote  for  Madison.*^ 

At  the  Convention  in  question  eleven  states  were  represented 
by  seventy  delegates.  Vermont  sent  two  delegates.  New  Hamp- 
shire two,  Massachusetts  eight,  Rhode  Island  three,  New  York 
eighteen,  Connecticut  six.  New  Jersey  twelve,  Pennsylvania 
twelve,   Delaware  two,   Maryland  three,  and   South  Carolina 

''Ibid.,  Hildreth,  "U.  S.  Hist,"  vol.  6.  p.  37^- 

*"King  always  stood  with  Hamilton  against  going  to  the  point  of 
secession,  and  this  meeting  he  considered  dangerous. 

"  King's  "Rufus  King,"  vol.  5,  p.  276.     Letter  from  Radcliff  to  King. 

*'Ibid.,  King  to  Gore,  p.  377;  Hildreth,  vol.  6.  p.  37^- 

^See  King's  Papers,  in  Life  and  Letters,  vol.  5,  P-  281;  see  pp. 
275-284,  same  reference,  for  King's  account  of  the  resolutions  and 
position  taken  by  the  Convention. 

'*  Sullivan's  "Public  Men,"  p.  3S1. 

*=  H.  Adams'  "Hist,  of  U.  S.,"  vol.  6,  p.  410.  Mr.  Adams  characterizes 
the  canvass  in  New  York  as  being  most  discreditable. 


four.  We  see  that  nearly  every  state  in  which  the  FederaHsts 
were  strong  enough  to  make  their  vote  a  counting  factor  in 
the  election  sent  delegates,  and  all  were  asked  to  send  them. 
So  far  as  the  party  was  concerned,  therefore,  we  may  be  safe 
in  saying  that  they  had  a  national  representation.  We  do  not 
know  how  the  delegates  were  chosen,  because  the  records  are 
too  incomplete  to  admit  of  the  assertion  that  they  were  duly 
elected.  They  doubtless  used  the  same  method  as  that  employ- 
ed in  1808. 

The  analogy  between  this  Conference  and  the  present  na- 
tional nominating  convention  is  practically  complete.  Delegates 
of  a  distinct  political  party  met  for  the  purpose  of  nominating 
a  candidate  for  the  Presidency.  They  nominated  such  a  candi- 
date; their  party  conducted  a  "Campaign"  in  his  behalf  and 
cast  their  votes  for  him.  The  facts  in  the  case,  then,  would 
seem  to  warrant  the  assertion  that  the  Conventions  of  1808 
and  1812  were  near  approaches  to,  if  not  the  strictest  sense, 
National  Conventions.  The  result  is  well  known.  Mr.  Madi- 
son was  elected  and  the  Junto  lost  its  last  chance  of  capturing 
the  Presidency.  , 

It  has  been  shown  how  upon  the  first  note  of  war.  New  Eng- 
land majorities  reverted  to  the  old  leaders,  under  whose  in- 
spiration the  legislatures  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and 
Rhode  Island  asserted  States  Rights,  and  discountenanced  all 
war  measures  against  Great  Britain  not  purely  defensive,  while 
the  Governors  refused  to  march  the  quota  of  militia  to  the  de- 
fense of  ports  or  place  them  under  the  orders  of  the  War  De- 
partment. We  shall  now  go  on  to  discuss  other  maeasures  of 
Junto  opposition. 

The  plan  of  military  operations  at  the  commencement  of  the 
war,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  was  to  garrison  and 
defend  the  seaboard  principally  by  occasional  calls  on  the 
neighboring  militia,  aided  by  a  few  regulars,  the  whole  to  be 
under  the  command  of  generals  from  the  regular  army.  With 
the  remaining  regular  forces,  together  with  such  volunteers  as 
could  be  procured,  they  were  to  attack  the  British  posts  in 
Upper  Canada,  and  subdue  them.  The  War  Department  be- 
lieved that  could  be  accomplished  before  England  would  have 
time  to  place  an  effective  army  there  and  it  would  give  the 
United  States  a  great  advantage.*^   Here,  however,  they  struck 

"Writings  of  James  Madison,  vol.  8,  p.  2^2. 

89 


the  full  force  of  Junto  opposition  because  it  was  offensive  war- 
fare and  leveled  against  their  beloved  England.  They  would, 
in  some  measure,  assist  in  the  defense  but  used  their  choicest 
language  against  all  offensive  movements. 

In  a  document  "^^  entitled :  ''The  Creed  of  Federal  Editors," 
one  can  find  such  sentiments  as  these:  "We  cannot,  and  we 
will  not  rejoice  in  any  event  of  victory  which  tends  solely 
to  prosper  the  unjust  and  wicked  views  of  our  Cabinet  in  pro- 
ducing an  offensive  war,  at  once  disgraceful,  unnatural,  and 
every  way  disastrous." 

"It  is  disgraceful  because  there  is  no  longer  a  doubt,  since 
the  development  of  the  juggling  arts  of  Bassano  and  Russell, 
that  it  was  produced  either  by  wicked  intrigues,  the  baleful  in- 
fluence, or  the  menaces  of  the  French  Tyrant.  It  is  unnatural, 
because  it  was  declared  for  the  sole  purpose  of  invading  the 
Canadian  provinces.  It  is  unnatural,  because  it  has  rent  asun- 
der, perhaps  forever,  nations  of  the  name  language,  laws  and 
religion;  nations  which  should  be  united  in  a  holy  league  to 
defend  law,  liberty,  and  religion  against  the  most  dangerous 
tyrant  who  was  ever  permitted  to  scourge  the  earth." 

Routed  at  the  polls  in  1812  as  a  national  party,  the  peace 
men  who  had  fallen  in  with  the  Junto  and  had  supported  De- 
Witt  Clinton  against  Madison,  began  to  disband ;  for  the  elect- 
oral vote  and  the  Congressional  returns  showed  that  the  war 
had  been  sustained  and  that  it  must  go  on.  But  the  inflexible 
rulers  of  the  Eastern  States  were  not  to  be  thus  turned  back. 
National  reverses  seem  to  have  bound  this  type  of  men  more 
closely  to  one  another.  Except  for  Gore  and  the  over-aggres- 
sive Pickering  who  were  serving  in  Congress,  all  the  other 
great  statesmen  of  the  Junto  school,  Quincy,  Lloyd,  Otis, 
Strong,  Chittenden,  Hillhouse,  J.  C.  Smith,  and  others,  were 
shedding  their  combined  light  upon  local  politics.  Some  of  these 
leaders,  like  Pickering,  continued  to  blaspheme  the  Adminis- 
tration ;  others  like  Otis  were  more  tolerant ;  but  all  agreed 
that  the  New  England  States,  even  though  left  alone,  must  look 
to  Federalism  as  their  last  hope  in  the  approaching  shipwreck. 
Practically  all  of  the  other  peace  states  had  reallied  to  the 
Union  cause.  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and 
Maryland  now  gave  the  Administration  a  firm  support. 

In  New  England,  on  the  other  hand,  the  peace  party  gained 

*''  The  Examiner,  p.  127. 

90 


in  strength  as  the  war  progressed.  In  the  spring  elections  of 
1813,  Strong  was  elected  Governor  of  Massachusetts  with  a 
Federal  legislature,  J.  C.  Smith  became  Connecticut's  chief  ex- 
ecutive succeeding  the  late  Griswold.*^  Chittenden  of  Vermont, 
who,  in  default  of  a  popular  choice,  was  made  Governor  by  a 
joint  ballot  of  the  legislature,  defeated  Galushia;  and  GiHam, 
of  the  same  Junto  School,  supplanted  Plumer  a  Governor  of 
New  Hampshire,  thus  deHvering  into  the  hands  of  the  Junto 
leaders  the  supreme  control  of  the  state  governments.  Gov- 
ernor Plumer's  defeat  was  a  hard  blow  to  the  Administration, 
because  he  was  a  firm  supporter  and  the  first  New  England 
Governor  to  promptly  send  militia  at  the  call  of  the  President 
in  1812.^^  He  gives  the  following  account  of  his  defeat:  "No 
part,"  he  says  March  9,  181 3,  *'of  my  official  conduct  has  been 
condemned  but  that  of  ordering  out  the  detached  militia  in 
1812  when  requested  by  the  President.  The  great  accusation 
is,  that  I  support  the  war  and  vindicate  the  National 
Government."^^ 

It  is  a  curious  fact,  overlooked  at  the  time  by  both  parties  to 
the  controversy,  that  the  Legislature  of  New  Hampshire,  in 
June,  1794,  by  a  resolution  still  in  force,  had  authorized  the 
Governor  to  call  out  the  militia  whenever  required  by  the 
President.^^ 

Chittenden,  as  soon  as  he  took  the  oath  of  office,  assumed 
command  of  the  State  Militia,  and  recalled  a  small  Vermont 
brigade,  detailed  by  his  predecessor  for  garrison  duty  at  Bur- 
lington, while  critical  operations  were  in  progress  at  that  point. 
This  action  by  Chittenden  was  rebuked  by  distant  states  as 
treasonable,  and  a  war  member  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives at  Washington  proposed  to  have  him  prosecuted.^^  But 
Otis  having  laid  on  the  table  of  the  Massachusetts  Senate  a 
resolution  expressive  of  the  duty  and  readiness  of  Massachu- 
setts to  aid,  with  her  whole  power,  the  Governor  of  Vermont, 
the  matter  was  dropped. ^^ 

*^  Griswold    had    died    in   office. 

*'Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  p.  273;  speech  to  Legislature  on  the  declara- 
tion   of    war. 

'"Plumer's  'Tlumer,"  pp.  408-414. 

''Ibid.,  p.  389. 

'^^  Niles'  Register,  vol.  5,  p.  423 ;  Hildreth,  vol.  3,  p.  465 ;  Schouler, 
vol.  2,  p.  421. 

''  Hildreth,  vol.  3,  p.  465. 

91 


Throughout  the  year  1813,  the  success  of  the  American  arms 
lay  principally  in  the  daring  and  splendid  work  of  her  small 
navy  which  operated  in  and  about  the  New  England  harbors. 
The  old  British  faction,  the  Essex  Junto  or  the  New  England 
peace  party,  ever  watchful  of  British  interests,  seems  to  have 
grown  quite  despondent  over  the  defeats  of  the  British  navy. 
They  attempted  to  aid  Great  Britain,  therefore,  in  destroying 
American  war  vessels  and  won  another,  and  even  more  odious, 
title — ''Blue  light  Federalists." 

One  incident  occurred  in  New  London  harbor  at  the  time 
Hardy's  blockading  squadron  hemmed  in  the  United  States 
frigates.  Stephen  Decatur  commanding  the  United  States 
squadron  addressed  the  following  letter^*  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  December  20,  1812 :  "Some  few  nights  since,  the 
weather  promised  an  opportunity  for  this  squadron  to  get  to 
sea,  and  it  was  said  that  on  that  night  we  intended  to  make  the 
attempt.  In  the  course  of  the  evening  two  blue  lights  were 
burnt  on  both  the  points  at  the  harbor's  mouth  as  signals  to 
the  enemy,  and  there  is  not  a  doubt,  but  that  they  have,  by 
signals  and  otherwise,  instantaneous  information  of  our  move- 
ments. Great  but  unsuccessful  exertions  have  been  made  to 
detect  those  who  communicate  with  the  enemy  by  signal.  Not- 
withstanding, these  signals  have  been  repeated,  and  have  been 
seen  by  twenty  persons,  at  least,  in  this  squadron.  There  are 
men  in  New  London  who  have  the  hardihood  to  affect  to  dis- 
believe it,  and  the  affrontery  to  avow  their  belief." 

As  illustrative  of  the  feeling  which  the  "blue  lights"  pro- 
voked we  will  quote  from  several  newspapers.  The  Rhode  Is- 
land American  has  this  to  say:^^  "The  infamous  'blue  light' 
incident  has  been  lustily  denied  by  many;  for  it  is  feared  the 
honest  part  of  the  community  may  reflect  on  the  circumstance, 
and  in  it  discover  that  wicked  'British  influence'  that  prevails 
in  certain  parts  of  the  United  States. "^^  The  Baltimore  Federal 
Gazette  says :  "It  is  astonishing  to  observe  the  efforts  made  to 
invalidate  the  truth  of  the  report  respecting  the  'blue  Hght'  ex- 
hibition on  the  shores  of  New  London.  With  impudence  un- 
paralleled the  facts  are  denied  in  toto,  and  the  thing  is  twisted 

^  Niles'  Register,  vol.  5,  p.  302. 
^^  Copied  in  Niles'  'Register,  vol.  5,  P-  302. 

^  See  also  Annals  of  Cong.,  No.  25,  vol  i,  House  debate  on  the  "Blue 
Lights"  affair, 

92 


and  turned  a  thousand  ways  to  weaken  its  force ;  for  the  people 
are  alarmed  and  shocked  at  the  vileness,  and  begin  to  see  the 
lengths,  to  which  the  attachment  of  some  to  the  enemy,  will 
lead  them."^''  No  positive  evidence  has  ever  been  found  con- 
necting this  affair  with  the  British  faction.  Congress  conclud- 
ed the  matter  too  trivial  for  investigation ;  but  public  suspicion, 
long  directed  against  the  "peace  men"  of  New  England,  did 
them  ample  mischief  in  the  epithet  of  "Blue  light  Federalists." 
Conclusions  may  be  drawn,  however,  from  what  has  gone  be- 
fore and  from  that  which  is  to  come. 

We  said  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  that  New  England's 
political  bosses  were  responsible  for  the  half  hearted  support 
given  the  Administration  during  the  war.  We  said,  too,  that 
Juntoism  had  been  breathed  into  the  nostrils  of  writers  (editors 
and  others,  and  that  even  the  most  learned  ministers  caught  the 
spirit  and  showered  invectives  upon  the  administration  at 
Washington  and  plead  with  their  people  to,  "Come  out  from 
among  them."  During  the  last  year  of  the  War  they  based 
their  complaints  upon  three  subjects,  i.  That  England  has 
always  been  willing  to  make  a  treaty  with  us  on  fair  and  hon- 
orable grounds.  2.  That  the  war  was  offensive  and  morally 
wrong.  3.  That  since  our  Administration  was  so  obstinately 
bent  on  continuing  the  war  no  prospect  of  peace  could  exist 
as  long  as  the  Government  had  means  of  carrying  it  on.  As  to 
the  first  subject,  we  cannot  say  that  it  was  reserved  for  the 
last  year  of  the  war,  in  fact  none  of  them  were  entirely  reserved 
for  the  second  year,  but  greater  effort  was  manifested  at  this 
period  to  make  them  felt.  The  first  subject  was  the  text,  as 
we  have  seen,  of  Pickering's  denunciation  of  the  Administra- 
tion in  1808.  In  that  letter  he  went  so  far  as  to  accuse  the 
President  of  withholding  documents  which  would  have  estab- 
lished the  innocency  of  England  to  the  satisfaction  of  all.^^  It 
was  used  by  Quincy  and  others  in  Congress  to  show  that  war 
was  unnecessary  and  that  if  England's  advances  had  been  met 
promptly  and  fairly,  peace  could  have  been  assured. ^^  The 
Junto  claimed  that  our  Ministers  were  instructed  in  such  a  way 
that  no  nation  could  treat  with  them.  This,  of  course,  refers 
to  our  demand  for  a  treaty  on  the  impressment  issue. 

"Copied  in  Niles'  Register,  vol.  5,  p.  311. 

"'  "Political  Tracts,"  1908. 

""  Edmund    Quincy's    "Life    and    Speeches    of    Josiah    Quinn." 

93 


The  second  subject,  which  is  concerned  with  the  morahty  of 
the  cause,  must,  in  all  justice,  be  entrusted  to  the  New  England 
clergy.  Governor  Plumer,  having  been  defeated  in  the  spring 
election  of  1813,  as  Governor  of  New  Hampshire,  was  removed 
from  the  scenes  of  public  life.  He  had  been  deeply  moved  by 
the  false  and  wicked  accusations  which  the  sermons  of  Osgood, 
Parish,  and  Gardiner  contained.  Therefore,  he  published  a 
series  of  essays *^°  during  the  winter  of  1813-14  entitled:  ''An 
address  to  the  Clergy  of  New  England  on  their  opposition  to 
the  rulers  of  the  United  States,  by  a  Layman/'  He  quoted  the 
text  of  Malachi :  "Ye  have  departed  out  of  the  way,  ye  have 
caused  many  to  stumble;  therefore  have  I  made  you  con- 
temptible and  base  before  all  the  people."  Plumer's  addresses 
were,  in  large  part,  quotations  from  the  sermons  and  their 
analysis.  Beside  the  newspaper  circulation,  about  three  thou- 
sand copies  of  it  were  circulated  in  pamphlet  form.  It  proved 
to  be  a  great  and  wholesome  publication  in  favor  of  the  Admin- 
istration in  its  attempt  to  counteract  the  baleful  influence. 

A  few  quotations  ^^  will  suffice  to  show  how  the  Clergy  took 
up^  to  old  Junto  songs  at  this  juncture,  and  chanted  them  from 
the  pulpits.  Dr.  Osgood  in  a  sermon  of  June,  1812,  says:  "Our 
government  has  the  hardihood  and  affrontery  at  which  Demons 
might  blush.  This  war  is  an  outrage  against  Heaven,  against 
all  truth,  honesty,  justice,  goodness,— against  all  principles  of 
social  happiness."  In  another  sermon  of  a  few  days  later,  he 
says:  "Were  not  the  authors  of  this  war  in  character  nearly 
akin  to  the  Deists  and  Atheists  of  France ;  were  they  not  men 
of  hardened  hearts,  sacred  consciences,  reprobate  minds  and 
desperate  wickedness ;  it  seems  utterly  inconceivable  that  they 
should  have  made  a  declaration  of  war."  Shortly  after  this 
exposition  we  find  him  warning  his  people  as  follows :  "Every 
man  who  volunteers  his  services  in  such  a  war  against  Great 
Britain  or  loans  his  money  for  its  support,  or  by  his  conversa- 
tion, his  writings  or  any  other  mode  of  influence,  encourages 
its  prosecution,  that  man  is  an  accomplice  in  the  wickedness; 
leads  his  conscience  with  the  blackest  crimes,  brings  the  guilt 

*"  The  pamphlet  containing  these  addresses  can  be  found  in  Harvard 
library. 

^All  of  these  quotations  are  taken  from  Plumer's  addresses.  He 
quotes  them  directly  from  the  sermons.  See  Carney's  "Olive  Branch" 
for  parts  of  many  of  these  sermons. 

94 


of  blood  upon  his  soul,  and  in  sight  of  God  and  His  law  is  a 
murderer — and  no  murderer  hath  eternal  life."  How  variant 
are  such  wanton  charges  from  the  spirit  of  that  mild  religion, 
which  enjoins  on  its  disciples,  to  let  their  moderation  to  be 
known  to  all  men,  and  not  to  judge  others. 

Dr.  Parish  in  a  sermon  of  April  8,  1813,  compares  the 
President  to  the  Devil,  and  says  Congress  has  established 
iniquity  and  murder  by  law.  He  represents  our  rulers  as  the 
abject  slaves  of  the  French  Emperor,  and  all  our  calamities  as 
rising  from  the  friendship  of  our  government  to  that  haughty 
master.  July  12,  1812,  he  tells  us :  "The  wicked  archives  of 
all  the  wicked  governments  from  Macedonia's  madman  to  the 
Swede,  furnish  no  parallel  to  this  profligate  measure.  The 
story  of  Herod  destroying  all  the  babes  of  Bethlehem,  will 
give  place  to  this  more  enormous  iniquity."  In  a  later  sermon, 
he  endeavors  to  excite  the  people  of  the  Eastern  States  to 
rebel,  to  dissolve  the  Federal  government  and  dismember  the 
Union.  "The  general  government,"  he  says,  "cannot  provide 
any  reasonable  defense.  They  cannot  raise  men ;  they  cannot 
borrow  money."  He  tells  them  further  that  they  have  thrown 
away  a  sufficient  number  of  petitions  and  remonstrances  by 
sending  them  to  the  Potomac  to  form  carpets  for  her  palaces. 
Then  followed  these  questions :  "Will  you  then  throw  your- 
selves completely  in  their  power,  by  suffering  this  warfare  to 
proceed?  Will  you  admit  Southern  troops  into  your  borders?" 
This  is  a  fair  sample  of  the  Massachusetts  pulpit  during  the 
war.  It  is  simply  Juntoism  as  it  had  been  proclaimed  from 
the  year  1800.  J.  Q.  Adams  wrote  to  Mr.  Plumer  January  10, 
1813,  saying:  "The  clergy  of  this  country  are  growing  more 
and  more  like  the  clergy  of  all  other  countries.  Osgood, 
Parish  and  Gardiner,  are  but  minatures  of  Lowth,  Sacheverel, 
Laud  and  Lorain ;  and  in  that  rank  I  leave  them."  *^- 

When  we  consider  the  third  subject,  "The  Government  can- 
not carry  on  war  without  money  and  as  long  as  they  have  it 
this  blood  shedding  will  never  cease,"  it  becomes  necessary  to 
uncover  one  of  the  darkest  and  most  treasonable  of  the  Junto 
plats.  From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
Peace  Faction,  as  they  called  themselves,  had  exerted  every 
influence  and  effort  to  thwart  the  government  in  its  effort  to 
provide  means  for  maintaining  the  war  against  Great  Britain. 

^  Plumer's  "Life  of  Plumer,"  p.  103. 

9S 


We  have  seen  how  at  the  beginning  they  attempted  to  block 
the  raising  of  an  army;  how  they  refused  to  send  out  the  State 
Mihtia;  and  how  they  chose  to  interpret  the  Constitution  to 
meet  their  own  wishes  and  desires.  It  now  remains  for  us  to 
see  how  they  acted  in  regard  to  financing  the  war.  Boston  was 
to  be  the  grand  focus  of  this  conspiracy. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  embargo  had  closed  all 
American  ports  to  the  legal  admission  of  foreign  goods.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  the  officers  were  not  very  zealous 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  restrictive  laws.  Smuggling,  there- 
fore, became  almost  respectable  and,  owing  to  New  England's 
capital,  was  extensively  carried  on.  This  illegal  trade  was 
kept  up,  and  during  the  war  many  valuable  British  prizes  ^^ 
were  taken  into  Boston  ports. ^*  Boston,  therefore,  became  a 
distributing  center  for  foreign  goods  to  other  cities.  For  these 
goods  they  paid  partly  in  bills  of  the  banks  of  the  Middle  and 
Southern  states  and  partly  in  their  own  promissory  notes.®^ 
Boston  by  this  means  became  a  financial  autocrat,  having  in  its 
hands  despotic  power  to  control  the  money  affairs  of  the  coun- 
try. This  fact  suggested  to  the  leaders  of  the  Peace  Faction 
in  New  England  a  scheme  for  blocking  the  Administration 
financially  and  thereby  compelling  it  to  abandon  with  dis- 
honors^ the  struggle  with  Great  Britain. Nor  were  they  slow  to 
act  upon  the  suggestion  and  to  put  the  scheme  into  operation. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  government  was  com- 
pelled to  ask  for  loans,  and  the  Peace  Faction  made  such  per- 
sistent opposition  for  the  purpose  of  embarassing  the  govern- 
ment, that  in  every  case  a  bonus  ^'^  was  paid  for  all  sums 
borrowed. s''  In  March,  1814,  a  loan  of  $25,000,000  was  auth- 
orized. Only  $11,400,000  of  the  proposed  loans  were  raised 
and  that  by  paying  a  bonus  of  $2,852,000.^®     It  was  so  dis- 

*' Carey's  "Olive  Branch,"  p.  286. 

•^Harrison  Gray  Otis,  charged  the  Administration  with  the  author- 
ship of  this  depredation  of  morals  and  execrable  course  of  smuggling 
and  fraud. 

^Lossing's  "War  1812,"  p.  1008. 

^  Ihid.,  Carey's  "Olive  Branch,"  p.  286;  Schouler,  vol.  2,  p.  415; 
Pickering  Mss.  February  4,  1814,  letter  to  Putnam;  Lodge's  "Cabot," 
p.  530. 

*^Niles'  Register,  vol.  2,  pp.  91  and  195. 

•^Lossing's  "War,"  p.   1008. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  1009. 

96 


astrous  that  only  one  more  attempt  was  made  after  that  time  to 
borrow  money.  This  was  the  darkest  period  of  the  war,  and 
then  it  was  that  the  Peace  Faction  at  pohtical  meetings,  through 
the  press,  and  from  the  pulpit,  put  every  obstacle  in  the  way 
to  crush  the  government.  By  inflamatory  and  threatening 
publications  and  personal  menaces,  they  intimidated  many 
capitalists. ^° 

Of  a  species  of  denunciation  held  out  to  deter  men  from  sub- 
scribing, some  idea  may  be  formed  from  the  following  ref- 
erences taken  from  various  Boston  papers  and  other  publica- 
tions at  this  time.  Mr.  John  Lowell  ^^  in  "Road  to  Ruin"  No. 
5,  says:  ''Will  Federalists  subscribe  to  the  loan?  Will  they 
lend  money  to  our  national  rulers?  It  is  impossible;  first,  be- 
cause of  principle;  secondly,  because  of  principle  and  interest. 
If  they  lend  money  now  they  make  themselves  parties  to  the 
violation  of  the  Constitution,  the  cruelly  oppressive  measures 
in  relation  to  commerce,  and  to  all  the  crimes  which  have  oc- 
curred in  the  field  and  in  the  cabinet."  (''Road  to  Ruin" 
No.  5).  He  continues :  "To  what  purpose  have  the  Federalists 
exerted  themselves  to  show  the  wickedness  of  this  war,  and 
to  show  the  authors  of  it  not  only  to  be  unworthy  of  public 
confidence  but  highly  criminal,  and  to  arouse  pubHc  sentiment 
against  it,  if  now  they  contribute  money  without  which  these 
rulers  must  be  compelled  to  stop?"  (The  same  reference  con- 
tinued) :  "By  the  magnanimous  course  pointed  out  by  Governor 
Strong,  that  is,  by  withholding  all  voluntary  aid  in  prosecuting 
the  war,  the  manfully  expressing  our  opinions  as  to  its  injustice 
and  ruinous  tendency,  we  have  arrested  its  progress ;  and  driven 
its  authors  to  abandon  their  nefarious  schemes,  and  to  look 
anxiously  for  peace.  What  then  if  we  lend  them  money? 
They  will  not  make  peace ;  they  will  hanker  after  Canada.  Pray 
do  not  prevent  them,  the  abusers  of  their  trust,  from  becoming 
bankrupt;  do  not  prevent  them  from  becoming  odious  to  the 
public  and  replaced  by  better  men.     Any  Federalist  who  lends 

^"  One  of  the  best  examples  of  New  England  literature  on  the  subject 
is  the  Examiner.  It  contains  fifteen  articles  entitled,  "Road  to  Ruin," 
by  John  Lowell.  There  are  many  political  essays  and  official  documents 
which  could  be  cited,  but  we  will  quote  largely  from  "Road  to  Ruin" 
and  indicate  by  numbers,  as  the  articles  are  numbered  from  i  to  15. 
Gary,  in  his  "Olive  Branch"  quotes  correctly  from  the  Examiner  and 
also  from  newspapers  on  this  phrase  of  our  subject. 

■^Both  Lowell's  were  loyal  Junto  supporters. 

97 


money  to  the  government,  must  go  shake  hands  with  James 
Madison  and  claim  fellowship  with  Felix  Grundy.  Let  him 
no  more  call  himself  a  Federalist  and  a  friend  of  his  country. 
He  will  be  called  by  others  infamous."  "But  Federalists  will 
not  lend  money  because  they  will  never  get  it  again.  How, 
where  and  when  will  the  government  get  money  to  pay  interest  I 
There  are  two  very  strong  reasons,  therefore,  why  Federalists 
will  not  lend  money — first,  because  it  would  be  a  base  aban- 
donment of  political  and  moral  principles ;  secondly,  because  it 
is  pretty  certain  that  they  will  never  be  paid  back  the  amount." 
The  Boston  Centinel,  March  24,  1813,  says:  "The  war  advo- 
cates appear  very  sore  and  chagrined  at  the  failure  of  the  late 
loan,  and  in  their  ravings  ascribe  the  meager  subscriptions  to 
the  truths  which  have  appeared  in  the  Federal  papers  on  the 
subject."  In  a  discourse  delivered  at  Byfield,  April  7,  1814,  by 
Elijah  Parish,  D.D.  we  find  the  following:  "No  peace  will 
ever  be  made,  till  the  people  say  that  there  shall  be  no  war.  If 
the  rich  men  continue  to  furnish  money  war  will  continue  until 
the  mountains  are  melted  with  blood — till  every  field  in 
America  is  white  with  the  bones  of  her  people. '^- 

The  Junto  seems  to  have  extracted  promises  from  many  of 
the  wealthier  citizens  not  to  lend  money  to  the  government; 
and  the  fact  that  they  loaned  their  money  secretly,  would  sug- 
gest that  they  were  liable  to  some  sort  of  disgrace  or  per- 
secution. To  quote  John  Lowell  again  in  "Road  to  Ruin," 
No.  5  :  "Money  is  such  a  drug  that  men  against  their  con- 
sciences, their  honor,  their  duty,  their  professions  and  promises 
— are  willing  to  lend  it  secretly  to  support  the  very  measures 
intended  and  calculated  to  ruin  them."  What,  alas,  must  be 
the  awful  state  of  society  and  the  tremendous  pressure  brought 
to  bear,  when  a  free  citizen  is  afraid  to  lend  his  money  publicly 
to  support  the  government  trying  to  protect  him!  And  to  be 
forced  to  suffer  such  abuse  as  the  above  from  Mr.  Lowell,  when 
he  rallies  secretly  to  its  support,  certainly  signifies  the  depths 
to  which  patriotism  can  be  dragged. 

Records  exist  to  prove  these  not  false  accusations.  The  fol- 
lowing is  taken  from  the  Boston  Chronicle,  April  14,  1814,  and 
signed  by  Gilbert  and  Dean,  Brokers.  Exchange  Coffee 
House,  Boston,  April  12"  :  "From  the  advice  of  several  friends, 
we  are  induced  to  announce  to  the  public  that  subscriptions  to 

''Carey's  "Olive  Branch,"  p.  292. 

98 


the  new  loan  will  be  received  by  us  as  agents.  .  .  .  Applica- 
tions will  be  received  from  any  persons  who  wish  to  receive 
their  interest  in  Boston,  .  .  .  and  the  names  of  all  subscribers 
shall  be  known  only  to  the  undersigned." 

These  extracts  give  but  a  faint  idea  of  the  violence  of  the 
publishers,  at  this  time,  by  the  peace  faction.  We  cannot 
wonder  at  the  people  becoming  intimidated  and  hiding  their 
money  in  stockings  beneath  hearthstones,  and  in  various  other 
places  to  prevent  its  getting  into  the  clutches  of  Madison  and 
his  cohorts. 

Nor  was  this  all.  To  make  the  blow  still  more  effectual  the 
conspirators  made  arrangements^*  with  agents  of  the  govern- 
ment authorities  of  Lower  Canada  whereby  a  very  large 
amount  of  British  Government  bills,  drawn  on  Quebec,  were 
transmitted  to  New  York,  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore,  and 
offered  on  such  advantageous  terms  to  capitalists  as  induced 
them  to  purchase.'^*  By  this  means  an  immense  amount  of 
gold  was  transmitted  to  Canada,  placed  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  Government  of  the  United  States,  and  put  into  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  to  give  succor  to  the  British  who  were  waging 
war  against  the  independence  of  the  Republic. 

These  machinations  failed  to  produce  the  desired  effect. 
There  were  loyal  men  in  New  England,  as  we  have  seen,  who 
still  subscribed  to  the  loans.  The  Middle  and  Southern  State 
banks,  with  such  outside  help,  were  able  to  keep  the  govern- 
ment going.  So  these  "Wise  men  from  the  East"  adopted 
more  strenuous  measures  to  drain  those  banks  of  their  specie, 
and  render  them  unable  to  meet  their  subscriptions  to  the  loan. 
The  Boston  banks  fell  into  this  scheme ;  otherwise  it  could  not 
have  been  effected.^^  The  notes  of  the  banks  in  New  York, 
and  of  the  banks  further  south,  held  by  these  Boston  banks, 

"Lossing's  "War,"  p.  loio;  Carey's  "Olive  Branch,"  p.  301;  Schouler, 
vol.  2,  p.  415. 

'*  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  Dec.  16,  1814.  These  transaction  were 
made  so  boldly  that  the  bills  were  advertised  in  the  Boston  papers.  I 
annex  the   following : 

"i  bill  for L.  800  British  Government  Bills, 

I  ditto 250  For  sale  by 

I  ditto 203  Chas.  W.  Green, 

No.  14  India  wharf." 

1,253 
"Lossing's  "War  of  1812,"  p.  1009;  Schouler,  vol.  2,  pp.  415-416. 

99 


were  transmitted  to  them  with  demands  for  specie.  At  the 
same  time  drafts  were  drawn  on  the  New  York  banks  for  the 
balance  due  the  Boston  corporations  to  the  amount  of  about 
$8,000,000  in  the  course  of  a  few  months.  This  of  course 
caused  the  New  York  banks  to  draw  heavily  on  those  of  Phila- 
delphia and  of  the  South  and  caused  a  panic.  Statistics  show  ^^ 
that  the  Boston  banks  which  had  taken  the  action  had  $250  in 
specie  for  every  $100  of  their  notes  in  circulation — "d.  state  of 
things,"  says  Carey,  ''probably  unparalleled  in  the  history  of 
banking  from  the  days  of  the  Lombards  to  the  present  day.''  '^^ 
The  extensive  smuggling,  the  forced  sale  of  British  Govern- 
ment bills,"^^  and  the  later  demands  of  the  New  England  banks 
upon  the  weaker  ones  caused  all  of  the  banks  of  New  York, 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  the  District  of  Columbia,  Mary- 
land, Virginia,  Kentucky  and  Ohio,  to  refuse  payments  in 
specie. '^^  Some  of  the  banks  farther  south  were  aided  by  some 
prizes  and  were  not  forced  into  such  straits. ^^  As  direct 
evidence  to  this  fact  we  have  a  report  ^^  addressed  and  signed 
by  the  presidents  of  the  six  Banks  of  Philadelphia  which  says : 
'We  are  forced  to  suspend  specie  payment  on  account  of  the 
payment  in  specie  for  smuggled  goods  and  the  trade  in  British 
government  hills  which  have  caused  very  great  sums  to  be  ex- 
ported from  the  United  States."  As  further  testimony  we 
have  a  letter  from  Mr.  Gallatin,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  say- 
ing: ''Not  only  did  New  England  lend  no  aid  to  the  Treasury, 
but  her  whole  influence  was  thrown  to  embarrass  it.  Of  loans 
to  the  amount  of  $41,000,000  paid  into  the  treasury  during  the 
war,  she  contributed  less  than  three  millions.  This  was  not 
all.  A  large  importation  of  foreign  goods  into  the  Eastern 
States,  and  an  extensive  trade  in  British  Government  bills  of 
exchange,  caused  a  drain  of  specie  through  New  England  to 
Great  Britain.  The  specie  in  the  vaults  of  Massachusetts 
banks  rose  from  $1,700,000  in  June-iSii,  to  $3,900,000  in  June 
1812,  and  to  $7,300,000  in  June  1814,  all  of  which  was  lost  to 

^' Henry    Adams'    "Life    of    Albert    Gallatin,"    pp.    473-474;    Carey's 
"Olive  Branch,"  p.  299;  Lossing's  "War,"  p.  loio. 
"  Carey's  "Olive  Branch,"  p.  300. 

''^Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  sup.  p.  175;  Schouler,  vol.  2,  p.  415. 
"Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  sup.  p.  175. 
""Ihid^v.  176. 
^^  Ibid.,  Full  report  published  and  signed  by  the  six  bank  Presidents. 

100 


the  Government  and  the  Treasury."^-  Disaffectitfri,  there-  ■ 
fore,  withheld  a  greater  part  of  the  capital  and  so  forced  the 
government  to  negotiate  a  foreign  loan  to  support  a  very  just 
war.  ^^ 

The  facts  concerning  the  attitude  of  the  "Essex  Junto,"  the 
"British  faction,"  the  "Peace  Party"  or  the  "Blue-light  Fed- 
eralists," during  the  War  of  1812  seem  sufficient  to  warrant  the 
assumption  made  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  that  this 
particular  coterie  of  individuals  rather  than  malicious  legisla- 
tion by  the  administration  were  responsible  for  the  half-hearted 
support  of  New  England.  We  have  now  only  to  discuss  the 
crowning  conspiracy  of  the  Junto — the  Hartford  Convention. 

''H.  Adams'  "Life  of  Albert  Gallatin,"  pp.  437-474. 
^Writings  of  James  Madison,  vol.  8,  p.  278. 


lOI 


CHAPTER  VI 
The  Hartford  Convention 

Before  attempting  to  discuss  the  Hartford  Convention,  it  is 
necessary  to  sketch  briefly  some  of  the  legislation  which  helped 
to  precipitate  it.  In  our  last  chapter  we  left  the  Administra- 
tion, perhaps,  in  the  darkest  hour  of  conflict.  It  was  being 
forced  into  the  most  extreme  measures  to  maintain  the  war.  It 
refused  to  make  peace  on  humiliating  terms,  and  it  seemed  next 
to  impossible  to  prolong  the  war  without  more  troops.  The 
proposition,  by  Monroe,  to  raise  a  large  force  by  conscription, 
therefore,  brought  matters  to  a  crisis  in  New  England.  In 
some  of  the  other  states,  the  matter  of  local  defense  had  been 
left  almost  wholly  to  the  discretion  of  the  respective  governors ; 
but  the  President,  becoming  suspicious  of  the  loyalty  of  New 
England  because  of  the  injurious  action  of  the  Peace  Faction, 
insisted  upon  the  exclusive  control  of  all  military  movements 
there.  The  Massachusetts  militia  not  having  been  placed  un- 
der General  Dearborn's  orders,  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  an 
official  letter  to  Governor  Strong,  refused  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  State  militia  defending  Massachusetts.^  Similar  action 
for  a  like  cause  had  occurred  in  the  case  of  Connecticut,  and  a 
clamor  was  instantly  raised  that  New  England  was  abandoned 
to  the  enemy  for  the  action  of  the  National  Government.  The 
forces,  it  is  true,  had  been  withdrawn  to  protect,  if  possible, 
the  Capital  at  Washington,  but  any  one  has  to  follow  only  the 
conflicts  of  war  to  understand  why  the  New  England  States 
were  thus  temporarily  unprotected. 

The  refusal  of  the  Government  to  pay  the  militia  defending 
the  coast  of  Massachusetts;  the  proposition  to  raise  a  large 
force  by  subscription  and  the  temporary  withdrawal  of  troops, 
from  this  section,  furnished  the  Peace  Faction  new  ground 
upon  which  they  could  proceed.  A  joint  committee  of  the 
Massachusetts  legislature  was  appointed,  having  H.  G.  Otis 
for  its  chairman,  to  make  a  report  on  the  state  of  public  af- 

'  Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  148.     Monroe's  letter  to  Strong. 

IQ2 


fairs.  This  report  ^  contained  a  convert  threat  of  independent 
action  on  the  part  of  that  State,  recommending  ''that  a  number 
of  troops,  not  exceeding  ten  thousand,  be  raised  and  officered 
by  the  Governor  for  the  defense  of  the  state ;  that  the  Gov- 
ernor be  authorized  to  borrow  from  time  to  time  a  sum  not 
exceeding  one  milHon  dollars  to  defray  local  expenses ;  that 
.  .  .  persons  be  appointed  as  delegates  from  this  legislature 
to  confer  with  delegates  from  the  States  of  New  England 
upon  subjects  of  public  grievance,  and  to  take  measures  for 
procuring  a  convention  of  delegates  if  they  think  proper;  that 
a  circular  letter  from  this  legislature  be  addressed  to  the  execu- 
tive government  of  each  of  said  states  explaining  the  objects 
of  the  proposed  conference  and  inviting  them  to  concur  in 
sending  delegates  thereto;  that  on  the  day  of  instant, 

the  legislature  will,  by  joint  ballot,  elect  persons  to  meet 
such  delegates  as  may  be  appointed  by  the  said  states,  or  either 
of  them,  at  in  the  state  of  ." 

The  Administration  minority  protested^  against  this  action, 
and  denounced  it  as  a  disguised  movement  to  prepare  the  way 
for  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  The  protest  was  of  no  avail. 
The  report  of  the  Committee  was  adopted  by  a  vote  of  three  to 
one,*  and  the  Governor  addressing  a  circular  letter  to  the  other 
Governors  of  the  New  England  States,  invited  them  to  appoint 
delegates,  to  meet  in  convention  at  Hartford,  Conecticut,  Dec- 
ember 15,  1 814,  to  deliberate  upon  the  dangers  of  which  the 
states  in  the  Eastern  section  of  the  Union  were  exposed.^  The 
proposition  also  contained  suggestions  relative  to  Constitutional 
amendments  on  the  subject  of  slave  representation,  which 
might  secure  to  New  England  equal  advantage  with  the  South. 

The  convention  of  both  houses  of  the  Massachusetts  legis- 
lature, October  10,  proceeded  to  the  choice  of  twelve  delegates, 
to  meet  and  confer  (on  the  15th  of  December  next)  with  such 
delegates  as  may  be  chosen  by  any  or  all  of  the  other  New 
England  States.^ 

Late  in  the  same  month  the  legislatures  of  Connecticut  and 
Rhode  Island  accepted  the  invitation  from  the  Governor  of 

^Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  150.     Report  of  Committee. 

^Ibid.,  p.  153. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  152. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  179.    The  circular  letter. 

'Ibid.,  p.  153.     Act  of  Mass.  legislature. 

103 


Massachusetts,  and  appointed  delegates  to  the  Hartford 
Convention,  Connecticut  appointing  seven  and  Rhode  Island 
four.^  The  legislature  of  Vermont  refused  to  adopt  the  Mass- 
achusets  resolutions  and  unanimously  reported  against  them.^ 
New  Hampshire  v^as  not  represented  as  a  state  because  a 
majority  of  the  council  v^^ho  must  authorize  a  call  of  the  legis- 
lature, to  appoint  delegates,  were  Republicans.^  This  Council 
consisted  of  three  Republicans  and  two  Federalists,  so  the  Re- 
publican majority  blocked  the  appointment  of  delegates  to 
Hartford.  But  there  followed  immediately  County  Conven- 
tions in  these  two  States  and  Vermont  was  finally  represented 
by  one  delegate  from  the  County  of  Windham,  and  New 
Hampshire  by  two  representatives  from  the  counties  of  Grafton 
and  Cheshire.^^  There  were,  therefore,  only  three  states  fully 
represented  at  Hartford. 

The  Convention  met  according  to  programme,  on  Thursday 
morning,  December  15,  1814,  composed  of  twenty-six  del- 
egates.^^ They  organized  by  the  appointment  of  George  Cabot, 
of  Boston,  President  and  Theodore  Dwight  of  Hartford,  Sec- 
retary. The  sessions  of  the  Convention  continued  thorughout 
three  weeks,  behind  closed  doors.  The  movement  had  created 
much  alarm  at  the  Seat  of  government,  especially  because  at 
about  that  time  the  Massachusetts  legislature  appropriated  a 
million  dollars  toward  the  support  of  ten  thousand  men  to  re- 
lieve the  militia  in  service,  and  to  be  exclusively  under  state 
control. 

The  Hartford  Convention  has  been  condemned  and  defended 
alike  for  almost  a  century  without  any  one  writing  a  satis- 
factory account  of  it.  Dwight,  Secretary  of  the  Convention, 
has  written  a  history  of  it,  but  it  is  quite  pointless.     The  treat- 

'  Niles'  iRegister,  vol.  7,  p.  165  and  180. 

^  Ibid.,  p.  167. 

°  Ibid.,  see  also  Plumer's  "Plumer,"  p.  417. 

'' Ibid.,  p.  305. 

"  The  following  are  the  names  of  the  delegates  :  Geo.  Cabot,  Nathan 
Dane,  Wm.  Prescott,  H.  G.  Otis,  Timothy  Bigelow,  Joshua  Thomas, 
Samuel  Summer  Wilde,  Joseph  Lyman,  Steven  Longfellow,  Jr.,  Daniel 
Waldo,  Hodijah  Baylies,  and  George  Bliss,  from  Massachusetts;  Chaun- 
cey  Goodrich,  John  Treadwell,  James  Hillhouse,  Zephaniah  Swift, 
Nathaniel  Smith,  Calvin  Goddard,  and  Roger  M.  Sherman,  from  Con- 
necticut; Daniel  Lyman,  Samuel  Ward,  Edward  Monton,  and  Benjamin 
Hazard  from  Rhode  Island;  Benjamin  West,  and  Mills  Olcott  from 
New  Hampshire ;  and  Wm.  Hall,  Jr.,  from  Vermont. 

104 


ment  of  the  Convention  in  Henry  Adams  "New  England 
Federalism"  is  equally  unsatisfactory.  These  are  the  most 
voluminous  accounts  available ;  but,  as  length  seems  to  be  their 
only  redeeming  feature,  we  propose  to  discard  both  of  them 
and  attempt  to  build  our  structure  upon  fragmentary  evidence 
wherever  it  can  be  found  available.  The  reason  for  nothing  of 
value  having  been  written  on  the  Hartford  Convention  is  the 
fact  that  it  was  conducted  in  secret  and  that  no  one  has  ever 
been  able  to  collect  any  considerable  amount  of  information 
concerning  it.  Never,  certainly,  were  doors  shut  more  closely 
upon  a  delegate,  and  (professedly  a  popular)  convention,  than 
upon  this  one ;  not  even  the  doorkeepers  or  messengers  gaining 
access  to  its  discussions.^^  Inviolable  secrecy  was  enjoined 
upon  every  member  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  injunction 
was  ever  removed. 

Four  years  afterwards,  when  the  Hartford  Convention  and 
its  projectors  bent  under  the  full  blast  of  popular  displeasure, 
Cabot  delivered,  to  his  native  state,  the  sealed  journal  of  its 
proceedings  which  had  remained  in  his  exclusive  custody.^^ 
When  this  report  was  opened  it  was  found  to  be  a  meager 
sketch  of  formal  proceedings.^*  It  makes  no  record  of  yeas 
and  nays ;  states  none  of  the  amendments  offered  to  the  various 
reports ;  attaches  the  name  of  no  one  to  a  single  proposition ; 
in  short,  it  carefully  suppressed  any  and  all  the  evidence  which 
could  ever  be  brought  against  an  individual  delegate. 

For  a  convention  lasting  three  weeks  to  leave  only  a  journal 
of  a  few  pages  does  not  seem  reasonable.  That  twenty-six  men 
should  have  consented  to  leave  no  ampler  means  of  vindicating 
their  own  names  to  posterity  seems  equally  incredible.  That 
sphinx-like  mystery,  therefore,  which  has  always  hung  about 
the  Hartford  Convention  leaves  us  in  grave  doubt  as  to  what 
really  took  place  behind  the  doors.  The  writer  of  today  is 
little  better  equipped  than  the  writer  of  a  half  century  ago. 

"  Dwight's  "Hartford  Convention,"  p.  385,  Resolution  3,  which  says : 
"The  most  inviolable  secrecy  shall  be  observed  by  each  member  of  this 
convention,  including  the  Secretary,  as  to  all  propositions,  debates,  and 
proceedings  thereof,  until  this  injunction  shall  be  suspended  or  altered." 
See  also,  Winsor's  "Nar.  and  Crit.  Hist."  vol.  7,  p.  32i ;  Randall's  "Jef- 
ferson," vol.  3,  pp.  411-420. 

"Winsor's  "Nar.  and  Crit.  Hist,"  vol.  7,  p.  321;  Schouler,  vol.  3, 
p.  473. 

"  Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  405.    Journal  of  the  Convention. 

105 


Let  us  begin  our  discussion  with  the  assumption  that  what 
the  most  earnest  projectors  wished  for,  and  really  intended, 
that  the  Convention  should  accomplish,  was  left  but  half  done  ; 
that  the  most  ardent  members  of  the  Junto  believed  that  they 
had  promoted  a  convention  which  would  assemble  and  im- 
mediately declare  the  Union  severed  and  that  the  Northern 
Confederacy,  toward  which  they  had  struggled,  would  suddenly 
spring  into  existence. 

What  we  propose  to  do,  then,  is  to  show  that  some  of  the 
members  of  the  Junto  intended  and  actually  besought  many  of 
the  members  to  declare  in  favor  of  separation.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  delegates,  as  they  assembled,  seem  to  have  had  in 
mind  a  different  method  of  attack,  which  was  not  a  bold  declar- 
ation of  secession,  but  the  withholding  of  all  support  and  the 
proposing  of  such  amendments  to  the  Constitution  as  would 
make  the  National  Government  powerless.  They  would  force 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  by  withholding  all  support 
from  the  Administration  and  in  such  case  the  Federalists 
would  again  get  into  power.  We  must  depend  upon  the  Jour- 
nal of  the  convention  for  proof  of  this  last  proposition. 

The  idea  of  a  New  England  Convention  was  not,  by  any 
means,  a  novel  one  with  the  Junto.  The  plan  was  in  their  minds 
from  1804  until  it  actually  took  place.  The  first  mention  of 
such  a  convention  was,  as  we  have  seen,  in  1808-9.^"''  Otis'  ideas 
were  exactly  the  same  as  those  drafted  by  the  Massachusetts 
committee,  of  which  he  was  chairman.  The  second  proposal, 
if  we  may  believe  J.  Q.  Adams  and  Pickering,  was  in  1812, 
immediately  after  the  declaration  of  war  against  Great  Brit- 
ain'^ The  plan,  at  this  time,  was  defeated  principally  by  a 
speech  against  it  in  Faneuil  Hall,  by  Samuel  Dexter,  who  for- 
mally denounced  it  as  a  forerunner  to  the  dissolution  of  the 
Union. '^  It  remained,  therefore,  for  the  third  attempt  to  be 
successful  and  that  can  be  said  to  have  been  only  partially  so. 

The  stout-hearted  Pickering  still  in  Congress,  spent  much  of 
his  time  and  energy  writing  letters  to  urge  the  Convention  on 
to  bolder  deeds.  ''Union,"  he  says,  October  21,  1814,  "is  the 
taHsman  of  the   dominant  party;  and  many   FederaUsts,   en- 

"Quincy's  "Life  of  Quincy,"  p.  164,  Otis  to  Quincy ;  Adams'  "New 
England  Federalism,"  p.  404,  Pickering  to  J.  Lowell;  Ibid.,  Adams  to 
Otis,  p.  240. 

'"Adams'  "New   England  Federalism,"  pp.  404-240-262. 

"Plumer's   'Tlumer,"  p.  404. 

106 


chanted  by  the  magic  sound,  are  alarmed  at  every  appearance* 
of  opposition  to  the  measures  of  the  faction,  lest  it  should  en- 
danger the  Union.  I  have  never  entertained  such  fears.  On  the 
contrary,  in  adverting  to  the  ruinous  system  of  our  govern- 
ment for  many  years  past,  I  have  said,  let  the  ship  run  aground. 
The  shock  will  throw  the  present  pilots  overboard,  and  then 
competent  navigators  will  get  her  afloat  and  conduct  her  safely 
into  port."^^ 

Gouverneur  Morris  seems  to  have  been  in  some  doubt  as  to 
what  the  Convention  would  do,  for  we  find  him  writing  Picker- 
ing, November  i,  1814,  as  follows:  "Doubts  are,  I  find,  enter- 
tained whether  Massachusetts  is  in  earnest,  and  whether  she 
will  be  supported  by  the  New  England  family.  But  surely 
these  outrageous  measures  must  arouse  their  patriot  sentiment 
to  cast  off  this  horrible  load  of  oppression. "^^ 

As  we  have  seen  all  through  our  narrative,  half  heartedness 
on  the  part  of  some  of  New  England's  leaders,  and  a  lack  of  the 
entire  confidence  of  the  people,  had  served  to  hold  in  check  all 
but  the  most  radical  when  it  came  to  a  striking  point.  There 
was  never  any  want  of  discussion,  but,  when  it  came  to  point  of 
action,  Pickering  and  the  most  radical  of  his  Junto  were  disap- 
pointed. 'T  hope  in  God,"  he  wrote  John  Lowell,  November 
7,  "that  the  delegates  of  Massachusetts  (a  decided  majority,  at 
least)  may  now  prove  their  readiness  to  act  as  well  as  to  speak. 
I  consider  the  destiny  of  New  England,  and,  in  the  result,  the 
United  States  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  proposed  con- 
vention. While  any  symptoms  of  faint-heartedness  will  ruin 
all,  the  wise  sentiments  and  efficient  measures  the  Convention 
will  be  able  to  express  and  devise,  and  the  dignified  firmness 
with  which  they  shall  be  enforced,  forbidding  every  suspicion 
that  they  will  not  be  verified  in  act,  will  insure  the  wished  for 
success.  The  forlorn  and  destitute  condition  of  the  states  south 
of  the  Potomac,  will  render  your  victory  easy  and  complete."-^ 

These  two  men  were  perhaps  the  most  active  and  violent  in 
trying  to  prepare  the  minds  of  the  delegates  for  action.  Lowell 
was  one  of  the  most  active,  influential  and  radical,  writers  in 
New  England.  His  pen  was  going  all  the  time  and  scathing 
indeed  were  its  productions.-^    Lowell  was  certainly  in  touch 

^®  Lodge's  "Cabot,"  p.  535,  Pickering  to  G.  Morris. 
"  "New  England  Federalism,"  by  Adams,  p.  403. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  404. 
^  His  "Road  to  Ruin"  is  a  fair  example  of  this  subject. 

107 


with  the  views  of  the  delegates  of  the  Convention.  In  a  letter 
to  Pickering,  December  3,  1814,  he  said:  "I  am  convinced  that 
the  Convention  will  do  little ;  that  they  will  be  ridiculed  by  one 
party,  and  loudly  censured  by  the  other.  I  am  convinced  that 
it  will  not  go  far  enough ;  but  they  ought  not  to  have  accepted 
the  position  unless  they  felt,  each  for  himself,  that  he  was 
ready  for  great  and  decided  measures.  When  you  ask  any  of 
them  what  the  Convention  will  do  you  will  find  that  they  expect 
to  talk.  I  say  no  man  should  have  accepted  such  an  office,  if 
he  expected  it  to  end  in  argument  and  remonstrance."^-  In  the 
last  part  of  this  letter  Mr.  Lowell  gives  us  some  idea  of  the 
state  of  mind  in  which  he  found  many  of  the  delegates.  Cabot, 
the  President,  first  gets  his  attention  in  this  wise:  "Cabot  is 
undoubtedly  a  wise  man  but  he  has  no  confidence  in  the  possi- 
biHty  of  awakening  the  people.  He  will  not,  therefore,  be  in 
favor  of  any  measures  which  will  disturb  our  sleep.  So  at 
least  I  fear ;  for  I  cannot  find  out  from  him  what  his  opinions 
are. 

''Otis  is  naturally  timid,  and  frequently  wavering— today 
bold,  tomorrow  like  a  hare  trembling  at  every  breeze.  He  is 
sincere  in  wishing  thorough  measures;  but  a  thousand  fears 
restrain  him." 

"Bigelow  is  bold.  He  sneers  at  all  threats  of  vengeance  from 
the  other  states,  and  if  well  supported  I  have  no  doubt  that 
measures  of  dignity  and  relief  would  be  adopted." 

"Prescott  is  a  firm  man,  but  extremely  prudent,  and  so  mod- 
est that  he  will  yield  his  opinion  to  others." 

"Mr.  Dane  you  know.  He  is  a  man  of  great  firmness  ap- 
proaching obstinacy,  and,  of  course,  it  must  be  uncertain  what 
course  he  will  take." 

"Mr.  Wilde  is  a  very  able  man  but  I  fear  his  counsels  may 
be  influenced  by  circumstances." 

"These  are  the  men  who  will  have  the  greatest  influence  in 
our  delegation.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  we  have  not  chosen 
two  or  three  such  persons  as  Daniel  Sargent,  Wm.  Sullivan  and 
Colonel  Thorndike."^^ 

Ex-Governor  Plumer  being  asked,  while  the  Convention  was 
in  session,  what  in  his  opinion  would  be  the  outcome,  gave  the 

"^Adams'  'Tederalism,"  p.  410. 

=^  These  were  men  of  known  radical  tendencies  and  thoroughly  con- 
verted to  Juntoism. 

108 


following:  "You  ask  what  will  be  the  result  of  the  Hartford 
Convention.  I  expect  no  good,  but  much  evil  from  it.  It  will 
embarrass  us,  aid  the  enemy,  and  protect  the  war.  The  prime 
object  is  to  effect  a  revolution, — a  dismemberment  of  the  Union. 
Some  of  the  members  for  more  than  ten  years,  have  considered 
such  a  measure  necessary.  Of  this  I  have  conclusive  evidence. 
I  think,  however,  they  have  too  much  cunning,  mixed  with  fear, 
to  proceed  further,  at  their  first  meeting,  than  to  address  re- 
monstrances and  resolves  to  the  general  government.  But  the 
spirit  they  have  excited  in  the  minds  of  the  more  violent  party 
will  not,  I  fear,  be  satisfied  with  mere  words,  but  will,  should 
the  war  continue,  lead  to  more  violent  measures."-*^  This  is  an 
excellent  summary,  in  advance,  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Con- 
vention. It  is  by  a  man  who  had  every  opportunity  of  knowing 
what  he  was  talking  about,  having  so  recently  been  Governor 
of  New  Hampshire.  It  bears  us  out  in  our  assumption  that  the 
more  radical  said  ''separate"  while  the  timid  ones  said  ''hesi- 
tate,'' but  we  will  not  leave  it  with  this. 

Gouverneur  Morris  has  left  us  many  interesting  letters  upon 
tihs  subject,  all  of  which  compare  quite  favorably  with  the  most 
violent  ones  of  the  time.  He  says  on  December  22,  that  his 
eyes  are  fixed  on  the  Star  in  the  East^^  which  he  believes  to  be 
the  day-spring  of  freedom  and  glory.  "The  men  assembled 
will,  I  believe,  if  not  too  tame  and  timid,  be  hailed  hereafter  as 
the  patriots  and  sages  of  their  day  and  generation."-®  This  gen- 
tleman was  evidently  confident  that  the  Convention  would  not 
fail  to  do  that  which  was  expected  of  them.  Just  before  it 
adjourned  we  hear  him  saying:  "Yankees  like  to  make  what 
they  call  fair  bargains,  and  will,  I  guess,  easily  take  up  the 
notion  of  bargaining  with  the  National  Government,  which, 
according  to  my  notion,  can  make  no  bargain  of  practical  result 
which  will  not  amount  to  a  severance  of  the  Union. "^^ 

Nor  can  it  be  said  that  these  were  the  only  observers  that 
expected  and  looked  for  radical  measures  from  the  Convention. 
The  newspapers  were  just  as  active  and  their  articles  just  as 
vituperative  at  this  time  and  in  this  connection  as  ever  before. 
The  Boston  Gazette  has  the  following:  "To  the  cry  of  dis- 

^*  Plumer's  'Tlumer,"  p.  420.     Letter  to  Jeremiah  Mason. 
^  Hartford  Convention. 
^  Sparks  "G.  Morris,"  vol.  3,  p.  322. 
/"Ihid.,  p.  326. 

109 


union,  the  plain  and  obvious  answer  is  that  the  States  are 
already  separated ;  the  bond  of  union  was  broken  by  President 
Madison.  The  Convention  cannot  do  a  more  popular  act,  not 
only  in  New  England,  but  throughout  the  Atlantic  States,  than 
to  make  a  peace  for  the  Government  as  a  whole."  The  Balti- 
more  Federal  Republican  said,  November  17,  1814:  ''On  or  be- 
fore the  Fourth  of  July,  if  James  Madison  is  not  out  of  office, 
a  new  form  of  government  will  be  in  operation  in  the  Eastern 
section  of  the  Union.  Instantly  after,  the  contest  will  be  in 
many  states,  whether  to  join  the  new  government  or  adhere 
to  the  old.  .  .  .  Mr.  Madison  cannot  complete  his  term  if  the 
war  continues." 

These  letters-^  are  the  only  trustworthy  sources  to  show  that 
separation  was  expected  of  the  convention  by  the  promoters. 
How  many  more  of  the  same  strain  President  Cabot  may  have 
torn  up,  one  can  only  conjecture.^^  If  we  keep  in  mind  that  the 
Hartford  Convention  was  as  much  a  product  of  the  conspiracy 
of  1803-5,  as  it  was  of  the  War  of  1812,  it  will  be  much  easier 
to  satisfy  our  minds  as  to  the  real  intent  of  this  convention. 
By  looking  carefully  at  the  attitude  of  the  Essex  Junto,  toward 
all  National  Republican  legislation,  throughout  this  period  it 
is  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  Hartford  Convention  was  the 
culmination  of  Juntoism, — the  crowning  act  of  the  conspiracy. 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  journal  left  us 
by  Mr.  Cabot,  which  contains  the  greater  part  of  the  informa- 
tion that  we  have  of  what  occurred  behind  the  closed  doors  at 
Hartford.  And  by  an  analysis  of  this  journal  we  must  support 
our  second  thesis,  namely  that  the  less  radical  believed  that  the 
administration  could  be  starved  and  frightened  into  terms  with- 
out openly  declaring  for  separation.  It  was,  they  believed,  at 
any  rate,  worth  trying. 

The  views  of  the  most  radical  first  claimed  the  attention  of 
the  convention,  and  a  discussion  of  the-  two  positions  ensued.^'' 

''  Many  other  letters  of  the  same  nature  and  by  many  different  per- 
sons can  be  found  in  Adams'  "New  England  Federalism,"  pp.  398-421 ; 
Sparks  "Life  of  G.  Morris,"  vol.  3,  PP-  310-321 ;  and  Lodge's  "Life  of 
Cabot,"  pp.  529-550. 

=^  Lodge  says  in  his  "Life  of  Cabot"  that  he  (Cabot)  destroyed  his 
correspondence  in  his  last  days  . 

^A  complete  copy  of  the  journal  is  printed  in  Niles'  Register,  vol. 
7,  p.  305.  There  are  also  several  copies  of  it  in  a  single  bound  volume 
in  Harvard  library,  entitled,  "Hartford  Convention  of  1814."  We  will 
refer  to  the  copy  in  Niles'  Register. 

no 


"There  are  those,"  it  says,  "who  regard  the  evils  which  sur- 
round them  incurable  defects  of  the  Constitution.  They  yield 
to  a  persuasion,  that  no  change,  at  any  time,  or  on  any  occasion, 
can  aggravate  the  misery  of  their  country.  This  opinion  may 
ultimately  prove  to  be  correct.  But  as  the  evidence  on  which 
it  rests  is  not  yet  conclusive,  and  as  measures  adopted  upon  the 
assumption  of  its  certainty  might  be  irrevocable,  some  general 
considerations  are  submitted,  in  the  hope  of  reconciling  all  to 
a  course  of  moderation  and  firmness  which  may  save  them  from 
the  regret  incident  to  sudden  decisions,  probably  avert  the  evil, 
or  at  least,  insure  consolation  and  success  in  the  last  resort. "^^ 
This  is  an  excellent  statement  of  the  two  opinions  regarding 
the  situation  as  the  Convention  assembled;  the  more  conser- 
vative offering  an  apology  to  the  more  radical  for  not  quite 
agreeing  with  them,  and  at  the  same  time,  setting  forth  what 
they  regard  to  be  the  wisest  policy  and  duty  of  the  Convention, 
which  is  virtually  our  second  thesis. 

Following  the  statement  of  the  two  positions,  the  Conven- 
tion goes  into  a  discussion  of  the  disgraceful  administration. 
"The  fierce  passions  which  have  convulsed  the  Nations  of 
Europe,"  they  said,  "have  passed  the  ocean,  and  finding  their 
way  to  the  bosoms  of  our  citizens,  have  afforded  the  adminis- 
tration the  means  of  preverting  public  opinion,  in  respect  to 
our  foreign  relations,  so  as  to  acquire  its  aid  in  the  indulgence 
of  their  adherents.^-  They  must  be  made  to  feel  that  the 
Eastern  States  cannot  be  made  exclusive  victims  of  a  capricious 
and  impassioned  policy."  ^^  But,  finally,  they  agree:  "If  the 
Union  be  destined  to  dissolution,  by  reason  of  the  multiplied 
abuses  of  a  bad  administration,  it  should,  if  possible,  be  the 
work  of  peaceful  times.  Events  may  prove  that  the  causes  of 
our  calamities  are  deep  and  permanent.  They  may  be  found 
to  proceed,  not  merely  from  the  blindness  of  prejudice,  pride 
of  opinion,  violence  of  party  spirit,  but  they  may  be  traced 
to  combinations  of  individuals,  or  of  States,  to  monopolize 
power  and  ofiice,  and  to  trample  upon  the  rights  and  interests 
of  the  commercial  section  of  the  Union.  Then  separation  will 
be  preferable  to  an  alliance."  ^* 

"^Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  306. 

^  The  long  nursed  cry  of  French  aid  and  British  oppression. 

'^  Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  306. 

Ill 


The  journal  next  leads  us  into  a  detailed  presentation  and 
discussion  of  their  grievances  in  connection  with  the  war. 
We  cannot  take  up  the  discussion  upon  these  various  subjects 
but  must  content  ourselves  with  the  conclusion,  which  will  af- 
ford a  key  to  the  discussion. 

They  declared  the  war  measures  ^^  unconstitutional  and 
absolutely  void,  which  was  followed  by  a  bold  statement  of 
''State  Interposition."  We  have  already  noticed  the  force  of 
this  declaration  in  connection  with  Louisiana's  application  for 
statehood,  but  we  will  quote  it  again  as  it  belongs  in  this 
connection,  and  is  the  strongest  declaration  of  "State  Sov- 
ereignty'' yet  made.  'Tn  case,"  it  says,  "of  deliberate,  danger- 
ous and  palpable  infractions  of  the  Constitution,  affecting  the 
sovereignty  of  a  state,  and  liberties  of  a  people;  it  is  not  only 
the  right  but  the  duty  of  such  state,  to  interpose  its  authority 
for  their  protection,  in  a  manner  best  calculated  to  secure  that 
end.  When  emergencies  occur,  which  are  either  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  judicial  tribunals,  or  too  pressing  to  admit  of 
the  delay  incident  to  their  forms,  states,  which  have  no  com- 
mon empire  must  be  their  own  judges,  and  execute  their  own 
decisions.  It  will  thus  be  proper  for  the  several  states  to 
await  the  ultimate  disposal  of  the  obnoxious  measures  recom- 
mended by  the  administration  and  use  their  power  according 
to  the  character  these  measures  shall  finally  assume,  to  protect 
their  sovereignty."  ^"'^  The  whole  journal  is  nothing  but  a 
states  rights  document,  but  these  few  lines  must  serve  as  an 
example  of  the  ideas  of  the  convention  upon  that  doctrine. 

The  next  step  in  their  discussion  is  perhaps  the  most  im- 
portant of  all  to  our  narrative,  for  it  furnishes  indisputable 
evidence  to  almost  all  of  the  positions  we  have  taken  in  re- 
gard to  what  New  England  called  ruinous  legislation,  and  to 
the  foundations  upon  which  the  Junto  has  labored.  The  con- 
vention furnishes  us  this  valuable  evidence  by  comparing  the 
administration  of  Washington  to  that  of  Jefferson  and  of 
Madison.3^  The  former  administration  had  been  nothing  but 
prosperity  at  home  and  respect  abroad,  while  the  succeeding 
administrations  by  a  change  of  policy  simply  tore  down  the 
wise  framework  of  the  Washington  Administration. 

^Direct  taxation;  conscription;  National  control  of  state  militia;  re- 
fusal to  pay  State  militia ;  offensive  warfare,  etc. 
^  Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  P-  3o8. 
^^  Ibid.,  p.  310- 

112 


The  reasons  for  the  absolute  failure  of  the  latter  two  ad- 
ministrations, as  enumerated  in  the  journal  of  the  Hartford 
Convention,  are  as  follows:  "i.  A  deliberate  and  extensive 
system  for  effecting  a  combination  among  certain  states  so  as 
to  secure  to  popular  leaders  in  one  section  of  the  Union  the 
control  of  public  affairs  in  perpetual  succession. 

2.  The  exclusion  from  office  men  of  unexceptional  merit, 
for  want  of  adherence  to  the  executive  creed. 

3.  The  infraction  of  the  judiciary  authority  and  rights,  by 
depriving  judges  of  their  offices  in  violation  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 

4.  The  influence  of  patronage  in  the  distribution  of  offices, 
which  in  these  states  has  been  among  men  the  least  entitled 
to  such  distinction. 

5.  The  admission  of  new  states  into  the  Union,  formed  at 
pleasure,  in  the  Western  region,  has  destroyed  that  balance  of 
power  which  originally  existed  between  the  states,  and  deeply 
effected  their  interests. 

6.  The  easy  admission  of  naturalized  foreigners  to  places 
of  trust  in  the  government. 

7.  Hostility  to  Great  Britain  and  partiality  to  the  late  gov- 
ernment of  France. 

8.  A  superficial  theory  in  regard  to  commerce,  accompanied 
by  a  real  hatred  to  its  interests,  and  a  ruinous  perseverance 
in  efforts  to  render  it  an  instrument  of  coercion  and  war."^^ 

Now  perhaps  we  can  safely  say  that  the  Hartford  Conven- 
tion was  simply  the  crowning  act  of  the  Essex  Junto  whose 
intrigues  began  with  the  Adams  Administration.  The  Con- 
vention was  not  a  mere  product  of  the  war  of  1812,  because 
we  recognize  in  these  grievances  the  very  earliest,  as  well  as 
the  latest,  grounds  for  Junto  conspiracies.  Pick  them  to  pieces 
and  what  do  we  find  ?  The  Virginia  rule,  removal  of  dissenting^ 
spirits,  fate  of  the  midnight  judges,  New  England  Federalists 
not  getting  their  share  of  appointments,  territorial  expansion 
and  a  destruction  of  the  balance  of  power,  Alien  Law  not  rigid 
enough,  hostility  to  Great  Britain,  and  a  deliberate  destruction 
of  commerce.  In  all  of  these  we  have  heard  the  complaining 
and  threatening  voices  of  the  "Essex  Junto,"  and  it  seems 
almost  superfluous  to  add  that  the  Hartford  Convention  was 
truly  an  offspring  of  Juntoism. 

°*Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  310. 

113 


Out  of  the  above  quoted  grievances  they  proceed  to  develop 
the  seven  famous  amendments,  v^hich  were  carefully  prepared 
but  destined  never  to  be  removed  from  the  journal.  We  will 
not  quote  these  amendments  because  they  simply  cover  the 
points  we  have  just  considered  and  can  be  easily  found  in  the 
above  reference  to  the  journal  of  the  Convention.  Some  of 
them,  however,  are  very  interesting  because  they  are  so  sweep- 
ing. The  sixth  says,  for  example:  "No  person  who  shall 
hereafter  be  naturalized  shall  hold  any  office  under  the  auth- 
ority of  the  United  States."  They  despair,  of  course,  of  ever 
importing  another  such  mind  as  Hamilton's  or  Gallatin's.  The 
seventh  declares :  ''No  person  shall  be  elected  to  the  presidency 
of  the  United  States  a  second  time ;  nor  shall  the  President  be 
elected  from  the  same  state  two  terms  in  succession." 

With  this  much  accomplished,  there  seemed  nothing  more 
to  be  added,  except  a  few  well  chosen  recommendations  to 
their  respective  states.  They  are  in  part:  "We,  your  delegates 
assembled,  do  hereby  recommend  that  you  adopt  all  such  meas- 
ures as  may  be  thought  necessary  to  protect  the  citizens  of  said 
states  from  the  operation  and  effects  of  all  acts  which  have 
been  or  may  be  passed  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States; 
that  a  certain  proportion  of  the  taxes  be  collected  and  placed 
in  the  State  Treasuries  to  be  used  for  the  support  of  the 
militia  which  shall  be  under  the  command  of  the  Governor; 
that  said  troops  be  armed,  equipped,  disciplined,  and  held  in 
readiness  for  service  and  upon  orders  from  the  Governor  shall 
form  a  conjunction  with  the  militia  of  any  of  the  other  states 
to  repeal  any  invasion."  ^^ 

But  it  was  further  resolved:  "That  if  these  resolutions  to  the 
National  Government  "^^  should  be  unsuccessful,  and  peace 
should  not  be  concluded  and  the  defense  of  these  be  further 
neglected,  it  will,  in  the  opinion  of  this  Convention,  be  ex- 
pedient for  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states  to  appoint 
delegates  to  another  convention,  to  meet  at  Boston  in  the  State 
of  Massachusetts,  on  the  third  Thursday  of  June  next,  with 
such  powers  and  instructions  as  the  exigency  of  a  crisis  so 
momentous  may  require." 

Resolved  further,  "That  the  Hon.  George  Cabot,  the  Hon. 

^'Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  312. 

*'*The    entire   report    was    to    be    presented    to    the    authorities    at 
Washington. 

114 


Chauncey  Goodrich  and  the  Hon.  Daniel  Lyman,  or  any  two  of 
them,  be  authorized  to  call  another  convention  at  any  time  be- 
fore new  delegates  shall  be  chosen,  if  in  their  judgment  the 
situation  of  the  country  demands  it."  ^^ 

With  these  expressions  of  their  feelings  and  desires  the 
Hartford  Convention  merely  adjourned  to  meet  again  if  the 
National  Government  failed  favorably  to  meet  their  advances. 
It  was  not  dissolved  as  a  mass  meeting  with  a  full  report,  but 
an  adjournment  to  a  later  day  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
what  action  the  Government  would  take  concerning  their  re- 
port. Do  they  not  leave  this  impression?  If  our  present 
report  is  not  effective  in  reHeving  the  situation,  we  will  meet 
*'on  the  third  Thursday  of  June  next"  and  follow  the  wishes 
of  the  more  radical  by  voting  secession.  What  would  have 
been  done,  however,  can  only  be  a  matter  of  conjecture.  We 
regret  that  the  evidence  available  does  not  give  some  idea  of 
the  debate  which  took  place  in  the  Convention.  There  must 
have  been  dissenting  voices ;  there  must  have  been  resolutions 
and  amendments ;  some  must  have  been  more  radical  than 
others;  there  must  have  been  heated  speeches;  but  upon  these 
points  we  must  remain  ignorant.  Mr.  Cabot  stated  over  his 
signature,  November  i6,  1819,  that  this  was  the  original  and 
only  journal  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Hartford  Convention, 
and  we  should  dislike  to  be  accused  of  even  attempting  to 
impeach  the  testimony  of  the  President  of  the  Hartford  Con- 
vention. *- 

The  apparent  timidity  of  the  Convention  provoked  some 
very  ironic  statements  from  the  Junto  members  who  remained 
at  home.  This  for  example:  Gouverneur  Morris  wrote  Moss 
Kent,  January  10  'The  meekness  of  their  doings  reminds  me 
of  one  of  La  Fontain's  fables.  A  council  of  rats  being  con- 
voked, to  devise  measures  of  defense  against  feline  de- 
predations, a  sleek  young  member  was  much  applauded  for 
proposing  to  tie  a  bell  around  puss's  neck,  which  giving  sea- 
sonable notice  of  her  approach,  would  enable  every  one  to  take 
care  of  himself.  Before  the  question  was  put,  an  old  rat 
(addressing  the  chair)  said,  T  too,  Sir,  entirely  approve  of  our 
young  friend's  proposal,  but  wish,  before  I  vote,  to  know  who 
will  tie  on  the  bell."  *^ 

*^Niles'  Register,  vol.  7,  p.  3^3- 
*^Dwight's  "Hartford  Convention,"  p.  399. 
*^  Sparks  "G.  Morris"  vol.  3,  p.  326. 

115 


The  legislatures  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut**  ac- 
cepted the  report  of  their  delegates  in  January,  1815,  and 
appointed  a  commission  to  proceed  to  Washington  to  make 
proposed  demands  upon  the  National  Government.  The  mem- 
bers of  this  body  from  Massachusetts  were  H,  G.  Otis,  Wm. 
Sullivan  and  Thomas  Perkins ;  those  from  Connecticut,  Calvin 
Goddard  and  Nathaniel  Terry.*^ 

While  the  Hartford  Convention  was  in  session  deliberating 
how  to  create  more  discontent  and  strife,  there  was  also  a 
meeting  at  Ghent  whose  members  were  exerting  every  effort 
to  effect  a  peace.  What  a  different  atmosphere  must  have  en- 
veloped the  two  Conventions!  On  December  24,  1814  the 
peace  of  Ghent  was  completed.  This  being  the  day  before 
Christmas  the  natives  of  Ghent  entertained  their  distinguished 
guests  at  a  public  dinner  where  the  band  played  "God  save 
the  King"  and  "Hail  Columbia."  Some  days  later  the  Hart- 
ford Convention  adjourned,  amid  shouts  and  hisses  from  all 
loyal  citizens.  Stigmatized  for  unpatriotic  motives  and  con- 
duct, the  twenty-six  members  of  the  Convention  remained 
condemned  to  political  infamy. 

The  tidings  from  Ghent  reached  Washington  before  those 
from  Hartford  and  the  news  of  the  peace  of  Ghent  and  the 
victory  of  New  Orleans  successively  sped  over  the  land.  Here 
was  a  sudden  turn  of  affairs!  The  "Northern  Confederacy" 
bubble  burst  and  the  "Essex  Junto"  and  its  cohorts  dwindled 
into  a  handful  of  malcontents,  who  could  be  easily  put  down 
by  the  people  of  their  own  states.  Derision  succeeded  indig- 
nation in  the  public  mind.  Henry  Wheaton  advertised  a  re- 
ward in  his  paper  (The  New  York  National  Advocate)  for 
the  discovery  of  some  unfortunate  gentlemen  who  had  started 
for  Washington  in  the  service  of  the  Hartford  Convention, 
but  who  had  missed  their  way,  and  it  was  feared  had  drowned 
themselves. 

The  committee  from  Hartford  neither  displayed  their  cred- 
entials to  the  President  nor  delivered  their  ultimatum  to  the 
Government,  but  took  an  early  opportunity  to  quietly  return 
home.  The  Hartford  Convention  remains  famous  in  American 
History  only  as  a  powerful  solvent  in  National  politics. 

The  War  of  1812  marks  the  end  of  the  "Essex  Junto"  and 

**  Niks'  Register,  vol.  7,  PP-  Z7^-2>7Z- 
^  Randall's  "Jefferson,"  vol.  3.  P-  4i5- 

116 


also  the  Federalist  party.  The  party  could  not  survive  the 
factious  opposition  to  the  war.  It  could  not  stand  the  op- 
probrium of  the  Hartford  Convention.  Many  of  the  Fed- 
eralist leaders  had  given  their  support  to  that  most  unpopular 
gathering,  while  many  others,  as  we  have  seen,  felt  that  the 
Hartford  assembly  should  have  adopted  even  more  effectual 
measures  of  opposition.  The  party  could  not  remove  the 
public  conviction  that  its  little  conclave  of  leaders  had  been 
secretly  plotting  treason  and  disunion-  Only  thirty-four  Fed- 
eralist electors  voted  for  Rufus  King  for  President  in  1816. 
It  held  only  Massachusetts,  Connecticut  and  Delaware,  with 
three  Maryland  electors  who  would  not  vote.  The  scattered 
Federalists  in  Congress  did  not  act  as  a  party,  having  no  issue 
even  as  a  pretense,  and,  as  a  National  party,  it  ceased  to  exist. 
State-wise,  it  controlled  Connecticut  till  after  1820,  and  Mass- 
achusetts till  1823,  when  the  Republicans  swept  even  Essex 
County  from  the  ''Junto."  It  lingered  also  in  Maryland, 
Delaware,  and  North  Carolina  for  some  time.  These  were 
the  last  surviving  remnants  of  the  party  of  Washington  and 
Hamilton,  ?nd  the  votes  were  the  party's  last  expiring  act. 

The  country  now  enters  into  the  ''Administration  of  Peace" 
having  realized,  with  the  exception  af  a  few  dissenting  voices, 
that,  "We  are  all  Federalists,  we  are  all  Republicans." 


117 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

A.  The  Primary  Sources  consist  of  letters  (public  and 
private),  documents  written  by  the  Junto  members  themselves 
or  by  others  who  had  fallen  under  their  influence.  In  this 
class  we  must  include  a  great  many  books  valuable  only  for  a 
few  printed  letters. 

1.  The  "Pickering  Manuscripts,"  consisting  of  about  twenty- 
three  volumes  and  including  Pickering's  whole  correspondence 
during  this  period.  These  papers  are  in  the  Boston  Historical 
Society,  Boston,  Mass.,  and  are  indexed  and  ready  for  publica- 
tion. They  have  been  searched  by  a  number  of  writers  wishing 
to  defend  their  friends  and  for  this  reason  almost  all  of  the 
letters  of  importance  to  our  monograph  have  been  published  in 
one  place  or  another. 

2.  Henry  Adams,  "Documents  relating  to  New  England 
Federalism,"  in  a  single  volume  1800-1815.  This  work  was 
prepared  largely  in  defense  of  the  position  taken  by  J.  Q. 
Adams  in  connection  with  the  Junto.  It  contains  a  very  large 
number  of  letters  together  with  the  entire  controversy  between 
J.  Q.  Adams  and  the  New  England  Federalists  of  1828. 

3.  H.  C.  Lodge's  "Life  and  Letters  of  Geo.  Cabot,"  contains 
a  large  number  of  valuable  letters  covering  the  same  period 
and  printed  to  vindicate  Cabot  in  his  connection  with  the 
Junto.  These  two  volumes  contain  almost  all  of  the  im- 
portant letters  in  the  Pickering  Papers  from  1803  to  1809. 

4.  Theophilus  Parsons,  "Memoirs  of  Chief  Justice  Par- 
sons," has  the  earliest  and  most  valuable  account  of  the  Essex 
Junto."  It  is  valuable  only  in  .  our  introduction  as  giving 
documents  showing  the  origin  of  the  name.  It  has  an  ex- 
cellent appendix  in  which  is  printed  the  "Essex  Result"  which 
has  been  referred  to  as  being  the  basis  for  the  term  "Essex 
Junto." 

5.  "The  Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton,"  by  John  C.  Ham- 
ilton, vols.  6  and  7,  furnish  much  of  the  correspondence  be- 
tween Hamilton  and  the  Junto  members  in  John  Adams' 
Cabinet,  and  in  vol.  7,  is  printed  Hamilton's  "Public  Denun- 
ciation of  John  Adams." 

As  important  in  this  connection,  see  the  "Works  of  John 
Adams,"  by  Chas.  F.  Adams,  vol.  9,  and  the  "Memoirs  of  the 
Administrations  of  Washington  and  John  Adams,"  by  Geo. 
Gibbs,  vol.   2.     These  two  volumes  throw   considerable  light 

118 


upon  the  controversy  between  Adams  and  the  Junto  regarding 
the  X.  Y.  Z.  affair. 

^  6.  "History  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States,"  by  John 
C.  Hamilton,  vols.  5  and  7.  Volume  7  is  a  very  important 
source  especially  in  connection  with  the  Burr  conspiracy  of 
1800-1801.  Many  of  the  letters  addressed  to  Alexander 
Hamilton  are  printed  in  this  volume.  Volume  5  is  important 
only  in  regard  to  the  Jay  appointment  to  the  court  of  Great 
Britain  by  Washington. 

^  7-  *'The  Life  of  Wm.  Plumer,"  by  his  son,  in  a  single 
volume,  has  a  number  of  letters  and  quotations  from  Plumer's 
diary  of  great  value  to  this  work. 

8.  "Life  of  Thomas  Jefferson,"  by  Henry  S.  Randall,  vols. 
2  and  3.  Volume  3  is  of  the  most  importance  having  an  appen- 
dix of  very  great  value.  In  this  appendix  there  are  copious 
quotations  from  Plumer's  diary  besides  other  documents. 
Both  of  these  volumes  have  valuable  footnotes. 

9.  "The  Life  and  Writings  of  Gouverneur  Morris,"  by 
Jared  Sparks,  vol.  3;  "The  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus 
King,"  by  C.  R.  King,  vol.  5,  1807-1816;  "The  Life  of  Josiah 
Quincy,"  by  Edmund  Quincy,  in  a  single  volume;  "The  Life 
of  Albert  Gallatin,"  by  Henry  Adams,  in  a  single  volume;  and 
"The  Life  and  Works  of  Fisher  Ames,"  vol.  i,  by  Seth  Ames, 
all  have  a  few  documents  of  value.  "The  Lives  of  King  and 
Morris  are  of  most  importance. 

10.  "The  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,"  vol.  3,"  we 
have  all  the  documents  concerning  the  Henry  Mission,  and 
much  of  the  correspondence  between  England  and  America 
prior  to  the  War  of  1812. 

11.  "Niles'  Register,"  vols.  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  and  35,  is  our 
most  valuable  source  in  furnishing  State  documents.  It  has 
supplied  much  of  the  information  regarding  the  action  and 
attiude  of  New  England  during  the  War  of  181 2,  and  the 
Hartford  Convention.  Volume  2,  contains  the  documents 
connected  with  the  Henry  Mission  agreeing  with  those  in  the 
Am.  State  Papers,  vol.  3.  Volume  7,  is  of  votal  importance 
and  contains  a  copy  of  the  journal  of  the  Hartford  Con- 
vention, 

12.  "Annals  of  Congress,"  Nos.  13,  22,  23,  and  24,  cover- 
ing the  years  1803- 1804,  and  1810-1812  furnish  testimony  as 
to  the  position  taken  by  members  of  the  Junto  on  such  ques- 
tions as,  "The  Louisiana  Purchase,"  the  admission  of  Louis- 
iana to  Statehood,  and  No,  23,  part  one,  12th,  Cong,  has  the 
House  investigation  and  report  on  the  Henry  Papers.  Vol- 
ume I,  No.  25,  not  included  above,  contains  the  House  debate 
on  the  "Blue  Lights"  affair- 

To  the  above  sources  we  would  add  the  following,  all  of 
which  are  in  the  Harvard  Library,  Cambridge,   Mass.,  "The 

iig 


Crisis,  or  Origin  of  our  Political  Dissensions,"  a  single  pam- 
phlet, by  a  Vermont  Citizen. 

''Pickering's  Public  Letter  to  Governor  Sullivan  and  Re- 
marks," in  a  single  pamphlet,   1808. 

"Memoirs  of  Aaron  Burr,"  by  M.  L.  Davis,  2  vols.,  con- 
taining some  important  letters. 

"A  View  of  the  Political  Conduct  of  Aaron  Burr,  Esq.,  Vice 
President,"  by  John  Wood.  Perhaps  as  good  a  view  of 
Burr's  conduct  as  can  be  found. 

The  Examiner,  containing  political  essays  and  official  doc- 
uments. Edited  by  Barent  Gardiner.  It  includes  the  fifteen 
articles  entitled,  "Road  to  Ruin,"  by  John  Lowell. 

"Hartford  Convention,"  a  single  bound  volume  containing 
several  copies  of  the  journal  of  the  Convention. 

"Political  Tracts  on  the  War  of  1812,"  several  volumes,  in- 
cluding many  speeches  and  addresses  characteristic  of  the 
time  and  of  the  Junto. 

"Political  Tracts  of  1812-1815." 

"Political  Pamphlets,  1800-1812."  These  political  pam- 
phlets and  tracts  are  valuable  as  giving  local  coloring  and 
views  of  the  extremists- 

"Political  Tracts  1805-1812."  In  this  volume  one  can  find 
the  decision  of  the  several  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Massachusetts  upon  the  questions  submitted  by  Governor 
Strong  regarding  the  management  of  State  Militia. 

"Diary  of  Dr.  Nathaniel  Ames,"  vol.  8-12,  in  the  Mass. 
Hist.  Society,  Boston,  Mass.  Dr.  Ames  was  a  RepubHcan 
in  sympathy  and  a  brother  of  Fisher  Ames  a  Junto  member. 
He  makes  most  biting  remarks  upon  Juntoism. 

B.  The  Secondary  Sources  are  of  little  importance  to  this 
subject.  All  that  are  of  any  value  will  be  given  in  the  fol- 
lowing order: 

1.  Newspapers. 

2.  General  Histories  of  the  United  States. 

3.  Histories  on  Special  Topics- 

4.  Miscellaneous. 

I.    NEWSPAPERS 

The  papers  which  will  be  mentioned  cover  pretty  fairly  the 
period  from  1800  to  1814.  The  files  are  not  complete  m  the 
case  of  some  of  them,  nor  do  they  all  run  through  the  entire 
period,  but  those  given  below  are  sufficient  to  give  us  the  local 
attitude.  Files  of  all  the  following  papers  can  be  found  m  the 
Harvard  Library  and  in  The  Mass.  Hist.  Society. 

T.    Boston  Gazette,  1800-1814. 
2.    The  Boston  Centinel,  1 800-1 814. 

120 


3-  The  Democrat,  Boston,  1808. 

4.  The  Statesman,  Boston,  i8o8- 

5.  The  Connecticut  Courant,  Hartford,   1800-1801. 

6.  The  New  York  Gazette,  New  York,  1 800-1 801. 

7.  The  Columbian  Detector,  Boston,  1808. 

8.  The  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  1814. 

9.  The  Essex  Register,  Salem,  Mass.  1808. 

10.  The  Pittsfield  Sun,  Pittsfield,  Mass. 

11.  The  Eastern  Argus,  Portland,  Mass.  1804. 

12.  The  Republican  Spy,  Springfield,  Mass. 

13.  The  American  Mercury,  New  York,  1803. 

14.  The  Morning  Chronicle,  New  York,  1804. 

1  have  given  the  year  of  the  particular  paper  as  quoted 
from.  It  is  not  necessary  to  criticise  them  individually  be- 
cause they  are  all  very  much  alike  and  simply  voice  the 
sentiments  of  the  Junto,  in  regard  to  our  subject. 

2.       HISTORIES   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES 

1.  Schoulers  "History  of  the  United  States,"  vols.  2  and  3, 
is  the  most  valuable  general  history  touching  the  Essex  Junto." 
The  references  and  statements  in  this  history  are  accurate  and 
helpful. 

2.  Von  Hoist's  ''Constitutional  History  of  the  United 
States,"  vol.  i,  has  some  valuable  notes  and  references,  other- 
wise it  is  practically  of  no  importance  to  our  narrative. 

3.  Hildreth's  "History  of  the  United  States,"  vol.  3;  Mc- 
Master's,  "History  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,"  vol.  i ; 
and  Henry  Adams,  "History  of  the  United  States,"  vol.  5  and 
6,  treat  very  sparely  the  Junto  movement  and  are  of  little 
practical  value.  Pitkin,  Bartlett,  Spencer,  Bryant  and  Gay, 
Hart's  American  Nation  Series,  etc.,  merely  mention  the  Es- 
sex Junto." 

3.       HISTORIES   ON   SPECIAL   SUBJECTS 

1.  B.  J.  Lossing's  "Pictorial  Field-Book  of  the  War  of 
1812,"  in  a  single  volume,  is  quite  a  valuable  source  for  its 
treatment  of  the  war  finances  and  the  Federalist  attempts  to 
crush  the  banks  supporting  the  war. 

2.  Samuel  Perkins,  "History  of  the  Political  and  Military 
Events  of  the  Late  War,"  in  a  single  volume,  gives  an  excel- 
lent review  of  our  grievances  with  Great  Britain  at  the  open- 
ing of  hostilities,  and  the  attitude  with  which  the  Federal 
Peace  men  met  the  declaration  of  war. 

3.  J.  G.  Palfrey's  "History  of  New  England,"  vol.  2,  has 
only  a  few  suggestions  for  us  at  the  beginning  of  our  work. 
I  have  been  unable  to  find  any  history  of  New  England,  or 
of  any  one  of  the  New  England  States,  of  any  value  in  treat- 
mg  this  subject. 

4.  J.   D.  Hammond's  "History  of  PoHtical  Parties  in  the 


State  of  New  York,"  vol.  i,  is  only  valuable  as  giving  results 
of   local   elections,   etc. 

5.  E.  P.  Powell's  ''Nullification  and  Secession  in  the  United 
States,"  in  a  single  volume,  has  a  chapter  on  the  ''Northern 
Confederacy  Plot  1803-1804."  It  is  of  little  value  in  either 
treating  or  studying  this  particular  phase  because  he  does  not 
refer  to  a  single  source.  His  chapter  is  fairly  accurate,  how- 
ever, if  one  cares  only  for  its  face  value.  It  has  not  been 
used  in  this  work  to  any  speakable  extent,  only  one  or  two 
references. 

6.  Theodore  Dwight's  "History  of  the  Hartford  Conven- 
tion; with  a  Review  of  the  Policy  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment which  led  to  the  War  of  1812,"  in  a  single  volume, 
has  rather  successfully  defeated  its  purpose;  that  is  to  say 
a  defense  of  the  members  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  based 
entirely  upon  Junto  grievances  will  scarcely  satisfy  us  that 
their  conduct  was  honorable.  The  journal  is  the  only  help 
it  contains- 

4.       MISCELLANEOUS 

1.  The  American  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  i,  October  1895  to  July 
1896,  has  an  article  entitled :  'The  First  National  Nominating 
Convention."  It  treats  the  secret  convention  of  1812,  as 
the  first  convention  of  the  Federalists,  and  is  the  only  available 
treatment  of  the  subject.  It  is  critical  and  has  a  number  of 
valuable  references.     By  J.  S.  Murdock. 

2.  The  American  Hist.  Rev.,  of  July  19 12,  has  a  similar 
article  by  S.  E.  Morrison,  entitled:  "The  first  National 
Nominating  Convention,  1808."  This  man  has  a  better  claim 
to  his  position  and  proves  that  Mr.  J.  S.  Murdock  was  exactly 
four  years  out  of  date.  This  article  is  of  much  greater  value 
than  the  one  above  for  the  same  reasons. 

3.  "Perpetual  War,  The  Policy  of  Mr.  Madison,"  by  a  New 
England  farmer.  This  pamphlet  being  an  examination  of 
his  late  message  to  Congress  as  far  as  respects  the  following 
topics:  Conscript  militia,  pretended  negotiations  for  peace, 
etc." 

4.  "The  Olive  Branch,  or  Faults  on  Both  Sides,"  by  M. 
Carey.  This  little  volume,  although,  very  radical,  is  of  great 
value  to  our  chapter  on  the  war  of  18 12.  It  quotes  correctly 
from  many  sources  and  is  of  the  greatest  importance  on  the 
financial  side  of  the  War. 

5.  "Mass.  Hist.  Collections,"  seventh  series,  vol.  i,  Jeffer- 
son papers. 

6.  "American  Politics,"  by  A.  Johnston,  single  volume. 

7.  "Political  Parties  and  Party  Problems  in  the  United 
States,"  by  J.  A.  Woodburn,  single  volume. 

8.  "Political  Men  of  the  Revolution,"  in  a  single  volume, 
by  Wm.  Sullivan. 

122 


g.  ''Familiar  Letters  on  Public  Characters  and  Public 
Events  from  the  Peace  of  1783  to  the  Peace  of  181 5,"  in  a 
single  volume,  by  Wm.  Sullivan. 

10.  "Ann.  Report  of  the  Am.  Hist.  Asso.,  1897." 

11.  "Ann.  Rept.  of  the  Am.  Hist.  Asso.,  1899,"  vol.  2. 


123 


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